Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/11–1051

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, November 10, 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Department of Defense has a number of comments and recommendations to make on the two alternative State Department draft position papers on Korea prepared for the guidance of the US Delegation to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly. These drafts, numbered SD/A/C.1/367 and 368, were attached with a letter of 19 October 1951 from the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to the Assistant to the Secretary for International Security Affairs.¹ Accordingly, I am transmitting herewith, for your information and consideration, a memorandum of 7 November 1951 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which I concur. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have inclosed a study of UN action against aggression in Korea, which I believe may be of assistance to the Department of State and to the US Delegation.

I wish to call your attention to paragraph 4 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which raises the point that an indefinite prolongation of armistice negotiations has not been given sufficient attention in the position paper. I strongly recommend that the position paper on Alternative I (No Armistice), especially paragraph 3 of the recommendation, be revised in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense recommends that the US Delegation be instructed, in its discussions of UN action against aggression in Korea, to present and seek concurrence in substantially stronger resolutions to cover both alternatives, each of which should include a statement expressing satisfaction at the task performed by the UN forces. It appears to me that the General Assembly has the definite responsibility of reiterating its support of General Ridgway and his Command in their efforts to achieve an armistice. I would also like to point out that the US should not bind itself categorically in the General Assembly to “maintain troops in Korea as long as necessary in order to insure the defense of the Republic of Korea against renewed aggression.” The sentence in Paragraph A of the Discussion in SD/A/C.1/368 containing this statement should be deleted.

The representatives of the Department of Defense in Paris will be available to assist in the revisions of these position papers.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense

top secret

Washington, 7 November 1951.

Subject: United Nations Action Against Aggression in Korea

1. This memorandum is in reply to your memorandum dated 24 October 1951,² in which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested on two Department of State draft position papers, both on the above subject, intended for guidance for the United States delegation to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, as alternative papers, one to be followed in the event there is no armistice; the other, in the event an armistice is achieved.

2. In the event current armistice negotiations in Korea fail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the tenor of the resolution to be sponsored by the United States should be such as to accentuate, to a greater extent than is now proposed, the changed situation which will then be confronting the United Nations. The necessity of applying more decisive measures than heretofore should therefore be emphasized.

3. In the event an armistice in Korea has been achieved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the proposed Recommendations of the United States position paper should include the following:

a. The proposed resolution to be sponsored by the United States delegation should negate the statement or implication that with the achievement of an armistice the mission of the United Nations forces in Korea has been accomplished;

b. The continuing necessity of maintaining substantial United Nations forces in Korea, at least until agreement has been obtained on a satisfactory political settlement, should be stressed without, however, making a rigid commitment to maintain forces indefinitely in Korea; and

c. The United States should take steps to prevent at this time the establishment of any conference for the discussion of other Far Eastern questions following the Korean settlement, if such discussions are to include matters pertaining to the status and ultimate disposition of Formosa.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the position to be taken in the event that negotiations are indefinitely prolonged has not been given the consideration it warrants. In view of the past course of the armistice negotiations, it would appear that this situation might well be more likely during the current session of the United Nations General Assembly than the two courses given primary consideration in the Department of State position papers. Accordingly, this problem deserves immediate additional study. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that under these conditions certain nations may be reluctant to adopt any strong resolution or to take any other vigorous action. However, it is believed that as a very minimum the United States should adopt a resolution strongly backing the United Nations Commander in his efforts to achieve an armistice, strongly condemning the dilatory and delaying tactics of the Communist negotiators and the regimes they represent.

5. Enclosed herewith, for your information, is a study which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had prepared on the subject of this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

W. G. Lalor

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Secretary

[Subenclosure]

Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

top secret

[Washington,] 7 November 1951.

Study on United Nations Action Against Aggression in Korea

1. If the current armistice negotiations in Korea fail, that failure will have occurred despite the best efforts of the United Nations Command. Such failure might indicate the desire of the enemy to prolong hostilities in Korea for an indefinite period at approximately the same scale as heretofore. Such failure would be indicative that the politico-military measures which the United Nations has applied thus far have not been effective in achieving its objectives in Korea and may not be adequate for this purpose in the future.

