Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

320/11–1151: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

secret
priorty

Washington, November 15, 1951—7:07 p. m.

Gadel 159. Re Delga 143, Nov. 11.¹

Dept believes appropriate to reaffirm in gen terms UC need for additional troops Korea during Comite debate CMC Report.² While Dept continues in favor postponement consideration Kor item (Gadel 60)³ during present state negots, this fact shld not be bar to emphasizing continued need additional forces Korea on appropriate occasions.

Dept agrees that we shld continue press hard for more troops Korea. You will recall we have in past conducted and are presently carrying on negots with nbr Govts with view getting additional forces. Our efforts have not abated as result armistice negots. Our assumption has been and is that regardless outcome armistice negots Korea, there is real need for additional troops. If armistice talks break down, need for more troops will be self-evident. On other hand, if Armistice negots successful and hostilities terminated, still be great need for troops because substantial ground forces must remain considerable time Kor in order maintain strong UN position, insure against possible renewal aggression. We believe firmly strong UN position Kor will contribute measurably in subsequent dipl efforts toward Kor settlement.

Comment in Comite by US Del might reaffirm publicly what we have stressed in extensive bilateral negots, i.e., that each state has stake in collective action against aggression, and it is matter of self-interest for each to make maximum contribution. It might further reemphasize our desire to broaden UN character of Kor operation and thereby make more equitable sharing of sacrifice.

Del will, of course, wish avoid sharp critical tone which might hamper Dept’s continued bilateral efforts and provoke resentment which wld not only have adverse effect upon our efforts this regard but endanger support on CMC Report itself and other matters of importance, as well as offer ammunition Commie propaganda. We desire further to avoid giving any impression in GA that action against aggression in Korea is unilateral US effort as Soviet propaganda contends.

Dept believes wld be particularly advantageous for US Del to avail self informal opportunities with other dels to stress continued UC need for additional troops Korea.

Webb

1. The text of this message from Paris read as follows:

   “Views expressed by some reps on GADel in informal discussion with members of staff are that securing additional troops for Korea from other states is important and urgent from congressional and American public opinion standpoint, and that US is bearing too heavy and too disproportionate share of Korean ground forces burden. In opinion of these reps we ought to take every occasion in and out of Assembly to point this out and press hard for more troops even to point of shaming those who have not contributed or contributed too little.

   “GADel staff explained in considerable detail the considerations underlying present troop situation, country-by-country, and past and current efforts in this regard. Mindful of Gadel 60 [footnote 3, below] particular point that was raised in discussion and on which GADel would like Dept guidance was whether on occasion of debate on CMC report in comite, we should take opportunity to stress need for more Korean troops from others.” (320/11–1151)

2. For documentation on the Collective Measures Committee, see vol. i, pp. 616 ff.
3. Dated November 4, p. 1087. On November 13, the General Assembly had placed on the agenda of its Sixth Session the item on the problem of the independence of Korea and the report of UNCURK and referred it to the First Committee which did not take it up until January 1952.