Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 151: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East ( Ridgway )

top secret
operational immediate

JCS–88226. From JCS.

1. A. General comments in part 1 your GX 31001 indicate that paras 1 and 2 of DA 874522 fail to convey clearly to you the intent of JCS. JCS have never visualized immediate withdrawal of UN forces from Korea upon conclusion of an armistice, but instead have held that withdrawal is unrelated to a mil armistice. For your info but not for discussion at the armistice negotiations, JCS hold that under certain circumstances it may be in the mil interests of the United States to effect a phased withdrawal of our forces from Korea, However, our primary goal continues to be the attainment of an armistice satisfactory to United States.

B. In seeking this armistice JCS do not desire to curtail planned action on your part which would insure the security of UN forces. [Page 1194] They share your concern in this regard and agree that detailed inspection, as you envisage it, would contribute to this security and is thus essential.

2. In view of foregoing and desirability of achieving both ground and aerial observation as indicated in JCS 87239, Nov 51,3 JCS desire that you adopt the position outlined in part 6, paras a, b, and c of your C 52227, Oct 51,4 as your initial position and as amplified by para 15 of your GX 3100. It is assumed that prior to formal submission of proposal for inspections, you will have set forth, under item 3 of agenda the proposed agreements on buildup, introduction of new equipment, etc; in accordance with your basic instructions in JCS 95354, Jun 51.5 JCS are concerned over the possible inadequacy of ground observation teams to maintain surveillance of airfields of North Korea numbering approx 100. If you are satisfied that adequate surveillance can be performed from the ground so as to insure against possible surprise air attack orginating from NK bases, you are also authorized to stand on the final position which you outline in part 6 your C 52227. If further study of this final position indicates essentiality of aerial observation, or negotiations with Communists as they develop indicates a modification of your security requirements, JCS will have to give consideration to possible change in the final position.

3. If negotiations are broken off over this issue, the decision to cease discussion of an armistice must be made by Communists and not by UNC.

  1. Dated November 24, p. 1173.
  2. Dated November 19, p. 1148.
  3. Dated November 16, p. 1142.
  4. Dated October 4, p. 997.
  5. Dated June 30, p. 598.