Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 47: Telegram

The Commander in Chief Far East Ridgway ) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

confidential
operational immediate

Tokyo , 11 September 1951—9:25 p. m.

CX–50634. This msg in 6 parts.

Part 1. At 100330I¹ September, the Liaison Officers at Munsan received from Communist Radio Station at Kaesong the following msg:

“At 1:35 AM September 10 an aircraft of your side made machine gunning over the vicinity of the conference site of the Kaesong Neutral Zone. We will inform you of the details of the above incident after the results of the investigation. By order of my Senior Delegate, I hereby first lodge a verbal protest with you.”

Part 2. UNC Liaison Officers conducted investigation during daylight, 10 September in area of gunning approximately 1400 yards south of conference house. Summary of evidence follows:

a. Holes in houses indicating travel of two bullets generally northeast to southwest.

b. Several marks on stone walls of building.

c. Cal 50 bullets on ground near marks on buildings.

d. Testimony of several Koreans living in houses not conclusive but all heard aircraft.

e. One shell casing found about 2000 yards northeast of marked buildings.

f. No casualties, no damage other than as indicated above.

Part 3. FEAF reports that what appeared to be a bogie was detected by radar over Kaesong at 100141I. Continuing radar plot including a directed identification turn and subsequent transmission indicates plane was one from 3rd Bomb Group. The pilot reports having strafed lights at 100136I September in what he believed to be a different area but which in view of the radar plot, must have been Kaesong. Faulty navigation on pilot’s part led to error.

Part 4. Admiral Joy is sending msg to Nam Il through the Liaison Officers at 120800 as follows:

“The UNC Air Commander has reported to the United Nations Command Senior Delegate that at about 0130, 10 September there was located by radar an aircraft in the Kaesong area. A continuing radar plot of the flight of the aircraft coupled with normal identification procedures revealed this aircraft to be one of the United Nations Command. Subsequent interrogation of the pilot disclosed that he had made a strafing attack at about 0135 on targets which through faulty navigation he had incorrectly identified.

“Based upon this information and the investigation conducted by the United Nations Command Liaison Officers today the fact that an aircraft of the United Nations Command strafed within the limits of the Kaesong Neutral Zone on 10 September is accepted.

“The United Nations Command regrets this violation of the agreed neutrality which resulted from the pilot’s error in navigation. Appropriate disciplinary action is being initiated. It is noted that investigation conducted by the Liaison Officers established the fact that no damage resulted from the attack.”

Part 5. It was decided to accept promptly full responsibility for the incident in order to lessen the advantage otherwise accruing to the Communists. The acknowledgement was made primarily on the basis of ground radar identification which strengthens the United Nations Command denials of guilt in the case of previously alleged violations. It was largely on the basis of radar reports, amplified by crew interrogations, that our participation in the former incidents was denied.

Part 6. I am releasing Parts 1 through 4 to the press at once.

1. Internal, i.e., Korean time.