132. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director for National Estimates
(Bull) to Director of Central
Intelligence Dulles1
Washington, April 22, 1954.
SUBJECT
- Review of NIE–84: “Probable Developments in Guatemala”
The Board of National Estimates has reviewed the conclusions of NIE-84,
“Probable Developments in Guatemala”, which was adopted by the IAC on 12 May
1953.2 In the course of this review the Board consulted with
Ambassador Peurifoy, DD/P/WH (Col.
King), OIR (Mr.
Burgin), and G–2 (Col.
Hennig), but the present memorandum has not been
formally coordinated. Discussion of critical aspects of the problem is
contained in the Enclosure.
Conclusions
- 1.
- We consider that the conclusions of NIE–84 remain essentially valid.
In particular, we reaffirm the first conclusion, as follows:
The current political situation in Guatemala is adverse to US
interests. The Guatemalan Communists exercise a political
influence far out of proportion to their small numerical
strength. Their influence will probably continue to grow as long
as President Arbenz
remains in power.
- 2.
- The Communists now effectively control the political life of
Guatemala. Arbenz’ decisions on
domestic and foreign policy are reached, not in the official cabinet,
but in a kitchen cabinet composed of Communists and pro-Communists.
There is no prospect of a break between Arbenz and the Communists.
- 3.
- There has probably been an increase in popular disillusionment with
the Arbenz regime. There is
certainly increased desperation among opposition elements.3 In present circumstances, however, the
possibility of effective internal political action to alter the
situation does not exist. We believe that effective revolutionary action
would require the active support of a major portion of the Army.
- 4.
- The disposition of the Army toward the regime is therefore crucial. We
note indications of unrest, even of disaffection, within the Army and
consider that a revolutionary potential now exists there. We do not
believe, however, that the Guatemalan Army is likely to take spontaneous
action against the Arbenz
regime.
- 5.
- The Communists will be concerned to neutralize the revolution
potential in the Army, and, with the passage of time, may succeed in
doing so.
- 6.
- The solidarity of the other Central American states in opposition to
Guatemala has weakened during the past year and may further
decrease.
- 7.
- In view of the foregoing considerations, we believe that time is on
the side of the Communists in Guatemala.
Enclosure
The Growth of Communist Political
Influence
- 1.
- The first conclusion of NIE–84 reads as follows:
The current political situation in Guatemala is adverse to US
interests. The Guatemalan Communists exercise a political
influence far out of proportion to their small numerical
strength. Their influence will
[Page 248]
probably continue to grow as long as
President Arbenz
remains in power.
- 2.
- This conclusion remains valid. Under the patronage of Arbenz, Communist influence in
Guatemala has grown during the past year and will probably continue
to grow. This growth is not the result of any innovation, but of a
year’s further development along the lines previously established.
For example:
- a.
- There has been further development in the organization of
rural workers as a political force under Communist influence
and control (as was anticipated in the sixth conclusion of
NIE–84). The Communists have demonstrated a capability for
the rapid mobilization and assembly of considerable numbers
of these workers for political demonstrations.
- b.
- The Communists are probably also capable of mobilizing up
to 20,000 of these workers as an armed militia available to
support the regime in an emergency. We cannot confirm
reports of the existence of such a para-military force, but
would consider it a logical development in the
circumstances. There is good reason to believe that the
required quantities of small arms have been distributed and
cached under the control of the Communist agrarian
organizers. It is not apparent that this putative militia
has received any appreciable military training. Even without
such training, however, a substantial number of rural
workers, armed and organized, could exert considerable
political and military force.
- c.
- The Communists have strengthened their control of the
pro-Arbenz
political parties. The Communist Party itself is small, but
crypto-Communists control the other parties in the
pro-Arbenz
coalition and through them effectively control the political
life of the country.
- d.
- There is good reason to believe that Arbenz’ decisions on
Guatemalan domestic and foreign policy are reached, not in
the official cabinet, but in a kitchen cabinet composed of
four Communists and six pro-Communists.
