795.00/10–151
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
Subject: Canadian Comments on Possible Course of Action in Korea in the Event that No Armistice is Reached.
| Participants: | Mr. Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador. |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs. | |
| Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs. |
Ambassador Wrong called on Mr. Rusk this afternoon at 4 o’clock by prior appointment. The Ambassador recalled that Mr. Merchant, in a recent discussion (Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation, September [Page 977] 13, 1951)1 with representatives of the New Zealand and Australian Embassies and himself, had reviewed the thinking of the Department of State on a course of action which might be followed in Korea if there were a breakdown in armistice negotiations. Ambassador Wrong also referred to an exchange of views between the Secretary and Mr. Morrison along the same general lines and stated that he had received certain of the British reactions on policy in this regard.
The Ambassador stated that he had now received Ottawa’s comments upon the considerations put forward by Mr. Merchant in his recent conversation and remarked that there would appear to be very little basic difference between Canadian views and the general thinking of the United States Government on this question. The Ambassador remarked that the military aspects of the problem had been reviewed by the Canadian General Staff and that its comments were more or less as follows: while seeing no objection to a series of tactical maneuvers and limited advances necessary to the protection of UN forces and the maintenance of local military initiative, the General Staff was not in favor of a strategic advance to the “neck” of Korea, since such an advance would not necessarily result in an overall strengthening of the UN defensive position in Korea, would lengthen UN supply lines and shorten those of the Communists and would bring UN forces within closer range of the Communist radius of air action. The General Staff also pointed out that the objective of destroying the enemy could be carried on as well along the present line as it could at the neck of Korea. The Ambassador pointed out, however, that the Canadian military authorities quite understood the necessity of maintaining freedom in local tactical operations. From the political standpoint, the Canadian Government believed it desirable that the UN nations contributing forces to Korea should be consulted before any general strategic advance to the neck of the peninsula were attempted, and that one of the factors to be considered might be the possibly adverse effect on Chinese Communist willingness to negotiate an armistice on that line as compared to the present situation. In summary, the Canadian Ambassador believed that the Canadian position was very close to that expressed by Mr. Morrison on this particular question.
Mr. Rusk pointed out that, as a practical military matter, general advance to the neck of Korea would require extensive UN reinforcement in the light of the strong position now held by the Communists [Page 978] and that such re-inforcement for various reasons was at the present time deemed impractical. What the United States sought in effect was political freedom to conduct the necessary tactical operations to keep the enemy off balance, to inflict casualties and to protect the forefront of our highly defensible “Kansas” line. He explained that, for instance, it might be militarily desirable to make tactical thrusts at the enemy which would conceivably carry as far as the neck if Communist resistance were not particularly heavy and that it would be obviously inconsistent to permit engagement in heavy fighting on a tactical basis for a gradual advance to the neck accompanied by heavy losses, and on the other hand to refrain from a more general strategic advance to that point if resistance proved weak. In essence, therefore, what was required was freedom to conduct the current tactical operations within certain limits but without too confining a political restraint, and remarked that, as a matter of fact, a gradual advance in UN lines was currently taking place as a result of the present localized UN actions. He agreed that if the neck of the peninsula were reached, new political factors would arise which would make a review of the situation with other UN governments highly desirable.
The Ambassador then stated that the Canadian Government was in entire accord with United States policy regarding a strengthening of ROK defense forces. The strengthening of Japanese defense forces was equally acceptable to Ottawa, once it was understood that such forces were not for use in Korea. With respect to the restrictions on the bombing of Rashin and the Yalu River dams, the Ambassador stated that Ottawa foresaw no difficulty over a continued bombing of Rashin if this did not involve any violation of Soviet territory, nor was there any particular objection to the bombing of the Yalu River dams which were now exporting power to Manchuria, again provided that Manchurian territory were not violated. In this connection, Mr. Rusk recalled that we had for some time been bombing the important bridges across the Yalu River while being extremely careful not to violate Chinese territory.
The Ambassador then noted that Mr. Merchant had raised the question of General Ridgway’s current instructions concerning hot pursuit in case of an all-out Communist air offensive which would seriously jeopardize the safety of UN forces, and stated the Canadian understanding as to these instructions. Mr. Rusk reviewed the United States position on this point, indicating that General Ridgway had been instructed to engage in hot pursuit only in case of a Communist air offensive against UN forces which would seriously prejudice their security, accompanied by a breakdown in communications; in any other circumstances [Page 979] General Ridgway had been impressed with the necessity of referring the matter to Washington for decision before taking action, so that opportunity could be provided for all possible consultation with the other UN governments having forces in Korea. He emphasized that General Ridgway was under no illusion as to the importance of this procedure.
With respect to the proposed courses of action in the United Nations, Ambassador Wrong explained the Canadian view that if pressure were brought upon Members for further contributions to the UN military effort in Korea, this pressure should, in the first instance, be applied to those Members not now contributing military forces; only after that should presently contributing nations be asked for further contributions.
The Ambassador then remarked that there had evidently been some confusion in terms with reference to an intensified blockade of China, the main point being whether we contemplated a tight naval blockade or something more in the general nature of a tighter economic blockade. He added that his Government was opposed to a complete economic embargo of China, since a complete embargo might have the disadvantage of creating additional strains within the membership of the United Nations now supporting the UN action in Korea, without proportionately advantageous results upon control of Chinese Communist military potential; this, however, did not refer to an embargo on military supplies and strategic materials, which the Canadian Government continues to support.
Mr. Rusk pointed out that there were two possibilities, one to place the UN fleet in such a position as to interdict all trade with the China coast by force, an action which would necessarily carry with it implications of belligerency against China, The other was to intensify a self-imposed restriction upon the use in China trade of flag vessels of each UN nation, perhaps enforced by UN naval action against such national vessels as might violate the restrictions. This latter course would avoid any question of direct belligerency and would be perhaps 95 per cent as effective. The United States Government favored a tightening of economic controls upon trade with China along the lines of this second alternative, rather than a naval blockade.
The Ambassador then asked if any late news had been received concerning the Kaesong negotiations. Mr. Rusk replied that there had been little basic change in the situation and that the Communists had not yet replied to General Ridgway’s suggestion for a change in the conference site. He indicated to the Ambassador that a new proposal from General Ridgway had been received and was under review; [Page 980] namely, that if the Communists continued adamant in insisting on the Kaesong site to the point of breaking off further negotiations, he propose that a map indicating the present military line of contact and embodying a proposal for demilitarized zone be submitted to the Communists through the UN liaison officers and that a sub-delegation discussion on the conference site might be held in which the UN Command would be willing to consider any suggestion for a site which would lie mid-way between the present battle lines.2 Mr. Rusk indicated that no decision had yet been reached in Washington on this proposal.
The Ambassador thanked Mr. Rusk for the opportunity of presenting the foregoing views of his Government and reiterated his impression that these views and those of the United States were, in general, closely parallel on matters of substance.