Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

320.2/1–2551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

secret   priority

Washington, January 25, 1951—2 p. m.

658. Urtel 1052.¹ Dept believes Asian-Arab res will appeal to large number dels and effort to give this res priority of consideration and vote over US res might receive substantial support.

In Dept’s view US must oppose this res and make effort to discourage having it brought to a vote. At same time, US shld not make opposition of such character as to stake its influence and prestige, so that passage of res or even substantial vote for it wld be further blow to US leadership and jeopardize passage US res.

You shld indicate to other dels including Asian-Arab dels, and in short sober statement in Pol Comite, that US does not agree to any conference so long as Chi Commies continuing hostilities. Holding Far Eastern conference while Chi Commies continue hostilities wld be blow to UN authority and constitutes basic deviation from 5 principles which were adopted as minimum basis for honorable peaceful settlement in Korea which UN eld accept.

If purpose res is to obtain further elucidation Peiping position, that can be achieved without deviation 5 principles. As Ambassador Austin indicated in yesterday’s speech,² US has no objection to any individual member seeking amplification Peiping views or making further appeal to Chi Commies. Furthermore, cease-fire group still technically in existence and if it sees any purpose it can again approach Peiping for further elaboration its attitude. If Peiping indicates it is prepared to discontinue hostilities, steps to arrange satisfactory cease-fire eld be taken immediately, but it seems clear to us that proposed 7 power conference not proper agency to make arrangements for cease-fire. If cease-fire agreed to in principle, detailed arrangements, therefore, shld be made by military commanders along lines accepted by Entezam group in its report. Thereafter, conference wld be appropriate.

US statement could also indicate that passage US res wld not close door to honorable peaceful settlement. Good offices group provided final para US res wld be available to make further approach Peiping for amplification or reconsideration its position. Appropriate negotiations on Far Eastern question eld take place any time Peiping indicates its desire for honorable settlement on basis UN principles.

In consultations with Pearson (urtel 1057)³ you shld take strong position that 7 nations proposed in Asian res are not in our view a satisfactory group. Principal question for negotiation is after all the future of Korea and logical states to represent UN on that question wld be the reps on UNCURK plus the big 4 and Peiping, to which because of their prior participation the members of the cease-fire group cld be added. We also agree with Pearson’s principle that on particular subjects other interested governments should be represented.

Acheson

1. Not printed. It transmitted the text of the draft Arab-Asian resolution which was tabled on January 24 as document A/C.1/642 Rev. 1. The text of this draft resolution is printed in the editorial note on the First Committee meeting of January 25, p. 130.
2. Reference is to Mr. Austin’s statement in the First Committee on January 24; see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.430. At his news conference on January 25, President Truman specifically endorsed Ambassador Austin’s statement on behalf of the U.S. draft resolution. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951, p. 122)

3. This telegram, not printed, forwarded the following draft outline for a settlement in Korea and the Far East which Mr. Pearson expected to present to the First Committee:

   • “(a) A conference of the following 7 powers should be convened at an appropriate place and at an early date, and attended by the following 7 states: the USA, UK, France, The Peoples Republic of China, USSR, India, and Egypt.
   • “(b) There should be agreement in advance that immediately upon the convocation of this conference, there should be a cease-fire and standstill in Korea.
   • “(c) The first order of business of the conference should be the immediate negotiation of a more permanent cease-fire arranged on the basis of the plan submitted in the report of the cease-fire group of January 11, this part of the work of the conference to be completed before other items on its agenda are considered.
   • “(d) Once arrangements for a cease-fire had been completed, the conference should consider a peaceful solution of Korean problems in accordance with the principles laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the statement of principles of January 11, and it should then consider arrangements for the withdrawal from Korea of all non-Korean armed forces.
   • “(e) The conference should then proceed to a discussion of Far Eastern problems in accordance with paragraph 5 of the statement of principles of January 11, and as the first item of such discussions the request of the Central Peoples Government for a definite affirmation of the legitimate status of the Peoples Republic of China in the UN should be considered. It would of course be understood that the conference could not decide the question of Chinese representation in the UN, which can only be decided by the UN itself. The most the conference could do would be to express a view on this subject. It might in effect be considered that the 7-power conference would perform the function which has now been assigned to the Assembly’s committee on Chinese representation which was set up at the beginning of the Assembly and which was instructed to report to the Assembly.
   • “(f) In the discussions at the conference of Far Eastern problems any government especially concerned with a particular problem should be invited to participate during that part of the discussion.
   • “(g) This recommendation should be transmitted by the political committee to the Central Peoples Government at once, with an indication that a reply was required within a brief period, perhaps 48 hours after its receipt in Peking, in order that the committee might know whether it would be possible to proceed with arrangements for convening the conference on the date proposed.” (795.00/1–2451)

   For Mr. Pearson’s plan as given to the First Committee on January 26, see U.N. document A/C.1/SR.432. It was similar to, but not identical with, the above draft.