Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 42: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
CX–58967. 1. Pls refer my CX 58838 of 7 Dec 51.
2. Our delegation continues to be confronted with the necessity of maintaining a non-committal position with respect to the present key Communist proposal relating to so-called neutral inspection. Our delegation is finding maintenance of this position increasingly difficult.
3. a. In the light of this situation and of my C 66585 of 8 Jul 51 and JCS 96094 of 12 Jul 511 in reply thereto, suggest you consider an armistice commission of three members, one representing each belligerent side and one a neutral nation, both the neutral nation and its selected representative to require the agreement of the belligerent commanders. The commission to have no responsibilities other [Page 1286] than to the belligerent commanders. All matters before the commission to be decided by a veto-free majority vote. Observer teams, responsible solely to Armistice Commission, to be similarly constituted. The Armistice Commission and its subordinate inspection teams to have the functions of inspection and investigation in accordance with the terms of the armistice, with responsibility for reporting to the belligerent commanders violations they observe, together with such recommendations as may be voted.
b. The Armistice Commission and its subordinate observer teams to have cognizance over, adherence to, and compliance with all terms of the armistice, both within the demilitarized zone and in the rear areas.
4. Our delegation has submitted for my consideration still another proposal; namely, that the composition of the Armistice Commission, as well as that of its subordinate inspection teams, be entirely neutral, the membership acceptable to both sides, and that it be responsible to both commanders for inspections and observation within and without the demilitarized zone.
5. a. Within the [With?] respect to para 3 above, I consider the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.
b. With respect to para 4 above, I think the contrary is true.
c. I make no formal recommendation with respect to either, the “principle of inspection” is so basic to our governmental position in worldwide negotiations with the USSR, and all aspects of this problem are so well understood in Wash, that in my opinion my recommendations in this specific case are unnecessary.
6. In planning our tactics it will be of the greatest assistance to have the guidance requested in my CX 58838 of 7 Dec, as well as your views on the foregoing proposals, soonest. It would likewise be very helpful, particularly if you anticipate your guidance may be somewhat delayed, to know the probable time during which we must maintain our current position on the issue of “neutral” inspection.2
- Neither printed.↩
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded in the following manner in telegram JCS 89119, transmitted on December 8:
↩“From JCS.
“1. Guidance requested in CX 58838 awaiting action at highest level, which is expected shortly.
“2. A. Re Para 3 of CX 58967, we concur with your views but consider that difficulty would be encountered in finding a neutral acceptable to both sides. Therefore, we think only practicable solution for mbrship of MAC would be belligerents designated on equal basis by opposing cdrs. Observer teams could be composed of neutrals, but would be responsible to, report to, and subject to the direction and supervision of MAC.
“B. We agree with your comments (5b) on Para 4 of CX 58967 insofar as it pertains to MAC, and we concur with your observation in Para 5c thereof.
“3. With respect to the organization and conduct of observer teams and MAC, you are reminded of the necessity to establish in the agreement safeguards against their inaction and resulting frustration by the exercise of a veto in MAC or in the teams themselves.” (Black Book, Tab 43)