Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 37: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East ( Ridgway ) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
priority

CX–55993. Reur JCS 84081.1

Part 1. Our basic objective in any exchange of PW resulting fm armistice negotiations is to achieve the early release by the Communists of the max nr of UN and ROK PW. Secondarily and subj always to the basic objective, our object is to injure the cause of Communism with every means at our disposal.

From the mil point of view the exchange of PW should be accomplished on a one-for-one basis to insure no mil advantage accrues to either side. However, the value to the morale of the US and UN soldier in knowing he is considered all important and the view which the US public places on the early release of UN and ROK PW transcends the immediate mil aspects. We feel, therefore, we should agree to exchange in bulk, including all-for-all, if it is found nec in order to secure agreement on the early release of UN and ROK PW or in order to prevent a breakdown of armistice negotiations.

Fm a humanitarian point of view, we sympathize with the various proposals re non-return to Communist control of Chinese nationals, NK PW who do not desire repatriation and with other spec provisions such as obtaining early return of civ internees and disposing of refugees and displaced pers. We believe however, no action should be taken now or during the negotiations which may jeopardize our basic objective to gain the release of UN and ROK PW nor should the UNC delegation press the Communists to include in the armistice agreement any exceptions or spec provisions which jeopardize the achievement of our basic objective.

Part 2. Reur par 1.

The present UNC plan for exchange of PW is based on a concept of a one-for-one exchange. If this basis is accepted by the Communists [Page 1069] and if the nr of bona-fide PW (represented by the total MIA of UNC including ROK) held by the Communists is not swelled by ROK refugees, NK civ, etc., the UNC, holding a vastly greater nr of PW than do the Communists, could hold out from the exchange those pers whose retention we deem advisable such as those Communist PW who have vol aided various UNC agencies, who are war crimes suspects or witnesses, who are intel prospects, or who do not desire repatriation or return to Communist control. Selection of those most desired would have to be made if a very large percentage elected not to be returned to Communist control. An accurate est of the total not desiring return would be difficult now, especially since there is no way of measuring what effect fear of reprisals against families of PW would affect indiv who elected non-return. Along this same line, you were informed in our radio C–530952 of action now being taken to reclassify about 41,000 impressed South Koreans from PW status to that “civilian internee”.

The refusal of Communist forces to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Con relative to reporting to ICRC, Geneva, the pris in their hands, constitutes a major obstacle to constructive planning, since UNC cannot know the nr of UN and ROK PW avail for exchange nor can UNC do other than guess what basis of exchange is most likely to prov the return of the max nr of UNC pers. The Communists, on the other hand, know through UNC reports to the ICRC the numbers and names of PW held by UNC.

From a mil standpoint, an all-for-all exchange will prov the Communists with a potential source of over 100,000 trained replacements who could be used against UNC in the event of resumption of hostilities. Balanced against this would be the return of an est max of 6,000 UN troops and about 28,000 ROK troops plus the possible return of some UN and ROK civilians.

Our present planned procedure re agenda item 4 is to attempt initially to force disclosure of names and numbers, by nationality, of all PW held by the Communists. This would assist us in bargaining more effectively. However we are convinced that, if the Communists desire to hold out certain UNC pers for a long-range indoctrination, or for any other reason, they will do so regardless of what basis of exchange is adopted, merely by deleting the names of such pers on lists furnished UNC.

In summary, it is believed auth for an all-for-all exchange should be auth if this appears nec to secure release of the max nr of UN and ROK PW, or is nec to prevent breakdown in truce negotiations. In [Page 1070] add, it may be nee, in an all-for-all exchange, to release to the Communists the fol classes of pers:

a.
Suspected war criminals and witnesses to war crimes.
b.
Intel prospects.
c.
Indiv who have voluntarily aided UNC.
d.
Indiv not desiring to return to Communist control.

In an all-for-all exchange, the UNC can probably secure the return, not only of certain UN civ, but also some named ROK civ. If it is not nec to agree to an all-for-all exchange, then the UNC can retain as many from the above classes of pers as is possible under the agreed exchange conditions.

Part 3. Reur par 2.

Discussions and agreements on agenda item 4 will undoubtedly be based on prin of Geneva Con relative to the treatment of PW. Neither the 1929 or the 1949 Geneva Con describes civ internees as PW, by definition or implication. Interjecting question of release of civ internees into discussion of PW exchange would involve reaching agreement that such internees may properly be regarded as PW. International law in this regard is obscure. Communist resistance to discussion or agreement re civ internees can be expected on the grounds that the question is political rather than mil. Assuming, however, that the opposing delegation would consent to discuss the question of releasing civ internees, there is a danger that the scope of discussion could not be limited to categories listed in your radio. Pressure from ROK to include repatriation of civ captives taken from South to North Korea by NK forces and from Communists to include return of NK refugees, could be anticipated. Many thousands of indiv are involved in these two groups. It is considered here that efforts should be directed toward effecting release on a basis of named indiv rather than categories. Rqst, therefore, that names of indiv in categories listed in your radio known or believed to be in enemy custody be furnished so that rqst for their release may be submitted at an opportune stage of negotiations. Considered aprop here for US Govt to ask ROK Govt to furnish UNC with restricted list of leading ROK civ believed to be in Communist hands for similar use by UNC delegation.

It is considered probable that with a spec all-for-all exchange or even with an agreed ratio of exchange, the UNC delegation may secure agreement on the release of some or all of these named civ without raising the larger question of exchange or return of all civ internees.

Part 4. Reur par 3.

Attainment of humanitarian objectives and of the long range objective [Page 1071] to injure the cause of Communism should depend solely on the success of negotiations in reaching agreement for exchange of PW on a more favorable basis than all-for-all. It is the conviction here that premature release of PW through parole or any other medium would be regarded by the Communists as a breach of faith, prejudicing bargaining position of UNC delegation and jeopardizing recovery of PW in enemy custody. With ref to our radio C–53095, in light of present armistice negotiations this headquarters does not anticipate auth the parole of SK civ internees unless it is clearly indicated such action will not prejudice the success of the armistice agreements.

  1. Dated October 13, p. 1034.
  2. Dated October 16, p. 1049.