795.00/9–2651: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
CX–51655. Ref telecon DA TT 5193. This msg in 4 parts.
Part 1.
Conference site.
1. My feeling is that meeting place of delegations should be between the forward elements of both sides at a point not dominated by either side. Ref DA 4, I intend to propose as an alternate site to Kaesong a location along line of contact in vicinity Songhyon-Ni BT 9701. This meeting place would minimize the difficulties which both sides have experienced at Kaesong.
2. Ref DA 5, following conditions will be specified:
A. Definition of a circular conference area having a radius of 1,000 yards centered on a selected point near Songhyon-Ni BT 9701. No armed personnel to be permitted in conference area from 0800 to 1800.
B. Both sides to refrain from acts of armed force during period of negotiations:
- (1)
- Within the conference area from 0800 to 1800 daily.
- (2)
- Along selected routes of approach to the conference area from Kaesong and from Munsan-Ni daily from 0800 to 1800.
C. Free access for both delegations and their parties to the conference area and free movement within the conference area from 0800 to 1800.
D. Patrols from each side, manned and armed as mutually agreed, to patrol along the other boundary of the conference area from 0800 to 1800. Area of patrol responsibility to be established by mutual agreement.
Part 2.
(A) Demilitarized zone.
1. I consider it implicit in exchange of views with you to date
- (a)
- That any armistice finally concluded must leave us in secure possession of the Kansas Line;
- (b)
- That we must retain in advance of the Kansas Line a security zone of adequate depth; and
- (c)
- That finally the present line of contact, if adopted as the median line of the 4 kilometer demilitarized zone, would provide this essential [Page 953] security zone and, except in the center of our present front, no more. It is my understanding that the foregoing statement, as our final minimum position, has your full support.
2. In the center of our present position we could withdraw somewhat to the south of the line of contact without essential encroachment of the minimum necessary security zone protecting the Kansas Line.
3. Such withdrawal, however, from this terrain, which was captured at considerable cost, would only be contemplated as part of an exchange by which the UNC would acquire control of a portion of the Yonan Peninsula. A withdrawal without compensation would represent a unilateral withdrawal on our part and hence an undue surrender to Communist pressure; and, not the least important, would abandon key terrain in the Chorwon Kumhwa area which controls the so-called “Iron Triangle”.
4. For the foregoing reasons, the 4 kilometer demilitarized zone based on present line of contact as the median line should be accepted as our minimum position.
5. At initial meeting of delegations on substantive matters it is proposed to present to Communists in writing and on a map the zone which was discussed with the Communist Delegates in the subcommittee meetings. At these meetings the southern boundary of a 20 kilometer zone was roughly sketched on a map by Maj Gen Hodes as possibility for discussion. This line represented concession on our part with respect to the zone formally presented by our delegation on a map at the 13 Aug plenary session. The effect of this would be to take up discussion of zone in plenary session where it ended in last subcommittee meeting. The southern boundary of this zone, subject to minor modification is as follows: AMS L 552 scale 1:250,000. From left to right YB 6391, north to YC 6102, northeast to BM 355 at CT 1719 northeast to ferry site at CT 2223, northeast to CT 4333, east to CT 6040 east to CT 7440, southeast to BM 1073 at CT 7838, northeast to CT 9742, east to Mun Dung-Ni at DT 1142 northeast to Ousil at DT 2551, northeast to DT 3362 to coast at DT 4670.
(B) Salient factors for considerations.
1. It is my view that any concession made to the Communists upon resumption of substantive discussions will be equivalent to making the first of a series of blackmail payments. While it may be trite, it is nevertheless true that blackmail never ends with the first payment. Certainly it is true in Communist dealings.
2. As stated in DA 6 it is possible that Communists may break negotiations completely if UNC Delegation does not return to Kaesong, but it is a risk I consider we should take. We must not let [Page 954] the Communists dictate all important moves. If they want an armistice, and there are strong indications that they do, they will agree to a new site. If they are indifferent about concluding an armistice, UNC Delegation will be forced to concede on most points of difference. The UNC tactical position is too strong for us to appease.
3. I still hold to my previously indicated view that, in the light of both the present tactical situation and the approach of winter, time is working for us and against the Communists. Yet, we cannot in my judgment afford to overlook the fact that time is traditionally less important to the Communists than to us.
4. It is distinctly possible, therefore, that the Communists may reason as follows: “If a 5 week layoff nets us an appreciable concession which we were unable to achieve in several weeks of negotiating, why should we not gain our next objective by staging another suspension as soon as negotiations again get sticky?”
Part 3.
1. Recommended course of action:
- a.
- State to Communists through liaison officers that our delegation will be at BT 9701 (Songhyon-Ni) at 1000I at [“] earliest possible time.” (Note: Query confirms that “time” refers to date.)
- b.
- If Communists meet at Songhyon-Ni, the UNC Delegation will attempt to limit discussion to conditions for resumption of conference and substantive items of agenda and definitely refuse to discuss past incidents.
- c.
- If Communists insist upon discussing past incidents, UNC Delegation will nevertheless read paper and present map giving position of demilitarized zone outlined in part 2 para 5.
- d.
- If Communist Delegation refuses to meet at Songhyon-Ni, abrogate the Kaesong neutral zone (see my CX[C] 50633)2 unless you have directed otherwise.
2. If these recommended courses of action are approved, I intend to send the following dispatch to the Communists: “Since you have not seen fit to give your liaison officers sufficient authority to permit satisfactory conditions to be arranged for the resumption of armistice talks, I submit the following proposal directly to you. I believe this proposal provides for arrangements that can be mutually satisfactory to both our sides.
“I propose that both delegations meet as early as possible at a point approximately midway between the battle lines in the vicinity of Songhyon-Ni.
“It would, of course, be agreed by both sides that this meeting place would be kept free of armed troops and that both sides would abstain from any hostile acts or exercise of authority over members of the other side in their passage to this point or while they are there.
“I propose that upon resumption of delegation meetings at this point, both delegations be prepared to return to the discussion of item 2 [Page 955] of the agenda immediately following any discussion that may be needed to clarify physical and security arrangements at the meeting place.
“If you concur, I will arrange to have our liaison officers meet to discuss immediate erection of the necessary physical facilities.”
Part 4.
Conclusions.
1. Recommendation contained in para 9b, my C 51575,3 represents my conviction reached after thorough and prolonged consideration with all my senior advisors and meticulous effort to carry out the spirit of your instructions.
2. I regard the issue of resumption of delegation meetings at Kaesong as the most fundamental of any so far faced. I regard retreat on this issue as surrender, which will enormously multiply our difficulties in all subsequent armistice discussions here.
3. I shall continue to do my utmost to execute faithfully your instructions, whatever be your decision on this issue of renewing delegation meetings in Kaesong. Unless, however, your decision should be to direct me to resume delegation meetings in Kaesong, I shall refrain from doing so.