795.00/12–451: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
2790. Re Emb tel 2587 Dec 3.1 In ur mtg with Eden Wed2 request you express to him Dept’s appreciation for his views transmitted to the Secretary which were made available to Dept by Brit Emb Wash.3
You may inform him that while some progress appears to have been made by armistice negotiators in gaining Communists acceptance of necessity for agreement by both sides not to increase level of forces or war matériel during period of armistice, and measures for each side to assure itself that other is complying with such agreement, it is by no means yet a certainty that Communists are willing to accept measures which will give essential assurances required for safety of United Nations forces. In this connection, it is of interest to note that thus far the Communists have been very outspoken with regard to their intent to engage in extensive airfield reconstruction within North Korea during the period of an armistice.
With respect to para 3 of Mr. Eden’s message, it is intent of US to continue to press for adequate inspection arrangements. However, it must be recognized that no inspection system within Korea can be completely effective in safeguarding UN forces from Communist breach of faith. Consequently, whatever inspection system may eventually be agreed upon, we feel it important to make clear to other side what would, in fact, be probable consequences of any major violation of armistice agreement.
With respect to numbered para 4 of Mr. Eden’s message, we agree that any statement to be made concerning consequences of major breach of armistice arrangements by Communists should not be made only by the United States and the United Kingdom and that a collective statement by the United Nations is not practicable. It is our preliminary view that most preferable course would be collective statement by all countries contributing armed forces. We are working on a draft statement which we hope shortly to discuss with UK. After general US–UK agreement on draft, we would consider desirability and timing of discussing statement, initially with certain other countries, and, if outcome of discussions warranted, eventually with all countries which have contributed forces.
With respect to para 5, while we agree it is difficult now to commit ourselves to exact action to be taken against China and that that decision can only finally be reached in the light of the circumstances [Page 1239] then existing in the Far East and elsewhere in world, we do feel that there are certain minimum steps upon which we should now reach agreement in order to give substance and meaning to any statement we make. We conceive these minimum steps to be aerial bombardment of Chinese military bases (not necessarily limited to air bases across the Yalu) and naval blockade of Chinese coast. It is our view that nothing less than these measures could be considered as bringing any effective pressure upon China itself.
We have just today received from the Brit Emb the UK views on trade with China4 and will shortly wish further to discuss in greater detail the question of blockade as well as bombing of Chinese bases.
While we appreciate Brit desire to keep Commonwealth countries principally concerned informed, in view of considerable number of other countries also strongly concerned we suggest that further discussion of this subject for time being and until further consultation be limited to US–UK.
- Not printed; it informed the Department that the Embassy in London had received from the Foreign Office the substance of the messages from Mr. Eden on the questions of greater sanctions and trade with mainland China (Black Book, Tab 11).↩
- December 5.↩
- Reference is to the first of the two British messages, transmitted to the Department on December 3, p. 1221.↩
- Reference is to the second of the two British messages, December 3, p. 1223.↩