2. The Communist forces in Korea have the capability of increasing their scale of ground operations. They have built up their air potential to a point where United Nations superiority in the air in Korea is already being challenged and, if this potential were fully employed, it could jeopardize the security of United Nations forces. This could come about as a result of a massive air attack or of progressively heavier and sustained enemy air operations.

3. In the event the armistice negotiations fail, United States public opinion may demand adoption of military measures adequate to achieve a satisfactory military conclusion of the Korean struggle.

4. If the Communists cause the armistice negotiations to fail, such act must, in common prudence from a military point of view, be interpreted to signify the Communist intention to continue hostilities for an indefinite period on the present, or perhaps, on an expanded scale. The United Nations, therefore, should consider more decisive measures than have been applied heretofore in Korea. The intention to do so should be reflected in the proposed resolution. Mere adaption of previous resolutions could easily be interpreted by the member nations as indicative of a passive attitude and could thus fail to stimulate support for the more positive measures which the changed situation would properly demand.

5. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated 31 August 1951,³ the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their views regarding the inclusion of nonbelligerent nations as members in any conference dealing with a political settlement in Korea, and at that time pointed out that neither Communist China nor the USSR is a belligerent in the Korean war. They further felt that the membership of such a conference should be limited to representatives of belligerent nations in addition to the delegation appointed by the United Nations.

6. In the event an armistice in Korea is achieved, there will be a continuing necessity to retain sizable United Nations forces there at least until agreement has been reached on a satisfactory political settlement.

7. It is noted (page 1343 of Alternative II)⁴ that the United Kingdom has in mind that, after agreement is reached on a Korean settlement, the same conference might also deal with other Far Eastern problems. A discussion of other Far Eastern questions immediately following a Korean settlement would be premature, particularly inasmuch as such a discussion would, among other matters, almost inevitably deal with the status and ultimate disposition of Formosa. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated 24 October 1951, presented their views as to the conditions which should obtain prior to the submission of the Formosa problem to an international conference.⁵

8. In view of all of the foregoing, the tenor of the resolution to be sponsored by the United States during the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in the event current armistice negotiations in Korea fail should be such as to accentuate, to a greater extent than is now proposed, the changed situation which will then be confronting the United Nations. The necessity of applying more decisive measures than heretofore should, therefore, be emphasized. Specifically, the United States should seek to cause the United Nations, among other things, to take official cognizance of the following:

a. Failure of the armistice negotiations has occurred despite the best efforts of the United Nations Command, and this failure can be directly attributed to the unreasonable demands of the Communists;

b. Failure of the armistice negotiations reveals the Communist intention to prolong hostilities in Korea and to avoid settlement by peaceful means, except on their own terms;

c. In furtherance of this intention, the Communists have used the period of negotiation to effect a substantial build-up of men and matériel in their ground and air forces; and

d. In view of the Communist determination and increased capability for continuing their aggression in Korea, United Nations members should increase and intensify assistance to the United Nations action in Korea, concurrently, undertaking the examination of additional measures to repel this aggression and to safeguard the security of the United Nations forces in the Korean area.

9. In the event an armistice in Korea has been achieved, the proposed Recommendations of the United States position paper should include the following:

a. The membership of the conference dealing with the political settlement in Korea should be limited to representatives of belligerent nations in ‘addition to the delegation appointed by the United Nations;

b. The proposed resolution to be sponsored by the United States delegation should negate the statement or implication that with the achievement of an armistice the mission of the United Nations forces in Korea has been accomplished;

c. The continuing necessity of maintaining substantial United Nations forces in Korea, at least until agreement has been obtained on a satisfactory political settlement, should be stressed; and

d. The United States should take steps to prevent at this time the establishment of any conference for the discussion of other Far Eastern questions following the Korean settlement, if such discussions are to include matters pertaining to the status and ultimate disposition of Formosa.

1. The letter of October 19 is not printed; the position papers may be found under date of October 12, pp. 1016 and 1020.
2. Not printed.
3. Ante, p. 878.
4. Reference is to the paragraph “Participants in a Korean Conference” in document SD/A/C.1/368, October 12, p. 1022.
5. For text of the memorandum, see p. 1842.