Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/11–1551: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

secret

Belgrade, November 15, 1951—1 p. m.

643. Embtel 640, rptd Paris 108, London 117.¹ During conversation with Tito yesterday I referred to hot-and-cold Soviet tactics in Korean armistice negots and asked for his analysis. He said Soviets, in any negots arouse expectations as much as possible by conducting negots up to point where agreement seems imminent, then refuse to conclude and attempt to throw blame on opposition for failure. Tito regards this tactic as part of Soviet war of nerves, ultimate aim of which is to break opposition thru succession of shock treatments. Immediate aim is to keep world conditions as unsettled as possible. He admitted he was “familiar” with Soviet methods and said only answer was to refuse to yield an inch.

This Soviet tactic in international affairs recalls method used to break political prisoners, on whom alternation of hope and despair is practiced until prisoner cracks under strain.

Sent Dept 643, rptd info Paris 109, London 119.

Allen

1. Not printed; it reported briefly on the signing of the United States-Yugoslav Mutual Assistance Agreement (768.5 MAP/11–1451). For documentation on Yugoslavia, see volume iv .