795.00/11–1651
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)
no distribution
Subject: Item Three, Korean Armistice Agenda
| Participants: | JCS: General Collins, Gen. Twining, Admiral Fechteler, Admiral Lalor. |
| State: G—Mr. Matthews | |
| S/P—Mr. Nitze | |
| UNA—Mr. Hickerson | |
| FE—Mr. Johnson |
A meeting was held with the Joint Chiefs at 11:45 a. m. today to discuss the inspection provisions of the UNC proposals under item 3 of the Korean armistice agenda. Various questions were asked by the State representatives concerning the JCS attitude on such problems as the increase in the Communist military capability by the rebuilding of airfields, railroads and roads; the degree of inspection of compliance with the armistice which the JCS considered essential; activities of Communist inspectors in South Korea, etc.
In general, the discussion was directed towards determining the views of the JCS concerning the absolute minimum of inspection considered militarily essential, the State representatives expressing the view that, as realized from the beginning of the discussions, inspection within Communist-held territory was the most difficult point in [Page 1142] the armistice agreement in view of the great Communist sensitivity to outside observation of conditions in their territories. There was some discussion of the likelihood of enlarged hostilities, particularly against China, in the event that following an armistice agreement there was a renewal of Communist aggression in Korea and the relationship of this to observance of the armistice terms by the Communists. There was also discussion of the relationship of over-all U.S. and Communist military strength in the Far East to the question of renewal of hostilities in Korea in the event an armistice was concluded. It was the view of the Chiefs, as expressed by General Collins, that in the absence of a firm agreement at a political level concerning action which would be taken against China in the event of a major violation of the armistice conditions, particularly action by the UK concerning a blockade of China, it would be essential to insist upon the present instructions to Ridgway (that is, inspection teams at key points in North Korea) as a minimum U.S. position. It was agreed that State would explore the possibilities of such a political agreement and that Ridgway would be informed accordingly.
After the meeting, JCS telegram No. 872391 was drafted by Admiral Lalor and Mr. Johnson, and subsequently cleared by Mr. Matthews, Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Nitze for State.
- Infra.↩