S/S Files: NSC 118 Series
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)1
Subject: United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea
1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, dated 11 December 1951,2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the draft statement of policy on the above subject in NSC 118/1 which was enclosed. In this connection, attention is invited to the fact that the Annex to NSC 118/13 was not attached to your memorandum nor has it been subsequently received. In any event, the Annex should be brought into consonance with the comments which follow.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in those parts of the draft policy statement in NSC 118/1 having military implications, subject to the following:
a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that NSC 118/1 expands and changes certain portions of NSC 48/5. They believe that the intent of NSC 118/1 is to amend only subparagraphs 6 (e) and (f) and paragraph 9 of NSC 48/5. In order to make it clear that NSC 118/1 does not supersede or contravene in any manner any of the other policy provisions, objectives, and courses of action set forth in NSC 48/5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a statement along the following lines be added at the end of the introductory sentences of paragraphs 1 and 2 of NSC 118/1:
“These amendments are not to be construed as changing in any manner the other policy provisions, objectives, and courses of action in NSC 48/5, including those pertaining to Communist China and Formosa which are set forth in paragraph 8 and subparagraph 11(c) of the latter.”
b. Change subparagraph 2 a (5) to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner:
“(5) Seek agreement among all the nations participating in the hostilities in Korea to the issuance of a joint declaration enunciating the responsibility of the Chinese Communist and North Korean [Page 1358] regimes for the strict observance of the armistice terms and warning that military action, not necessarily limited in geographic scope, will be undertaken against them if aggression is renewed. If agreement cannot be reached to make such a declaration, at least by the United States, United Kingdom, and France, the United States should consider issuing a declaration unilaterally. without geographic limitation will be taken to meet a renewal of the aggression. In any event the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China that future military aggression in Korea will result in a military reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic scope or in methods of warfare employed. Efforts should be make to the end that the heads of other governments, particularly the UK and France, take similar action.”
Reason: The paragraph as originally written contains an implied threat to the forces and territories of the USSR and further constitutes a too rigid commitment of future U.S. action under unknown circumstances.
c. Change subparagraph 2 a (6) to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):
“(6) Endeavor to obtain in the Security Council or General Assembly a resolution calling upon all parties to the armistice agreement faithfully to observe its terms. and declaring that future aggression in Korea in violation of the armistice agreement would be met by military action on the part of the UN.
Reason: The portion of the resolution recommended above for deletion is illogical in that the United Nations would be calling upon itself as well as the Communists to observe the terms of the armistice agreement and would be threatening to punish itself by military action in the event of violation. Moreover, there is a real danger that, in the event of an armistice, incidents may be created by South Korea which would prove embarrassing to the United Nations. Further, provisions for deterring the Communists from renewed aggression are made in subparagraph 2 a (5), as amended in subparagraph b, above.”
d. Change paragraph 2 b (1) to read as follows:
“(1) Determine and take whatever measures in addition to the current mobilization effort would be required to meet the greater risk of general war which would then exist, and to support such additional military measures as might be required to attain the minimum settlement in Korea acceptable to the United States.”
Reason: Additional mobilization effort may become necessary in order to attain a minimum settlement in Korea.
[Page 1359]e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in alternative subparagraph 2 b (6) as proposed by the Department of Defense and would record their nonconcurrence in the alternative subparagraph 2 b (6) submitted by the Department of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that, in the event armistice negotiations fail, a request by the Department of State for some nations to participate in the imposition of an embargo would be a fainthearted initial action, not at all in keeping with the gravity of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the proper course of action would be to apply pressure upon the major maritime powers to join in the imposition of a naval blockade on Communist China in order to bring about effective economic isolation of that nation from seaborne trade. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that the United Kingdom now purports to have established suitable controls to deny the importation by Communist China of strategic materials through Hong Kong. The facts of the case are that these controls are largely ineffective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff doubt that any course of action short of a blockade would provide an effective bar to the importation of even strategic materials into Communist China from the Hong Kong-Macao area, among others.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff