Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 20–A
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense ( Lovett )
Subject: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners.
1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum dated 23 November 1951,1 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered [Page 1225] the instructions which should be furnished General Ridgway regarding the disposition of those prisoners who are accused of conventional war crimes, or who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also considered the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) message CX 58195 (DA IN 3785) dated 28 November 1951 (copy enclosed)2 on the general subject of repatriation of Chinese and Korean prisoners of war.
2. As stated in your letter of 23 November 1951 to the Secretary of State, the decision either to release or to withhold certain categories of prisoner personnel during a general exchange of prisoners will have undesirable consequences. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which appear later in this memorandum are made after weighing those consequences. There follow certain background data which the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered in arriving at their recommendations:
- a.
- The directive to General Ridgway on the broader aspects of the exchange of prisoners of war which was forwarded with the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to you, dated 15 November 1951,3 would authorize him to agree to an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war if this appeared necessary in order to secure the release of all, or a maximum number of, United Nations (UN) and Republic of Korea (ROK) prisoners of war, or to avoid unacceptable delay in their recovery, or to prevent a breakdown of armistice negotiations;
- b.
- The absence of a complete victory in Korea creates a condition which inhibits our freedom of action in adhering to the principles of international law with respect to war criminals;
- c.
- Discussions in the armistice negotiations regarding the disposition of accused war criminals would, as a minimum, provide the Communists with a field of propaganda and could result in delaying the recovery of UN and ROK prisoners of war or even militate against the release by the Communists of a maximum number of these prisoners. Accordingly, such discussions should be minimized although the arrangements must insure that any exchange which is arranged on an all-for-all basis includes prisoners held by both sides who are suspected, accused, or convicted of war crimes and those prisoners who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses;
- d.
- In view of the Oriental attitude toward human life and of the enemy’s known disregard for international conventions and humanitarian considerations, it can be expected that the Communists will react harshly in reprisal to any attempt by the United Nations forces to withhold for trial prisoners of war accused of any crime. Such a reaction would probably include the withholding of a similar or greater number of UN and ROK prisoners for trial and possibly summary execution, on trumped-up charges. Such procedures would be followed by the Communists for propaganda purposes and as face saving devices, if for no other reason; and
- e.
- It is recognized that if war criminals are relinquished without trial or punishment, public resentment will undoubtedly be generated in the United States and other affected nations, including the Republic of Korea. On the other hand, it is believed that a greater number of the people of these countries would strenuously oppose a breakdown of armistice negotiations over this issue with the consequent exposure of UN and ROK prisoners of war to barbaric Communist reprisals which would inevitably follow United Nations trials.
3. In view of the great value for propaganda purposes, and again in view of the oriental attitude toward human life, it is conceivable that the Chinese might not agree to relinquish UN personnel whom they have charged with war crimes. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that in this eventuality the UN armistice negotiators propose that such prisoners held by both sides be delivered into the custody of the Armistice Commission.
4. On balance then, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the best interests of the United States would be served if, in the event of an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war in Korea, those prisoners of war accused of either conventional war crimes or post-capture offenses be relinquished by the United Nations forces, and be included in the exchange of prisoners as mutually agreed upon in the terms of the armistice. Accordingly, they recommend that this policy be approved and that there be no deviation from a final United States position of an all-for-all exchange of prisoners.
5. In connection with the foregoing the Joint Chiefs of Staff would record their concern over the fate of those enemy prisoners of war who have voluntarily aided the United Nations Command. They have no concrete suggestion by which the exchanging of this group of prisoners can be avoided, but would welcome any solution of the problem which, while insuring the return of a maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners in Communists hands, would also preserve the lives of those prisoners in United Nations forces hands who have rendered outstanding assistance to the United Nations Command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with General Ridgway that the proposal by the Department of State for the parole of these groups by him is not an acceptable solution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their view that this consideration not be permitted to jeopardize the main purpose of the negotiation, which is to obtain the early release by the Communists of the maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners of war.
6. In response to the request for recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the instructions which should be furnished General Ridgway on the disposition of those prisoners who are accused of conventional war crimes or who have been convicted or are [Page 1227] awaiting trial for post-capture offenses, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would state that this problem is of secondary importance to the matter of the release by the Communists of the maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners of war.
7. In light of all the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:
- a.
- Approval as a matter of urgency of the draft message to CINCFE which was forwarded with their memorandum to you dated 15 November 1951, subject “Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners”; and
- b.
- Approval of a reply to CINCFE’s message CX 58195 along the following
lines:
“Planned procedure in urad CX 58195 approved. Discussions in armistice negotiations regarding the disposition of war criminals should be minimized although the arrangements must insure that any exchange which is arranged on an all-for-all basis includes prisoners held by both sides who are suspected, accused, or convicted of war crimes and those prisoners who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses. In the event the Communists refuse to agree to arrangements for the above exchange you should propose that such prisoners held by both sides be delivered into the custody of the Armistice Commission. JCS have no concrete suggestions but would welcome any solution of the problem which, while insuring the return of the maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners in Communist hands, would also preserve the lives of prisoners in UN hands who have rendered outstanding assistance to the UN Command.
“Recognizing that a completely acceptable solution of this problem is improbable and that we may be forced to return to the Communists certain personnel whose retention would be desirable, JCS assume that you are maintaining a complete record of individuals in the categories indicated in subparagraph 1 d of your CX–58195 for such use as may later be desirable.”
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff