Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

320/12–1151: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

Paris, December 11, 1951—9 p. m.

Delga 615. Re: Korea. Gross and Hyde called on Officer¹ (Australia) at his request. For some days he has expressed growing concern at need for consultation. Gross stated that absent instructions he cld hear Officer’s views and perhaps offer only personal comments. There have been various Commonwealth consultations in Paris and Officer stated that the views he expressed cld be taken as fairly reflecting the Commonwealth point of view, at least that of the “Old Dominions”.

1. Australia recognizes that the US has made the greatest contribution in Korea in manpower and treasure. Therefore it recognizes the key position US shld have in next steps. But Australia on basis of its size is next contributor of mil forces and it has just claim to participate in strategic decisions on future of Korea. He inquired how far US is committed to the idea of a unified independent and democratic Korea, because he feels that US troops and financial support must in a large measure guarantee it. He thought this might be largely a mil question and recognized that in the foreseeable future US will have troops in Japan and that their presence there has strategic value to US. But for UK and Australia it is without strategic benefit and a burden to have troops in Korea or Japan, if they were to be withdrawn from Korea. Yet continuing measures are necessary or we wld wake up to find Korea a Commie state. Gross commented that US public opinion cld not in his view understand or accept a decision to write off Korea. An armistice will involve the continuing use of troops in the area for a long period.

2. If there is an armistice, Officer stressed Commonwealth thinking that there shld be ratification of it by SC in anodyne res (precise phrase used by Jebb and reported in USUN’s 115 of July 19)² simply noting the armistice and passing on the question to GA avoiding if possible Soviet veto. The res in the GA wld then note and reaffirm all the UN resolutions.

3. Officer expressed concern at reports of Dept thinking about creation of a comm to handle Korean polit questions. He thought the typical UN comm as an organ of the GA is undesirable in the extreme and that these questions of the future of Korea cannot effectively be discussed in the first comite and that those who are directly concerned, such as US, UK and Australia, must not have to discuss these problems in a forum with others who have made little if any contrib. On the other hand, the type of res that Australia favors wld be to recommend that the members concerned set up a conf which wld include US, UK, France, Australia, USSR and perhaps Thailand and Turkey. These states wld be asked to confer with other interested parties, meaning the Koreans and the Chi Commies, on ways and means of settlement.

At this point Gross analyzed the various sorts of instrumentalities that cld be used, assuming there is an armistice:

(a) Gross and Officer agreed that the type of conf proposed by Indian-Asian-Arab group with India and Egypt to sit with the Chi Commies and big four is out of the question and not at all what Officer has in mind.

(b) Gross suggested another possibility wld be a UNO rep, but he wld be a very hard man to find. Officer felt this idea might have great merit if the type of man, such as Joseph Grew,³ cld be found who wld undertake the task over a long period and work with patience and diplomatic skill. He agreed that such a man wld naturally be an American and that he must have a measure of idealism and much practical common sense. Preferably he shld act under instruction.

(c) Gross suggested also that there might be an advisory comm made up of permanent UN del members in NY with a permanent chairman or executive agent. Again Officer thought that this might be more practical than trying to find the right individual, altho he wld prefer such a group to be in Washington rather than NY because of the endless publicity that any activity at UN HQ entails. He concluded that the word “commission” and the concept of the ordinary UN comm was what particularly disturbed his govt and he thought that the arrangement suggested by Gross had a flexibility and the same sort of purpose which he had originally intended by the word “conf”. It was agreed that personal opinions were being expressed, but that in general there was agreement on the sort of measures desirable.

4. Officer referred to the Secretary’s discussion with Eden at Rome (further Delga 530)⁴ and stated with seriousness his opinion that Australia is entitled to be consulted. He added that if the US were to make a statement on our views on a less rigid inspection system than originally contemplated in Korea, we shld not purport to speak for Australia unless an opportunity was given for full consultation in advance.⁵

5. At the Commonwealth mtgs on Korea, Pannikar⁶ has come forward with the idea of a study group to be created by the GA and composed of three individual experts not reps of govts. Presumably he wld be one of the three. Without awaiting an armistice or awaiting the Korean case coming to the GA this group wld study the bases for a polit settlement, the degree of unification that is obtainable and methods of holding elections in North and South Korea. Officer added that presumably Pannikar wld go to Peiping and negotiate with the Commies on the basis of the findings of such a group. He added that the Commonwealth mtg had firmly but politely rejected this idea. He feels that Pannikar able but vain man and understands he will be in charge of the Korean item for India when Rau goes on the bench.⁷ Gross expressed our complete and thorough distrust of Pannikar which wld extend to any proposals he might make.

It was understood that this was a personal exchange of views and that we had received no instructions from the Dept which wld authorize Gross to indicate its positions.⁸

Austin

1. Sir Keith Officer, Australian Ambassador in France, was head of the Australian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1210.
3. Retired American diplomat and former Under Secretary of State.
4. See footnote 1, p. 1254.
5. Telegram Gadel 431, December 12, to Paris, instructed the U.S. Delegation to inform Officer that consultation with Australia was actively proceeding not only with respect to the greater sanctions statement but on other aspects of the armistice negotiations as well (320/12–1151).
6. K.M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador in the People’s Republic of China, was a member of the Indian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
7. Sir Benegal Rau had been elected to the International Court of Justice beginning February 6, 1952. He was head of the Indian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
8. On December 13, in telegram Delga 639, Ambassador Austin reported from Paris that Messrs. Gross and Hyde had conveyed to Mr. Jebb and M. Chauvel the Department’s views as set forth in telegram Gadel 393, December 8, to Paris, (p. 1282). The discussion was tentative in tone, and Jebb and Chauvel received the Department’s views sympathetically but wanted time to think about the United States suggestions. (320/12–1351)