Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/10–2951

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

confidential

[Washington,] October 29, 1951.

Meeting With the President, Monday, October 29, 1951

korean negotiations

The President read the memorandum¹ with respect to Korea, considered it carefully, and then made the following comments:

First. That the major consideration with respect to a line is that this must be one that Ridgway is able to hold. He stated he had sent a message to General Ridgway to this effect this morning.²

Second. With respect to prisoners, that the plan to exchange all for all is, in his opinion, not an equitable basis. He does not wish to send back those prisoners who surrendered and have cooperated with us because he believes they will be immediately done away with. He points out that whereas we have lost only about 16,000 men now held by the Communists, we have about 145,000 of their prisoners.

I pointed out to the President that a situation might come about in which all other matters might be settled and a final settlement might rest on the exchange of prisoners; that the Communists had always insisted on getting back any persons who had gotten out from behind the Iron Curtain; and that we might have a real problem in determining what to do with any prisoners which were not exchanged, particularly in the very unlikely event that we could turn back only the same number of prisoners which we received. This discussion resulted in the President receding to the extent of saying that he certainly would not agree to any all for all settlement unless we received for it some major concession which could be obtained in no other way.³

James E. Webb

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State⁴

confidential

[Washington,] October 29, 1951.

Korea

The basic situation in the cease-fire talks is as follows:

a. Each side has now presented a proposed cease-fire line. The Communist proposal is generally 8 to 12 miles south of the United Nations proposal, although the Communists are willing to concede the useless tips of the Onjin peninsula on the west. However, the two proposals are responsive to each other and there would seem to be no political reason why a line cannot be found by mutual adjustment.

b. The line is only the first of the four important elements in a ceasefire. The other three are: (1) supervision and inspection; (2) provision for no reinforcement; and (3) prisoners of war. An agreement on a line would not, in itself, quickly produce an armistice since the other subjects are very difficult.

c. It is probably true that neither side is willing to take an armistice at any cost. The greater likelihood is that each is willing to take an armistice on certain terms; the real problem is, therefore, whether the terms of the two sides can be brought into adjustment.

1. Attached.
2. The message referred to has not been identified.
3. A carbon copy of this memorandum (in Black Book, Tab C) bears the following manuscript notation by U. Alexis Johnson: “We should consider how to educate Pres. a little on PW problem.”
4. The source text gives no indication of authorship.