Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 162: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East ( Ridgway ) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
C–58288. CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 493 for info.
“Report of armistice conference 29 November. Convened 1100.
“1. Nam Il opened with a statement along the following lines: UNC third and fourth principles are inappropriate, impracticable and absolutely not acceptable. A military armistice should lead to a peaceful settlement which would render resumption of hostilities impossible. Therefore, the question of withdrawal of foreign troops must be settled before any other matters concerning prevention of a resumption of hostilities are discussed. Its discussion should follow immediately upon the fixing of the military demarcation line. It was at the insistence of the UNC delegation that it was agreed to settle a simple military armistice first leaving the question of withdrawal of troops to another conference. However, the UNC delegation now insists on extensive discussions of measures to prevent resumption of hostilities under agenda item 3. We are in favor of doing so. How can the resumption of hostilities after the signing of the armistice be prevented? The UNC holds that both sides should maintain the forces. We agree to defer this to item 5. However, since UNC insists upon discussing broad question of preventing resumption of hostilities under the third item, we agree and insist upon starting with the discussion of the withdrawal of foreign troops. We still maintain that the 5 principles proposed by our side provide an adequate solution to agenda item 3.
“2. UNC delegation stated that deliberations should be limited to considerations within the powers of the respective commanders to implement; that security of forces during an armistice could not be left to political considerations beyond their purview. UNC stated it cannot consider any proposal which would omit from the agreement [Page 1202] provisions for the security of its forces and the stability of the armistice during its duration. Specifically, it insisted upon provisions against increase in military capabilities and provision for observation of the adherence of both sides to such limitations during the period a military armistice is in effect.
“3. Nam Il replied in the following vein: ‘To safeguard against the resumption of hostilities steps must be taken immediately to eliminate the state of war and not to maintain it. Discussion must begin immediately on the withdrawal of foreign troops. The UNC wants to discuss limitations upon the increase of military forces. We consider this is not enough. If the UNC agrees to discuss conditions to prevent the resumption of hostilities why does it not agree to discuss the decrease of the military forces by stages?’
“4. UNC replied that the delegations were to work out a military armistice, not write a peace treaty. It said that if an agreement on an armistice can be reached there will be a cessation of hostile acts, but that a peaceful settlement will require further negotiations in which the present delegations will not take part. UNC said that it was empowered to take only the first step in the process of going from war to peace, that is a military armistice. It said question of withdrawal of troops must be left to a later conference; that we could make recommendations to the governments concerned on this question but do no more. It asserted that discussion on this point should be held under agenda item 5.
“5. Nam Il replied as follows: ‘The UNC says the withdrawal of troops is not within scope of third item. But it insists upon discussing extensive measures for preventing resumption of hostilities. Withdrawal is the essential condition to prevent resumption of hostilities. After withdrawal there will be no question on an increase of forces. If the UNC insists on broad discussions of measures for preventing hostilities under the third item of the agenda it cannot avoid the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops. If the UNC has the authority to discuss the question of a limitation upon the increase of foreign forces in Korea, how is it that it does not have the authority to discuss their withdrawal? Is not the UNCs statement that it is not empowered to discuss withdrawal simply a device for opposing the withdrawal of troops from Korea to facilitate the resumption of hostilities at a time of its own choosing?’
“6. When UNC proposed a recess for lunch Nam Il proposed recess until 1100 tomorrow. UNC concurred. Meeting recessed 1235. Signed Joy”.