Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Truman Library, Truman Papers, PSF–General File–Joint Chiefs of Staff

Memorandum for the President¹

top secret

[Washington,] December 10, 1951.

The following notes summarize the discussion at the meeting held in the Cabinet Room at 10:30 a.m., December 10, 1951, at which you presided, with the following in attendance:

• James E. Webb, Acting Secretary of State
• Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense
• Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army
• Francis P. Whitehair, Acting Secretary of the Navy
• Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force
• General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
• Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations
• General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
• H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State
• Brig. Gen. Harry H. Vaughan, Military Aide to the President
• Rear Adm. Robert Dennison, Naval Aide to the President
• Brig. Gen. Robert Landry, Air Force Aide to the President
• Maj. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The President opened the meeting by explaining that he had decided to come back from Key West because it was time for one of his regular meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he felt it would be better to have it in Washington with representatives of the State Department than to have it in Key West. He then asked General Bradley to give a briefing on the situation in Korea.

General Bradley reported that there has been a steady build-up in Communist air strength. In addition, they are working on three airfields in Northwest Korea which CIA estimates will be operational in mid-December unless they are knocked out. This Communist air build-up has made it necessary to stop daylight missions of B–29’s. In addition, two new Chinese armies, plus 145,000 replacements, have recently moved into Korea from China. Ground action has consisted of Communist artillery fire averaging recently about 900 shells per day, and patrolling by U.S. units. There have been two recent Communist air missions against our front lines. Two South Korean divisions have been moved out of the front line and sent back to clean out the guerrillas. In summary, General Bradley said that the most significant developments have been a 209,000 build-up on the ground and a continuous air build-up by the Communists.

The President said that it was this developing situation which concerned him. He felt that the Communists, by their build-up and their negotiations, were trying to prevent us from being able to meet the situation that they, not in good faith, were developing. That was why he wanted this meeting.

General Bradley noted that the present estimate of Communist strength in Korea was 800,000.

The President said that he felt that our negotiators in Korea had been a little too conciliatory. He did not believe that it was necessary to give so much or take so much. He was worried about the State Department saying that it would take years to get a political settlement. If, by building up, the Communists are able to drive us out of Korea, our whole career in Korea will have been wasted. The question before us was how we meet this threat.

General Bradley said that he thought the following quotation from the latest CIA estimate expressed the situation most accurately:

“We believe that the Communists desire a suspension or termination of hostilities in Korea, but that their present position is not such as to oblige them to accept terms which they may regard as seriously disadvantageous. We believe the Communists will protract the military negotiations while there is a chance of obtaining concessions of actual or propaganda value. Thereafter, political negotiations will be prolonged in the confidence that while negotiations continue the UN will not renew or widen hostilities, and in the hope that popular pressures in the West will oblige the UN to conclude a settlement on terms more favorable to the Communists.”

The President stated that this presented a serious problem not only there but here at home. He feared that the increasing “home for Christmas” idea may make it impossible for us to meet the situation. He felt that our demands had not been strong enough. His impression was that they had been making the demands and we the concessions.

General Bradley expressed the view that the Communists had made very big concessions when they had given up on the line being at the 38th parallel and on Kaesong. He thought that neither side could give in on rehabilitation of things like houses and roads.

The President said that we should not give in on military installations such as airfields and railroad yards.

General Bradley said that we have reserved our position on airfields. We would not give in on that until we reached a final breaking point, and then we would try to limit the number the Communists could build so that we could knock them out quickly in the event of new hostilities. General Bradley thought that the choice facing us was to give in on some of these things or to go all out against China. He believed that a reasonably satisfactory armistice was preferable to all-out war with China.

The President said there was no argument on that, but on the other hand we should not compromise our position.

General Bradley agreed that there were some things that we would have to stand on, such as our rotation policy.

The President said that was necessary so that we could keep up the strength and morale of our forces.

General Bradley explained that the proposals which concerned the President were only efforts to give a final position to our negotiators. That was why they looked bad at this time. General Bradley felt that rehabilitation would be mutually advantageous even though it would be better for them. He pointed out that we have the problem of having to cut the roads daily by air attack. Also, we want to be able to do some rehabilitation ourselves, particularly if, for instance, there is a severe storm that wrecks South Korea. Besides, restrictions on rehabilitation can’t be enforced anyway, since you can never be sure that they are not building new roads and houses. General Bradley felt that the biggest thing we could do to prevent a violation of an armistice would be to say that if the armistice is violated we will go all out against China.

The President agreed that that was another alternative.

Secretary Lovett shared the views of the JCS after originally having some concern about them. He said he was influenced in part by recent conversations with the British on two counts. First, what if we don’t get an armistice? The British are in desperate straits and the French are practically bankrupt. We are generally inadequate in air strength throughout the world. In our conversations with the British we had put up General Bradley’s idea of enlarging the geographical area if the armistice is violated, but had not specifically mentioned the blockade. The first British reaction was to draw back from the possibility of a blockade. We feel that this is one of the best things to do. The British therefore agreed to go back to London and discuss the matter with Churchill. Secretary Lovett said that he understood that the British had now tentatively indicated that they would favor a warning against a violation of an armistice.

Secretary Webb said that was true, but that the British wanted to weaken our proposed statement.

Secretary Lovett said that he felt that we did not have staunch support in the UN. The British and French were in bad shape, both financially and regarding manpower, so that their desire for an armistice is greater today than it has been. Secretary Lovett was also concerned about our ability to enlarge the conflict, which would have to be done largely with Air and Navy. The prospects are that we would have to accept considerable attrition in the air in view of the Communist build-up.

General Vandenberg said that the attrition would depend upon how you enlarged the air war.

Secretary Lovett explained that there would be large attrition if we made air attacks on Manchuria.

General Vandenberg agreed that that would be true. He said that he had gone along with the approach indicated by General Bradley because he thought that it was in line with our national policy. His own feeling was that we should get an armistice, get our troops out of Korea, and tell the Communists that if they violated the armistice we would do whatever is necessary. Actually we will have to enlarge the conflict whether there is a violation of an armistice or whether we fail to get an armistice. General Vandenberg thought that the American people would go along with an armistice that would allow us to get our troops out of Korea.

The President asked if General Vandenberg thought the American people would go along if it meant surrendering Korea. The President was concerned that the Communists would build up after an armistice and then come right down the peninsula to Pusan.

General Vandenberg thought that this would not happen if we made it clear that we would go all out against China if the armistice is violated. In that event he would not attack Manchuria, but China proper, hitting at their ports, mining their rivers, etc.

Secretary Pace thought that General Bradley’s approach was a good one. Secretary Pace felt that we should indicate what we would do if there was a violation of an armistice. Then we might yield on fundamentally minor questions but hold on the major ones. He explained that in any case we would not withdraw immediately from Korea in view of our UN commitment there. In that connection he pointed out that General Collins has reported that the ROK officers training at Forts Benning and Sill have performed exceptionally well. Also, General Van Fleet is moving forward in improving ROK capacity there. Secretary Pace felt that the big issue was what we say if there is an armistice violation. If we can agree on that we can afford to yield on smaller questions.

Secretary Finletter thought that we should bear in mind that we have already achieved our objectives in Korea of repelling aggression and upholding the UN. He thought that we should henceforth not try to rub their noses, but should make concessions on minor points. The big question is what we should do if there is an armistice violation. First, he felt that we should not go it alone, but should act under the UN. Second, he believed that we should take vigorous leadership in the UN to strengthen its position on the Korean question, despite the fact that many of the nations are in financial trouble and are generally fed up with the Korean war. Third, we should not make war on China alone. Fourth, we should try not to take actions that are so serious as to get the Russians involved.

Admiral Fechteler expressed his concern that making a threatening statement would not make much of an impression on China. Moreover, we might have trouble elsewhere and then not want to do what we had said we were going to do. In other words, he felt that any statement should not be interpreted as a threat or commit us to a line of action indefinitely into the future.

Secretary Whitehair said that he was familiar with the slow-bleeding tactics which the Chinese are carrying out in the negotiations. He felt that we should try to get an armistice before the American people get fed up with these tactics.

