795.00/11–2651
Memorandum of Conversation, by Walter N. Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
Summary JCS Meeting, November 26.1
Admiral Fechteler asked how the British felt about a naval blockade in the event of a renewed Communist attack. He was informed that the [Page 1178] British might find it more difficult to accept than air action, against Chinese bases. When asked about figures as to strategic material going into China, Admiral Fechteler stated he did not have any but that it was impossible to contemplate as much traffic as there is into Hong Kong and imagine that it is not going into Communist China.
In opening the discussion on the inspection question, Mr. Hickerson said that in a telegram of November 23 [24] General Ridgway had stated that the Communists might prolong or break off the negotiations if we insisted on inspection in the non-demilitarized zone and then recommended that we should still insist on it. Mr. Hickerson stated that if that estimate is correct we attach greater importance to inspection than to getting an armistice. The security of troops is, of course, a function of the military and in case it was really essential we could not press for a relaxation. General Vandenberg said that from a military point of view we should not go below what General Ridgway suggested. General Hull said that General Ridgway’s suggestion would provide military security, but whether we would stand or fall on it is a question. Of course, without some inspection there is no real security. Mr. Bohlen doubted the possibility of Communist acceptance of the type of inspection recommended by General Ridgway.
General Vandenberg recalled his talk with General Ridgway and said that the latter was convinced that the Communists were badly hurt. If that was the case, they would have to accept anything reasonable from our point of view. He raised the possibility that the Communists were scheming to renew the fight under more favorable conditions to them. Mr. Bohlen said that the Communist position on this issue was not a black and white proposition. Even if they were in bad shape, they would not agree to terms under which their hold on North Korea would become untenable. The Communists are faced by a balance of considerations just as we are.
General Vandenberg said that the alternative to an armistice was worse than an armistice. This fact must be weighed against the possibility of a renewed Communist attack after a big build-up. In the event of no inspection, we could not guard ourselves against a surprise attack. Our intelligence might be as ineffective as on June 25, 1950. Admiral Fechteler said we should support the man in the field. General Hull stated in the event of no inspection, General Ridgway ran a serious risk of being overrun by a surprise attack.
Mr. Johnson stated that the real deterrent to a renewed Communist attack was the overall U.S.-UN strength. When the possibility of an overwhelming surprise attack next spring was raised again, Mr. Bohlen [Page 1179] asked how our forces could protect themselves against the enemy buildup in the event of no armistice. Both Generals Vandenberg and Hull stated that our forces were relatively safe in that event.
Mr. Bohlen said that General Ridgway recognized that his position tended to “freeze” us. We should not advance a final “take it or leave it” proposition. There is a vast area (of compromise) between a position on no inspection and General Ridgway’s present position.
When asked whether he envisaged a North Korean or Chinese surprise attack, General Vandenberg thought that the Chinese would leave enough forces to dominate the entire area. Mr. Bohlen suggested that the Russians might not be pleased with Chinese interference in a Russian area. He thought that the Russians wanted an armistice because of their fear of general war. General Vandenberg suggested that the Communist air buildup indicated that the armistice was not started for the purpose of actually getting one.
Mr. Bohlen stated that nowhere along the periphery of the Soviet Union is there much protection and security for forces of the free world. Are we not asking for something in Korea that we do not have anywhere else? When mention was made of the atomic sanction in the event of a Soviet attack against Germany, Mr. Bohlen said that consideration was being given to the question of whether sanctions against China were enough. Mr. Matthews stated that if General Ridgway said that inspection was necessary for the security of his forces, it could not be argued. The matter should, however, be referred to the President.
Mr. Bohlen said that we could not tell General Ridgway that his proposition is our final position and subsequently—if the Communists reject it—pull away from it. What if the Communists meet us halfway and make a counter proposal? Is it necessary to say this is the final position?
Mr. Bohlen suggested that General Ridgway should tell the Communists what he wanted to inspect against. It would help us a lot if things came to a break and we would be able to say that we wanted to inspect in order to check on the armistice terms against a buildup.
The question was raised whether this meant that restrictions and inspection be discussed simultaneously. The suggestion was then made that the discussion of restrictions precede inspection. Changes in the wording of the message were discussed and incorporated.
Because of the delay involved in sending the message, the question was raised whether a message regarding our initial position should be sent. It was decided that General Ridgway had the initial position, [Page 1180] and that pending the sending out of a message on inspection, an interim message be sent telling General Ridgway to start with the problem of limiting an arms buildup.2
-
This memorandum summarized the discussion held at a State–JCS meeting in the morning of November 26. The State Department draft memorandum on the substance of the discussion (not printed) does not list Mr. Treumann as a participant for the Department of State, which was represented by Messrs. Matthews, Bohlen, Hickerson, Bonbright, Johnson, and Ferguson, but presumably Mr. Treumann’s memorandum was drawn up on the basis of notes taken by Mr. Johnson. Generals Vandenberg and Hull and Admiral Fechteler were the principal representatives for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the absence of Generals Bradley and Collins who were in Rome attending the meeting of the NATO Council which took place from November 24 to 28, 1951. (S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 728)
The purpose of the State–JCS meeting was to discuss a proposed message in reply to telegram GX–3100 TAC KCG, November 24, from General Ridgway, p. 1173.
↩ -
The Joint Chiefs sent the following message to General Ridgway in telegram JCS 88055, transmitted at 6:39 p. m. on November 26:
↩“From JCS.
“1. Reur GX 3100 TAC KCG, JCS assume that prior to formal submission to Communists of proposal for inspection under item 3 of agenda you will have proposed the conditions outlined in paras 4e and 4f of your basic instructions governing armistice negotiations (JSC 95354, 30 Jun 51).
“2. Approval of your initial position as given in JCS 84817, 23 Oct 51, is reaffirmed. Guidance relative to a final position will be provided you at an early date.” (Black Book, Tab 139) For General Ridgway’s response, see footnote 2, p. 1188. For the text of telegram GX–3100, see p. 1173.