Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

611.61/9–2151: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ¹

top secret

Washington, September 28, 1951—9 p. m.

225. For ur info only since not yet cleared by Def or fully in Dept.

We are inclined view at present juncture may be useful you discuss with Stalin or Vyshinsky specific issue Korean armistice talks. In context specific Korean issue two points suggested by you Embtel 491 Sep 21 wld very appropriately fit.²

If you succeed seeing Stalin you might begin by outlining your personal plans as already given Vyshinsky (Deptel 224) recall to him it has been over two years since you last had opportunity having talk with him and point out many things have occurred during this period not conducive betterment relations between our two countries or easing tensions internatl relations throughout world. You shld then go on say at present moment one outstanding issue, namely Korean armistice talks, which you authorized discuss which once settled cld do far more than any other single thing ease tensions and provide atmosphere in which further constructive steps might be taken toward solution other pressing internatl problems.

You shld continue and take line that developments between UN Command and North Korean and Chi Commie negotiators are incomprehensible US Govt; that NK and Chi Commie proposal for armistice line inconsistent with current mil situation and with statements which Gromyko made to you upon occasion your call on him June 27 to clarify initiative of Malik in suggesting armistice talks between parties involved in Korean war. You shld remind him it was Malik’s speech which set off train of events leading Korean negotiations and that in your interview with Gromyko clarifying position Sov Govt Gromyko explained that Sov Govt envisaged mtg opposing commands to conclude mil armistice which wld include cease fire and which wld be limited strictly mil questions and wld not involve any polit or territorial matters (Embtels 2180 and 2181 June 27).

UN Command surprised and disappointed discover that negotiators opposing command kept insisting upon armistice line not strictly mil in character, which introduced complicated polit factors and which did not correspond understanding on which UN Command had entered negots nor does it conform with existing mil situation. To take polit step in conversations between mil commander representing UN on one side and commanders who represent so-called Chi volunteers and armed forces NK regime which enjoys no internatl status is not acceptable; polit issues Korea must be dealt with by govts concerned on responsible basis.

You shld then go on say that refusal of NK and Chi Commie negotiators reach armistice settlement based on purely milit dispositions and upon reasonable line affording safety and security to armed forces both sides wld involve possible future dangers of which Sov Govt must be well aware. If gen offensive were launched again against UN armed forces, events ensuing therefrom cld easily get out of hand and have results not desired or within present policies parties involved, including Sov Govt. US Govt for its part by its declarations and by its actions has clearly shown that it does not desire widening conflict Far East. On contrary US sincerely desires see concluded armistice on basis which provides safety for armed forces both sides and security against resumption hostilities. Armistice line not based on these factors cannot be accepted. Surely Sov govt must be fully aware dangers involved present situation if an armistice not achieved. It can see that logic of events flowing from non-conclusion armistice agreement and resumption large scale fighting wld very possibly bring about those events which our desire and presumably desire Sov Govt avoid.

This juncture you shld pause and wait for comment or retort your statements. Line taken by Stalin or Vyshinsky will probably be defense Sov Govts position, of their constant striving for peace, of their noninvolvement in Korean affair and they may also point out that Malik’s speech specifically referred to 38th parallel and assert that Secy Acheson’s statement before Congressional Comite in June indicated 38th parallel acceptable basis for concluding armistice.³ Shld they cite statements by Malik and Secy, you shld point out again statements made by Gromyko to you June 27 and fact such armistice line involves polit and territorial questions utmost importance. You shld add that of all problems and causes tension in post war world Korean problem presents clearest issue. Invasion South Korea June 25, 1950 act naked aggression oh part North Koreans—fact understood throughout world. Very fact North Korean army almost succeeded reaching Pusan early stages war demonstrates clearly upon whose responsibility aggression lay. However you have no desire now enter fruitless discussion concerning what has been done; what you wish impress upon him is seriousness present impasse in Korean armistice talks and serious eventualities which may ensue. Sov Govt must also be aware these dangers and it is hoped it will use its influence with North Korean and Chi Commie Govts to end realistic armistice agreement which wld afford safety for both sides can be achieved.

You might then remark you assume Sov Govt receiving full and objective reports concerning developments outside Sov Union and attitude US and other states confronted by Sov policies which have proved uncompromising and not contributory solution mutual problems. Sov Govt does not need be told that other nations determined defend their own way life and independence. Measures now being taken by US and other govts increase their security are for defense and defense alone. You wish assure Sov Govt that US has no aggressive designs on USSR or anyone and we hope there may soon be restored nations of world sense confidence and security which shld be conducive settlement outstanding issues embittering internatl relations. Nothing cld contribute more to this at present time than successful outcome Korean armistice talks.

You shld add that without achievement armistice Korea there is little if any prospect for solution other problems besetting us throughout world; that armistice Korea wld do far more than any other single thing open up perspectives for useful discussion other measures which may be taken alleviate existing tensions and so long as hostilities continue Korea there remain ever present dangers unwanted broadening conflict. You shld conclude by stating it is earnest hope US Govt that armistice can be achieved and that Sov Govt will use its influence that end.

If you are pressed state what you mean concrete terms by “perspectives” you shld limit your reply to gen statement you are not prepared this time go into concrete details or mention specific matters but you may allude to issues raised Paris mtgs Deputies⁴ and to other gen problems both inside and outside UN.⁵

Webb

1. Repeated for information to London as telegram 1744, to Paris as telegram 1883, and to Tokyo as telegram 510.
2. See footnotes 2 and 3, supra.
3. See the editorial note, p. 497.
4. For related documentation, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.

5. The Department sent the following message in telegram 511, September 28, 9 p. m., to Tokyo:

   “For Bohlen. Please show Deptels 509 and 510 addressed SCAP for USPolAd, Sept 28th, to Gen. Bradley. Desire ur views urgently.” (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 101)