Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/S Files: NSC 118/1

Memorandum by the Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Gleason) to the National Security Council

top secret

Washington, December 7, 1951.

NSC 118/1

United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea

• References: A. NSC 118¹
• B. NSC Action No. 562²
• C. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject, “United States Courses of Action in Korea,” dated September 5, 1951³
• D. Progress Report, dated September 25, 1951, by the Secretaries of State and Defense on NSC 48/5⁴

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the Senior NSC Staff pursuant to NSC Action No. 562–b in the light of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in NSC 118, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at an early meeting. An NSC staff study will be circulated separately.⁵

Attention is invited to the alternative paragraphs 2–b–(6) proposed by the Departments of State and Defense.

It is recommended that, if the enclosed statement of policy is adopted, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve it and direct its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

S. Everett Gleason

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared by the Senior Staff of the National Security Council

top secret

[Washington, December 7, 1951.]

Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea

objectives

1. The United States should continue to seek in Korea the following objectives, as set forth in paragraphs 6 e and f of NSC 48/5 subject to amendment of paragraphs 6 e and f as indicated below:

a. As an ultimate objective, continue to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. As a current objective, seek, through appropriate UN machinery, a settlement of the Korean conflict acceptable to United States security interests which would, as a minimum and without jeopardizing the U.S. position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN:

(1) Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements.

(2) Establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and, in general, not south of the 38th parallel.

(3) Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea.

(4) Permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression.

b. Seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, or with Communist China.

c. Continue the military action until an armistice is agreed upon and continue economic and political sanctions against the aggressor until at least the minimum settlement is achieved.

d. In any event, continue to seek to develop strong barriers against communist subversion and military aggression in Korea, and to develop political and social conditions in Korea which would facilitate a united, independent and democratic Korea.

courses of action

2. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should pursue the following courses of action, in lieu of those set forth in paragraph 9 of NSC 48/5:

a. In the event that an armistice is achieved:

(1) Endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN Commission to undertake negotiations looking toward an eventual political settlement which would establish a united, independent and democratic Korea.

(2) Maintain all existing political and economic sanctions against Communst China and exert vigorous efforts to persuade our allies to do likewise, at least until a minimum settlement of the Korean conflict is achieved.

(3) Exert vigorous efforts to continue the contribution by UN members of forces to the UN Command in Korea so long as UN forces are required in Korea.

(4) Intensify, to the maximum practicable extent the organization, training, and equipping of the armed forces of the ROK, so that they may assume increasing responsibility for the defense and security of the ROK so as to facilitate the phased withdrawal of UN forces from Korea.

(5) Seek agreement among the nations participating in the hostilities in Korea to the issuance of a joint declaration enunciating the responsibility of the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes for the strict observance of the armistice terms and warning that military action without geographic limitation will be taken to meet a renewal of the aggression. In any event the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China that future military aggression in Korea will result in a military reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic scope or in methods of warfare employed. Efforts should be made to the end that the heads of other governments, particularly the UK and France, take similar action.

(6) Endeavor to obtain in the Security Council or General Assembly a resolution calling upon all parties to the armistice agreement faithfully to observe its terms and declaring that future aggression in Korea in violation of the armistice agreement would be met by military action on the part of the UN.

b. In the event that armistice negotiations clearly fail:

(1) Determine and take whatever measures in addition to the current mobilization effort would be required to meet the greater risk of general war which would then exist.

(2) Increase the scale of military operations in the Korean area consistent with the capabilities of the forces available to the Commander in Chief of the UN forces whenever, in his judgment, such operations will contribute materially to the destruction of enemy forces and will not result in disproportionate losses to UN forces under his command.

(3) Remove all restrictions against advances or attacks in Korea, including restrictions against attacks on the Yalu River dams and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River but excepting attacks against areas within approximately 12 miles of the borders of the USSR.

(4) Remove restrictions against the employment (unilaterally and on short notice, if the situation so requires) of United States air forces to attack Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity threatens seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area, such employment, however, to be specifically authorized by the President. (See paragraph 2 d (1) for action in case of enemy mass air attack).

(5) Seek both within and without the UN the imposition on Communist China of additional political and economic pressures such as agreement by the maximum number of countries to the diplomatic isolation of Communist China.

*[(6) Seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all their trade with Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports, at the same time indicating to these nations that failure to achieve increasingly effective multilateral economic pressure upon Communist China’s aggressive military potential through these means may require employment of UN naval forces for search and seizure at sea, closure of ports or imposition of a naval blockade of the China mainland coastline.]

†[(6) Press the major maritime powers participating in the Korean campaign to impose, immediately upon the failure of armistice negotiations, a naval blockade on Communist China. Failing acceptance of this course, seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all shipments to Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports.]

(7) Exert vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from UN countries which have not yet contributed military forces.

(8) Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed to:

(a) Aid to the maximum practicable extent anti-communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(b) Interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications.

c. In the event a decision is reached that the Communists are deliberately delaying armistice negotiations indefinitely and are increasing their offensive capabilities, increase pressures on the aggressor by stages and execute those courses of action specified in paragraph 2 b above, including political and economic pressures, through UN and diplomatic channels, to the extent feasible.

d. Whether or not an armistice in Korea is achieved:

(1) Continue in effect standing instructions to the Commander in Chief of UN forces in case the communists launch massive air attacks against UN forces in the Korean area.

(2) Develop and equip dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength, with a view to their assuming eventually responsibility for the defense of Korea.

(3) Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese defense forces.

(4) Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist to the maximum practicable extent the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Communist China and Korea.

(5) If the USSR commits units of Soviet “volunteers” sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.

(6) Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations effort for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from Communist control.

1. Dated November 9, p. 1106.
2. See footnotes 4 and 5, p. 964.
3. See footnote 1 to Marshall’s memorandum of September 4, p. 882.
4. See editorial note, p. 936.
5. Not printed. The Staff Study was circulated on December 14 as an Annex to NSC 118/1; it differed substantively only in Paragraph 33 from the Annex to NSC 118/2, dated December 20, p. 1387.
6. Proposed by the Department of State. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
7. Proposed by the Department of Defense. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]