795.00/10–851
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
Subject: Various Topics Concerning Korea
| Participants: | Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE | |
| Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs |
Mr. Tomlinson called on Mr. Rusk at 4:30 this afternoon by prior appointment. He opened the conversation by referring to an item appearing recently in the New York Times indicating that the Secretary had presented to a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee certain background material on the question of the recognition [Page 1006] of Communist China, including information on the British position at the time of their act of recognition in 1949. Mr. Tomlinson stated that he was raising this question solely on his own initiative and not on instructions from his Government. He wished, however, to be in a position to reply to any inquiries in this regard which the Embassy might receive from the Foreign Office.
Mr. Rusk replied that we had, in fact, orally reviewed the U.S. position in 1949 on recognition of Communist China in a recent confidential session of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee but that we had not left any documents with the subcommittee.1 Mr. Rusk further explained that, in discussing the British attitude at that time toward recognition, we had presented the general background of the reasons for British action in this regard, which Mr. Rusk understood had subsequently been made public by the British Government itself. He, therefore, did not believe that any breach of confidence had resulted from this action and stated that if confidential matters in connection with this question were, in fact, to have been raised publicly the Department would, of course, have taken action to consult with the British Government. Mr. Tomlinson expressed his satisfaction with this explanation.
Mr. Tomlinson then referred to Ambassador Kirk’s farewell visit to Mr. Vyshinsky and showed Mr. Rusk a communication from the British Foreign Office in which surprise was expressed that the Department had not seen fit to consult the British Government in advance as to the nature of Ambassador Kirk’s proposed representations on Korea. Mr. Tomlinson then inquired as to the nature of the outcome of Ambassador Kirk’s conversation with Mr. Vyshinsky.
Mr. Rusk replied by first explaining that we had not consulted the British in advance because the general nature of the position to be put forward did not represent any departure from a policy towards the Korean problem already firmly established and concurred in by both the British and United States governments and that, furthermore, the imminence of Ambassador Kirk’s departure from Moscow and his farewell call at the Soviet Foreign Office had precluded any opportunity for discussion of the matter with the British Government beforehand. Mr. Rusk remarked that he gathered from the British Foreign Office communication that the American Embassy, had given it an accurate reflection of the character of Ambassador Kirk’s representations and he assumed that the information concerning the outcome of the discussions would also be made available to it through our Embassy. Mr. Rusk then reviewed in detail for Mr. Tomlinson’s [Page 1007] benefit the nature of Ambassador Kirk’s comments upon his conversation with Mr. Vyshinsky.
Mr. Tomlinson inquired as to our impression concerning the significance of Vyshinsky’s replies to Ambassador Kirk and noted that Ambassador Kirk had stressed the desirability of having Mr. Vyshinsky call certain of the topics discussed to the personal attention of Prime Minister Stalin, a feature of the conversation of which Mr. Tomlinson believed his Foreign Office to be unaware. Mr. Rusk confirmed that Ambassador Kirk had been instructed to request Vyshinsky to convey certain of the points which he was raising to Stalin. He remarked that Mr. Vyshinsky’s reaction to the points put forward by Ambassador Kirk appeared rather inconclusive and obscure.
Mr. Rusk then raised the question of whether our action in keeping the British closely informed on Ambassador Kirk’s representations might not cause embarrassment to the Department from the other Commonwealth countries, not similarly informed, if this fact became known to them. Mr. Tomlinson did not feel that this was a likely possibility.
Mr. Rusk then commented briefly on the military situation in Korea and upon the latest information which had been received indicating that General Ridgway had accepted the Communists’ latest proposal for a change of site to Panmunjom, pointing out, however, that we had not received the official text of this reply. He also remarked that there would not appear to be any direct connection between Communist willingness to compromise on the site for a renewal of the negotiations on the one hand, and Ambassador Kirk’s representations to Vyshinsky on the other, although it was possible that some influence might later be exerted by the Soviets, as a result, upon substantive issues which might subsequently be raised in the negotiations. Mr. Rusk further explained that the discussions of General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen with General Ridgway had been for the purpose of establishing a better mutual understanding of the over-all picture with regard to the developments in Korea, with particular reference to the policy considerations surrounding the armistice negotiations.
Mr. Tomlinson remarked that from the press and other available sources one got the impression that the UN military position in Korea was not particularly favorable at this time. Mr. Rusk stated that this impression was not accurate, that our position was far stronger than was being reflected in the news and that we had perhaps made an error in stressing only enemy capabilities in the Ambassadors’ briefings which gave an unbalanced picture of the situation and which he thought might be corrected. Mr. Rusk then informed Mr. Tomlinson that our military authorities were reviewing the problem of inspection as related to a cease-fire, with the thought that such inspection might be more practicably applied by employing a type of “bottle-neck” [Page 1008] approach wherein inspection teams would concentrate on critical transportation and supply points such as harbors, important bridges, etc.
Mr. Tomlinson then raised the question of a proposed British appeal to Prime Minister Nehru to use his influence with the Chinese Communist regime in facilitating the entrance of International Red Cross representatives into North Korea for the purpose of safeguarding the welfare of UN prisoners of war. Mr. Tomlinson stated that he had recently discussed this question with Mr. Alexis Johnson and that the British Foreign Office was interested in determining whether the United States would perceive any objection to such a course of action and, if no objection were perceived, whether we would desire to associate ourselves with such an approach. He explained that the approach was envisaged in two phases, first that Prime Minister Nehru would seek to obtain Chinese Communist assistance for the entry of International Red Cross officials into North Korea; second, failing an agreement to this, Nehru would then bespeak the cooperation of the Chinese Red Cross in the handling of packages and mail for UN prisoners of war.
Mr. Rusk replied that he had been informed of the British proposal and that, in general, the Department of State could see no objection to the British approach; furthermore, if the British considered that it would be of assistance for the United States Government to associate itself with this approach, we would be inclined to do so, but that we should not be inclined to do so unless the British Government felt a substantial benefit would ensue. Mr. Tomlinson added that the British approach would, of course, be on the basis of an effort to ameliorate the condition of all prisoners of war and not just those of Great Britain. He asked Mr. Rusk’s opinion as to whether the other participating UN governments should be apprised of the British proposal. Mr. Rusk was of the opinion that at least for the present this would not be necessary or desirable.
- See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, on Nomination of Philip C. Jessup to be United States Representative to the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 624 ff. See also the editorial note, p. 1810.↩