320/12–551: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France
Gadel 350. Re Delga 294, Nov. 22. Dept sending latest info status bilateral negots via Airgram.1 Eight copies tabulations of offers mil assistance Korea pouched GADel.1
In gen Dept’s view that continuation bilateral approaches greatly preferable to full discussion this question in GA.
Re reco 1, Dept heartily agrees US shld stress informally in gen terms need additional troops Kor. Dept indicating to GADel in material being sent via Airgram details various bilateral negots and selected Dels which GADel shld approach informally.
Dept concurs in reco 2 urtel.
Re reco 3, we believe this not appropriate time discuss informally with Chairman and selected members AMC question possible request AMC for additional UN forces.
We believe prospect prompt and positive action by AMC not good. Reconvening for any purpose group designed solely to recommend additional measures against Chi and North Kor Commie aggression wld undoubtedly be opposed by friendly dels as likely disturb armistice negots, and might be considered as lack good faith US and lack true desire achieve armistice. Even if AMC reconvened there wld be reluctance recommend additional troops this time for same reasons. Also, since some members AMC not yet prepared commit themselves publicly further contributions this time, they wld be reluctant propose such recommendation. Possible failure in getting AMC make such reco wld give Commies propaganda ammunition and be interpreted some quarters as overt indication UN inability maintain strong position against possible renewal aggression, in event present armistice negots result in cease-fire. Furthermore, vote in GA on reco from AMC in nrs substantially less than 53 supporting action of June 25 and 27 Resolutions wld be damaging and be exploited by Commie propaganda as indication lack strong, united support for Kor effort.
We have not heretofore used AMC for mil recommendations, only economic. While this fact does not preclude its use, Dept believes undesirable set precedent which might put US under obligation secure prior AMC approval other mil steps in meeting aggression in Kor.
Advantage bilateral approaches is that constant pressure can be maintained on UN Members without opening Members free world to charge of lack of unity and unwillingness give full support to UN collective [Page 1249] effort against aggression. Furthermore, special factors which obviously influence character negots can be given full consideration without giving comfort publicly to enemy. For example, ability increase in nr forces from NATO countries obviously affected by efforts being made by Eur countries to build mil estabs in fulfillment NATO commitments. By bringing question troops Kor in open GA forum, we wld be prodding nr NATO countries and others to announce publicly fact which we have known for some time; namely, needs for Kor must be balanced against needs for defense NATO and other strategic areas.
GADel shld bear in mind and make clear that in event armistice agreement includes prohibitions on increase level forces (item c, last part of Depcirtel 489, Nov 27),2 such additional UN troops that may be sent Kor wld be employed relieve UN forces now in theatre and not raise overall level forces.