Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 97: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

top secret
operational immediate

CX–57332. Desire you press for early settlement item 2 of agenda negotiations on basis present line of contact as “a provisional line of demarcation[”] with clear understanding that agreement as to this provisional line will remain valid only for definite period during which agreement must be reached on remainder of agenda. Period of 1 month is suggested. It will be made clear that, if at end of stated period settlement has not been reached on all items of agenda, agreements with respect to location of this provisional line of demarcation will no longer be valid, and a new, although not necessarily a different median line will have to be established.

If Communists raise difficulties about agreeing to location of actual line of contact, suggest you attempt to get agreement on basis of map, making such concessions as are not significant, or if this is impossible that you work out such methods of checking line as would be acceptable to you (such as marking and aerial photography), and as will not compel suspension of operations, other than as already provided in Kaesong area.

You will inform Communist delegation that above is with understanding that both sides will be unrestricted in their ground, naval and air operations until armistice agreement is accomplished in full. It is desirable that prefatory paragraph be [to?] actual agreement on agenda item number 2 be couched in terms such as “the Representatives of the United Nations Command, the NKPA and Chinese Peoples Volunteers do reaffirm their understanding that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice document and do agree that … et cetera.” Further, it is desirable that the word “provisional” be used to modify the terms “demilitarized zone” and “median line” wherever appropriate.

Attempts to attain the objectives of previous 2 paragraphs must be guided by the desirability of getting through with item number 2 as promptly as possible.