General Collins said that he feels that he would like to get our troops out of Korea, but he also thought we should go as far as possible to get concessions from the Communists. He believed that although a UN statement may not influence China, it may give the Russians pause.

Mr. Matthews said that he agrees with the JCS proposal. He felt that it is important for us to get an armistice, but that neither side is willing to have one at any price. He thought that the best deterrent for an armistice would be the “larger sanction”. He felt that the Chinese would pay attention to such a statement. He is hopeful that we will be able to get the UN nations having troops in Korea to go along with a stronger statement.

Secretary Webb pointed out that we are trying to build a military shield against Russia. Moreover, we have many weak allies to build up. He said that his great concern was to keep countries from going Communist behind our lines, such as Japan and in Europe. He thought that the JCS proposal was about as good a formula as can be worked out for our immediate purposes. He thought that longer range settlement depended upon building strength out there in Asia.

The President said that this was what he had wanted to find out. Looking at General Bradley, he said, “We’ll have to go ahead with it, General.”

The President then asked about the situation in Europe.

General Bradley said that the Harriman group² feels that we will not quite reach our goals for ’54 by that time, but that we can have approximately the number of divisions with some deficiencies in strength, equipment, and training. General Bradley said that it was discouraging to hear Mr. Schuman talk about a European defense force, but throw monkey wrenches into a German contribution. General Bradley was hopeful that the French may agree to go along during the course of the next year.

Secretary Lovett pointed out that what both the French and the Russians are worried about is Germany. Germany is therefore the key. Our own forces there are first-class. Our allies, however, have a tendency to make broad commitments but are not taking the necessary steps to produce things which have developed as bottlenecks here, such as electronics and machine tools. In general, he felt that the sense of urgency from a military point of view is greater with us than with those who would be hit first, except for the British.

The President said that there is one principal difficulty. This is that the situation here at home is somewhat similar to the French. During the coming election year it will be most difficult to keep up our defense program. He felt that it was a pity we have to look forward to 1952 for that reason, when what we should be doing is devoting all our attention to the world situation. That is why he is worried about Korea. We must not waste our position there or we may then find this country going isolationist.

General Collins said that if that was what was worrying the President, he felt that he could assure the President that the Communists would not get to Pusan next year. Even with an armistice we would make sure that that won’t happen.

Secretary Lovett said that the TCC report would be of considerable assistance here because it focuses attention realistically on what can be done by the end of calendar 1952, which is the important first step. It also ultimately shows what can be done.

The President said that this forthcoming budget is the biggest headache he has ever had. With reference to the civil activities in the budget, the President pointed out that, if we do not keep up morale in this country, we cannot maintain the free world, which is what we are after. We have never faced a situation such as we have now. It is a discouraging and dark picture, but we must make sure that there is no letdown.

General Bradley commented that if there is no armistice it will be a terrific blow to morale.

Secretary Pace pointed out that if we get an armistice we can make the capacity of Europe greater. He felt that we are now realistically assessing what can be done. European effort in the fiscal and economic fields is not there, but our own troops in Europe are fine. Also, our allies have made considerable progress on manpower. This is encouraging, particularly in view of the quality of our own forces in Europe.

Secretary Webb thought that it was very important to recognize that many members of Congress are travelling and will come home with impressions similar to Secretary Pace’s. He thought that this would be very helpful. Secretary Acheson has pointed out that we have faced these same difficulties at every point in our efforts. We are now assessing where we can get strength soon, which is a valuable approach. Secretary Webb felt that we may get progress in the next few months because we are now looking at what can be done.

The President agreed that the situation is better than in 1946, but the political situation at home is what bothers him. He felt there was a danger that this country might again go isolationist.

Secretary Webb pointed out that we have another year of experience with military unification and building up the team at the State Department. He believed that this would result in better relationships with the new Congress.

The President warned that this might be optimistic, since many members of Congress next year would be saying, in effect, “Elect me and to bell with what happens to the country.”

1. The source text gives no indication of authorship.
2. For documentation on the work of the Temporary Council Committee (TCC), composed of W. Averell Harriman, Jean Monnet, and Sir Edward Plowden, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 616 ff. and 693 ff.