Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 84: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1
flash
C–51575. Mymsg C–51545.
1. In my 3 official broadcasts to Kim and Peng of 6 Sept (my C–50292), 17 Sept (my CX 50998 to CINCUNC Adv, info to you), and 23 Sept (my C–51409), all made with your prior approval, I laid down 1 simple condition to a resumption of meetings, namely “to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for a resumption of the armistice talks.”
[Page 938]2. At 25 Sept meeting of liaison officers, the Communists continued their refusal to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for a resumption of armistice talks.
3. The Communists are thus adhering to their settled practice of dodging and evading UNC positions, sometimes adroitly, sometimes bluntly, always ceaselessly.
4. It seems clear that their purpose now is to force the UNC delegation to hold at least 1 more meeting at Kaesong. Once that occurs, all arguments, either for a new conference site, or for changed conditions at Kaesong, will lose force, and from a public opinion standpoint, will be difficult to maintain. It should be clear to both the US public and our allies that to date the unsuitable conditions at Kaesong have furnished the Communists with the means of suspending the conference talks, and a tremendously valuable propaganda platform. Continuation of those conditions would be indicative of a lack of both strength and wisdom. To go back to Kaesong either temporarily or permanently would be complete surrender to Communist aims and tactics.
5. In recent weeks I have received the unsolicited private opinions of several influential Japanese that the only way to handle the Communists is to continue to take the strong positions we have taken with them thus far. This point of view, from people who understand the Chinese and who are obviously interested in our success, lends support to the view that we should neither soften nor hasten our approach.
6. As previously stated, I shall have grave concern for the safety of our delegation while in, and enroute to and from Kaesong, if the talks are resumed there. I place no trust in Communist guarantees of safety, for if it should ever serve their purposes, they would not hesitate to stage an alleged partisan attack, disavowing all responsibility.
7. Furthermore, the ceaseless flow of protests and propaganda from the Communists about alleged UNC violations of the Kaesong area would keep the UNC always in the role of a defendant. This situation could be largely avoided in a new and properly selected site. There is no possible way now to make Kaesong a satisfactory site for further meetings of the delegations. Only complete abandonment of the old area will permit a fresh start. If done, I believe time will ultimately be saved. I further believe that, if the Communists intend to conclude an armistice, they will ultimately agree to our insistance on a new site.
8. It is my view that the UNC delegation should agree to a resumption of the armistice conferences only under conditions fully acceptable to us. It is my estimate that Communists now find themselves confronted with 2 significant factors: An unfavorable military situation and approaching winter. Time works to their disadvantage. An early [Page 939] armistice is for the Communists a matter of urgency. For our part agreement on the Kaesong issue would constitute a deplorable abandonment of all we have so far achieved; would surrender the initiative; and subject us to further outrageous demands and the ridicule of US and world opinion.
9. a. My views expressed in my C–501152 remain unaltered.
b. I therefore strongly recommend that I be authorized soonest to refuse categorically, at a time of my choosing, to send my delegation back to Kaesong and to then insist upon a new and satisfactory conference site within which security for both sides can be assured beyond any reasonable doubt.