S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 20041

United States Delegation Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of United States–French–United Kingdom Foreign Ministers1

secret
Tripartite Min–7

Members

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)

Mr. Morrison (U.K.)

M. Schuman (Fr.)

Also Present

U.S. U.K. France
Mr. Jessup Sir Oliver Franks M. Payens
Mr. Merchant Sir Pierson Dixon M. Alphand

[Here follows the first portion of the meeting dealing with the Middle East Command; for the full text of these minutes, see volume III, Part 1, page 1291. For documentation on the Middle East Command, see volume V, pages 1 ff.]

Far East

4. M. Schuman said that he believed the Ministers would be interested in information from Mr. Acheson regarding Korea, the military situation in general, and any forecast which could be made regarding the possibility of an armistice. Mr. Acheson set forth the military situation as based on current reports from the JCS and proceeded to explain what steps the United States proposed to take in case an armistice was agreed in Korea. He next outlined the steps which we propose to take if no armistice was established. This entire discussion followed closely the exposition reported in Paragraphs 1–15 of the minutes of the second US–UK meeting on September 10, 1951.2 M. Schuman thanked Mr. Acheson and indicated there was no need for discussion. He said he assumed that any questions arising in the future would be discussed in the Consultative Committee of the United Nations. Mr. Morrison said that he would report to his colleagues and see how they reacted to the US proposals. He reiterated his doubt regarding the effectiveness of a blockade or “embargo” and pointed out that Hong Kong must trade with the mainland to live. He said he believed Communist China was not a servile satellite of the USSR and that he did not desire to take any steps which would drive her toward the Soviets.

[Here follows the remainder of the discussion dealing with Indochina. For documentation on Indochina, see volume VI, Part 1, pages 332 ff.]

  1. This was the final tripartite session and the only one at which any substantive discussion on Korea was held.
  2. Reference is to the meeting of September 11; see p. 893.