Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 143: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, 27 November 1951—10:11 p. m.

C–58115. My C–58114.¹ After ratification of agenda Item 2, UNC asked that before delegations go on to discussion of agenda Item 3 they entertain a suggestion that would in due course facilitate the solution of agenda Item 4. The suggestion was that both sides exchange (1) names, nationality and identifying data of POW’s, (2) the location of POW camps and (3) the number by nationality, of POW’s in each camp.

Nam Il noted this suggestion and went on to make a formal proposal of general principles for consideration under agenda Item 3. These were: 1) All armed forces of both sides, including regular and irregular units and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces, shall cease all hostilities from the day of the signing of the armistice agreement. 2) All armed forces of both sides shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within 3 days after the signing of the armistice agreement. 3) All armed forces of either side shall be withdrawn, within 5 days after the signing of the armistice agreement, from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of the other side, with the military demarcation line as the dividing line. If they are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no reason for delaying the withdrawal, the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order. 4) All armed forces of both sides shall not enter the demilitarized zone and shall not carry out any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone. 5) Both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form an arimstice commission to be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangement and the supervision of the implementation of the armistice agreement.

The UNC noted this proposal and made an opening statement on agenda Item 3 which recommended that the following be included in the concrete arrangements. 1) Details of Cease-fire, removal of troops from the demilitarized zone and civil administration of the demilitarized zone. 2) Measures which will reduce the possibility of resumption of hostilities. 3) The establishment of a supervisory organization to include joint observer teams. 4) The authority for the supervisory organization and its joint observer teams to observe in such parts of Korea as necessary.

At 1200 the conference recessed to resume at 1430.

Nam Il opened afternoon session with preliminary response to UNC proposal. He expressed general agreement with 1st principle. With respect to the 2nd he expressed fundamental stand of Communists that a ‘thorough peaceful solution which alone can prevent resumption of hostilities required the convening of a conference at a higher level to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops and similar matter.’ He stated that this was the purpose of agenda Item 5; that the purpose of the present conference is to attain a military armistice and that it cannot solve such questions as these as expressed in the 2nd principle of the UNC. In this connection, it was notable that in presenting their proposal the Communists ignored the question of joint inspection, and in commenting on the UNC proposal they again ignored the question of joint inspection.

With reference to UNC 3rd and 4th principles Nam Il said that they corresponded to Communists 5th principle. As to authority of armistice commission, he said, it should be limited to that necessary to supervise implementation of armistice terms. In closing, he said delegations should seek to reach agreement on subjects within scope of a military armistice.

UNC commented on Communist proposal saying it was inadequate as an expression of principles under the wording of agenda Item 3 and proposed a list of general principles to be adopted prior to referring the problem to a sub-committee for detailed solution. These were:

1. There shall be a cease fire, effective within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice agreement, and adhered to by all forces of any type under the control of either side.

2. There shall be established a supervisory organization, equally and jointly manned by both sides, for carrying out the terms of the armistice agreement.

3. There shall be no increase of military forces, supplies, equipment, and facilities by either side after the signing of the armistice.

4. The military armistice commission, in carrying out its supervisory functions, shall have free access to all parts of Korea, for itself and for the joint observation teams responsible to the armistice commission.

5. There shall be a withdrawal of forces of each side, air, ground and naval, regular and irregular, from the territory controlled by the other side.

6. There shall be no armed forces in the demilitarized zone except as specifically and mutually agreed by both sides.

7. The military commanders shall administer their portion of the demilitarized zone in accord with the terms of the military armistice agreement.

Nam Il stated that these 7 principles were only an elaboration of the UNC proposal of the morning session to which he had already made a preliminary response. He then proposed a recess until 1100 tomorrow to enable both sides to study the opinions expressed by the other side.²

1. Not printed. It reported on the acceptance by both delegations at the plenary meeting on November 27 of the demarcation line submitted by the subdelegations. It then listed the coordinates of the line of demarcation. A map illustrating the line is printed as Map IV in Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front.

2. General Ridgway transmitted the following message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his telegram CX–58313, November 30:

   “Ref my C–58115. Urmsg JCS–88055.

   “Urmsg forwarded to delegation. Afternoon plenary session was underway when urmsg recd at Munsan. Consider that UNC delegation properly presented our position. To counter Communist proposal and to maintain initiative, it was nec to present 7 principles as outlined C–58115.

   “Para 2, JCS 88055 noted.” (Black Book, Tab 167) For text of telegram JCS–88055, see footnote 2, p. 1180.