Arbenz’ Commitment to the Communists
- 3.
- The third conclusion of NIE–84 reads as follows:
President Arbenz still
exercises personal control of the Administration and of the
Army and the Police. It is still possible for him to break
his ties with the Communists and to moderate the policies of
his Administration, but it is highly unlikely that he will
do so.
- 4.
- This conclusion remains valid, but the likelihood of a break
between Arbenz and the
Communists is even more remote than it was a year ago. He is too
deeply committed, emotionally and politically, to extricate
himself.
[Page 249]
The Absence of Effective Political
Opposition
- 5.
The key sentences of the seventh conclusion of NIE–84 read as
follows:
There is no likelihood that [internal]5
opposition could alter the course of the Government by
political action. It could not succeed in a
revolutionary attempt opposed by the Army.
- 6.
- We believe that this conclusion remains valid. There has probably
been an increase of popular disillusionment with the Arbenz regime. There is certainly
increased desperation among opposition elements. In present
circumstances, however, the possibility of effective political
action does not exist. We continue to believe that effective
revolutionary action would require the active support of a major
portion of the Army.
The Position of the Guatemalan
Army
- 7.
The eighth conclusion of NIE–84 reads as follows:
The Army is the only organized element in Guatemala
capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political
situation. Although a quick change of attitude is always
possible, there is no present reason to doubt the
continued loyalty of the Army high command and of most
of the Army to Arbenz. The Army under its present
leaders could not be expected to take revolutionary
action unless they became convinced that their personal
security and well-being were threatened by Communist
infiltration and domination of the Government …
- 8.
- We consider the probable action of the Army to be the critical
factor in the situation. In modification of the second sentence of
the quoted paragraph, we note certain indications of unrest, even of
disaffection, among Army officers which suggest that the
precondition for revolutionary action specified in the third
sentence may be approaching fulfillment. G–2 (Colonel
Hennig), however, would reaffirm the second
sentence, stressing the watchful control which Arbenz exercises over the Army
command, the considerations of personal advantage which bind key
officers to the regime, and the disposition of the rank-and-file to
follow their leaders. This difference is a matter of emphasis rather
than of essential substance. All would agree that a revolutionary
potential now exists in the Guatemalan Army, but that the Guatemalan
Army is not likely to take spontaneous action against the Arbenz regime.
- 9.
- The Communists will be concerned to neutralize the revolutionary
potential in the Army. With the passage of time they may succeed in
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doing so by: (a) a
gradual purge of disaffected officers; (b) subversion of the
enlisted personnel; (c) a gradual reduction of the military
capabilities of the Army by the government’s failure to replace used
weapons, equipment, and ammunition; and (d) development of a
Communist-controlled workers’ militia as a counter-balancing force.
There are current indications of action along these several
lines.
The Position of Other Central American
Republics
- 10.
The ninth conclusion of NIE–84 reads as follows:
… The Governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua
… are fearful that the trend in Guatemala will lead to
Communist subversion and social upheaval in their own
territories. They are probably giving serious
consideration to the possibility of effecting a
political change in Guatemala through clandestine
support of revolutionary action there. It is highly
unlikely, however, that they would or could mount an
open military intervention in Guatemala.
- 11.
- This conclusion remains valid. Prospective US military aid to
these countries will take time to become effective and is not likely
to alter the situation substantially. To the extent that it
reassures them regarding their security against Guatemalan
retaliation, it may embolden these countries to render clandestine
support to revolutionary activities in Guatemala. Open military
intervention would be a doubtful adventure at best, all the more so
in view of Latin American sensitivity on the subject of intervention
as recently demonstrated anew at the Caracas Conference.
- 12.
- The current imbroglio between Nicaragua and Costa Rica has
weakened Central America solidarity in relation to Guatemala. If
long continued, it may cause Costa Rica to look to Guatemala for
support. The approaching election in Honduras presents opportunities
for Guatemalan intrigue in that country and the possibility of an
adverse change there.