795.00/9–2851
Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Lockhart of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea
| Participants: | Australia | —Mr. Moodie, Counselor |
| Belgium | —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor | |
| Canada | —Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor | |
| Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary | ||
| Colombia | —Mr. Pastrana, Minister Counselor | |
| Ethiopia | —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary | |
| France | —Mr. Millet, Counselor | |
| Great Britain | —Mr. Tomlinson. Counselor | |
| Greece | —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor | |
| Korea | —Absent | |
| Luxembourg | —Absent | |
| Netherlands | —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary | |
| New Zealand | —Mr. Corner, First Secretary | |
| Philippines | —Absent | |
| Thailand | —Mr. Prasong, Second Secretary | |
| Turkey | —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor | |
| Union of South Africa | —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor | |
| Mr. Botha, Second Secretary | ||
| United States | —FE, Mr. Merchant | |
| UNA, Mr. Hickerson | ||
| UNP, Mr. Wainhouse | ||
| UNP, Mr. Henkin | ||
| R, Mr. Trueheart | ||
| EUR, Mr. Allen | ||
| NA, Mr. Johnson | ||
| FE. Mr. Hackler | ||
| FE. Mr. Lockhart | ||
| FE. Mr. Barbour | ||
| FE, Mr. Johnson | ||
| Army, Captain Hooks |
Captain Hooks informed the Ambassadors that the heaviest fighting over the past three days occurred in the Hwachon and Chorwon areas and that the fierce fighting in the area of “Heartbreak Ridge” was continuing.1 There were no significant changes in the locations of enemy troops and no change in the last Far Eastern Command estimate of the enemy’s capability to launch an offensive. He stated that of the 2,953 sorties flown by United Nations aircraft during this period, 1,870 were combat sorties, and added that press accounts of air-to-air engagements were substantially correct. He also reported that the box score to date—62 MIG’s shot down as against 6 F–86’s lost—showed that the United Nations continues to maintain air superiority. Captain Hooks reported that of the 10,149 enemy vehicles sighted during the period, well over half were southbound, which led Mr. Hickerson to observe that the enemy could probably sustain a 46 division offensive for slightly longer than the 26 days as last estimated. In response to a question, Captain Hooks stated that no new information had been received concerning Soviet troops in Korea or the reported presence of “Caucasian puppet troops”.
The Belgian representative observed that all reports indicated that since the negotiations started the enemy had accomplished a considerable build-up. He asked whether the United Nations forces had been able to strengthen their position to compensate for this enemy build-up. Captain Hooks replied that, unlike the enemy, the United Nations forces had not been able to obtain substantial numbers of additional troops but that their position is not less advantageous than it was at the start of the negotiations. Mr. Merchant pointed out that it was difficult to arrive at a balance in that the communists had relied on bringing in fresh manpower whereas the United Nations forces have strengthened their own positions by building installations, maintaining air superiority, superiority in weapons and aircraft and the like. On the whole, Mr. Merchant stated, we do not feel that the enemy’s build-up has reached serious proportions as yet. Mr. Hickerson remarked that the United Nations forces have seriously disrupted the communist build-up and that the actions of both sides would have been the same even if there had been no negotiations.
The French representative, referring to a press report that United Nations bombers had recently been forced to jettison their bombs short of their target because of heavy enemy air activity, asked whether this increased enemy air activity might not be creating a new situation by preventing the United Nations from carrying out interdiction [Page 968] of enemy transportation and other tasks. This new situation, he continued, was quite apart from the question of taking retaliatory action against Manchurian bases in the event of a massive enemy air effort against United Nations ground forces and asked if there would be prior consultation with the Ambassadors. Mr. Hickerson assured him this problem had not yet become acute, but that if the enemy’s air strength does become an urgent problem, new decisions would be called for. Mr. Merchant observed that the enemy’s air strength had not yet reached highly dangerous proportions and that the enemy still confined its major operational effort to the extreme northwestern portion of Korea. The Netherlands representative remarked that he supposed that there would be prior consultation should the situation become serious.
Mr. Hickerson then informed the Ambassadors that the communists had not yet answered General Ridgway’s message of September 27 which proposed that the full delegations meet as early as possible at a point half way between the battle lines in the vicinity of Songhyon-ni in order to take up item 2 of the agenda. In response to a question why this site was suggested, Mr. Hickerson pointed out that it was actually in no-man’s land and would be neutralized only during the actual armistice sessions. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the area would be kept free of armed forces, not being in enemy hands, and that the possibility of manufactured incidents would be considerably lessened.
Mr. Hickerson then stated that as he had remarked at the previous briefing the issue of a new site for the negotiations would not be pressed to a breaking point without prior consultation with the group. He added that General Ridgway believes strongly that grave disadvantages would accrue to the United Nations if Kaesong were the site for the resumed talks and considers it of utmost and fundamental importance that a new site be selected. He added that General Ridgway believes that the communists will agree to a new site and will not make the matter an issue leading to a break-off. Mr. Merchant pointed out that General Ridgway’s proposal was not a refusal to meet at Kaesong but was a counter-offer proposing a better site in order to get the full delegations together under conditions equally fair to both sides. If the communists, he added, suggested some other site which would be satisfactory, General Ridgway would probably accept it.
Mr. Hickerson then stated that while General Bradley was taking no new instructions to Tokyo with him for General Ridgway he did expect to consult with General Ridgway and Admiral Joy to the [Page 969] fullest on both the current military situation and the armistice negotiations.2 Mr. Hickerson added that Mr. Bohlen was going along at General Bradley’s invitation.
Mr. Hickerson then informed the Ambassadors of the project which has been worked out to bring to the United States from the Korean battlefield two representative military men from each country contributing to the United Nations forces and two from each branch of the United States armed forces. This group will arrive in Washington on United Nations Day, October 24, will be presented to the President, and will, if the plan works out be awarded by President Entezam the new United Nations Korean medal. The group will then be divided into two groups to tour the United States and perhaps Canada to demonstrate the collective spirit of the United Nations and the contribution other countries are making in the Korean war. The tours will end in San Francisco on Thanksgiving Day, November 22.
It was agreed to hold the next briefing on October 2 at 3 P. M.3