Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 62: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, 11 December 1951—5:45 p. m.

CX–59128. 1. Ref JCS 89119,¹ 89173² and my msg CX 58967.³ In the event Communists refuse to agree to a military armistice commission composed of belligerents designated on an equal basis by opposing commanders and negotiations reach the breaking point on this issue, I recommend that I be authorized to propose an armistice commission composed of numerically equal representation from both sides and with a neutral chairman.

2. I consider it important to point out that a military armistice commission composed of numerically equal numbers from each side will inevitably result in each side having a de facto veto. Whereas a military armistice commission composed of numerically equal representation of the two belligerent sides with a neutral chairman, together with a provision that prohibits the use of the veto, will permit the UNC to abide by the provisions of para 3 of JCS 89119.

3. Your views are requested.⁴

1. See footnote 2, p. 1286.
2. See the editorial note, p. 1296.
3. Dated December 8, p. 1285.

4. General Ridgway sent the following further message in telegram C–59130, December 11, from Tokyo:

   “Urmsg JCS 89173.

   “In connection with neutral observer teams some thought has been given here as to relative desirability from our point of view of certain theoretically neutral nations. Certain so called neutral countries are more subject to Soviet pressure than others, and some neutrals are opportunistic in their attitude toward the present world situation.

   “Request guidance as the relative desirability of various acceptable countries. Further, if there is any choice among Communist dominated countries, your views would be appreciated.” (Black Book, Tab 63)