Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 20041

United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Meeting of United States–United Kingdom Foreign Ministers¹

secret
U.S.–U.K. Min 2

Washington, September 11, 1951—10:30 a. m.

Members

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)

Mr. Morrison (U.K.)

Also present

U.S.	U.K.
Mr. Harriman	Sir Oliver Franks
Mr. Gifford	Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Jessup	Lt. Gen. Sir K. McLean2
	Mr. R. H. Scott3
	Mr. Gaitskell4
	Sir Leslie Rowan5

Alignment of US–UK in Far East

a) Korea

1. Mr. Acheson said the US side had been getting its ideas together regarding a course for UN action in Korea in case there is an armistice. The plan was to get on with political discussions keeping them confined to Korea and avoid discussing issues such as Formosa and China. The possibility of political agreement regarding Korea is not bright. We would not go back to where we were before hostilities began, and desire a united, free Korea. We recognize there is not much chance for agreement on this point, but we would not “sanctify” a division of the country at the 38th parallel, which line had been drawn solely for purposes of the Japanese surrender. Our policy called for a united Korea.

2. Mr. Morrison said he agreed that discussions should be kept to Korea, keeping in mind, however, the possibility of a comprehensive approach to settlement of problems in the area. He said the UK also desired a unified, democratic regime. In the back of his mind, however, were thoughts regarding UK public opinion on China, and also the point that Korea might not be ready for democracy immediately and if a democratic state were created and left to its own devices, it might easily be upset by a Fifth Column. This was a danger to be kept in mind. Regarding the nature of a cease fire conference and any armistice talks, he felt these should not be conducted in such a manner as to make it appear that it was the UN versus the Communist powers which were debating the issue. We should emphasize that the UN is a world organization—everyone is in it—and are working their problems out among themselves.

3. Mr. Acheson then read from a position paper setting forth a proposed US course of action in case of no armistice.⁶ In addition to general consideration of the problem by the UN nations we believed we must accelerate military preparations. The free nations must get themselves in a state of readiness for general war. He did not wish to alarm anyone, but he believed there was a clearly increased likelihood of general hostilities. We have evidence of a considerable build-up in the Chinese air force, and at least two armored divisions have appeared in North Korea. The Western Allies should increase the tempo of their production and carry out their defense plans as quickly as possible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a paper which includes a number of recommendations.

If the fighting falls off, the UN Commander in Chief should be directed to increase immediately the scale of military operations in order to retain the initiative in battle and prevent deterioration of morale.

Restrictions on General Ridgway’s movements should be removed in order to give him tactical leeway to make advances into North Korea to the waist of the North Korean Peninsula.

Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese troops.

Develop and equip additional Republic of Korea military units, increasing their responsibility for the defense of Korea. Mr. Acheson said forces of this type took a long time to develop. Two of the ROK divisions had turned out all right (the First and Capital Divisions), but there had been several disasters when ROK divisions had broken in battle allowing the enemy to come through and the UN Command had lost several months repairing the damage. The military policy now was not to place two ROK divisions side by side and to keep them on the Eastern side of the Peninsula where there was less chance of Communist pressure. Time is the important factor since there were few effective Korean officers and non-commissioned officers, and it would take time to train them.

Remove restrictions against attacks in North Korea, especially against the Yalu River Dams and the power installations on the Korean bank. Mr. Morrison asked why we had originally embargoed action against these objectives. Mr. Acheson explained that we thought such action might be provocative to the USSR. However, the Communists had now removed most of the equipment which generated power for North Korea so that the entire output is going into Manchuria. In addition, one of the Dams serves as a main highway into North Korea. With regard to air attacks on Rashin, these would be approved on an individual case basis, and the emphasis in this connection was to keep UN aircraft clear of the Soviet border. Mr. Morrison said he was not familiar with Rashin and Mr. Acheson explained its location and proximity to Manchuria and Soviet territory. We had bombed it approximately three weeks ago, destroying the railroad marshalling yards and large quantities of war material. Mr. Morrison asked if there had been any Soviet reaction, and the Secretary replied that there had not been any evidence of it but that there may well have been concern.⁷

A complete economic blockade of China by the UN nations was also recommended.

4. In case of any large-scale air attacks against UN troops and installations in Korea, General Ridgway was to carry out his standing instruction of informing Washington, which would in turn carry out consultation with the UK and other participating nations to the extent permitted by the situation, after which Ridgway might be authorized to conduct pursuit and retaliation against Communist air bases. Mr. Morrison recalled the UK had agreed this point in the past in a communication with the Secretary.⁸ Mr. Acheson said that as far as action in the UN is concerned we plan to give a history of the Kaesong discussions, including full detail on the alleged violation of the neutral zone, emphasizing that any breakdown in talks was not the fault of the UN, we believe the UN should reaffirm its decision to carry on the struggle against aggression and that members should take diplomatic action to bring political pressure to bear. Additional economic measures should be considered looking toward a complete blockade of China and the US would seek to give effect to such a blockade either through the UN or bilaterally. The US would also seek to get increased military support and participation in the Korean operations.

6. Mr. Morrison said he agreed on a lot of points and had some questions about others. It was desirable to give the UK background and approach to the problem. The UK was anxious not to become involved in a mainland war with China. This was partly because of the general UK attitude toward China and partly because they must look at the world as a whole with all its potential for trouble elsewhere. One difficulty was that there were so many places where the Soviets might make trouble. The Middle East with its bad governments and restless peasant classes could be exploited quite easily by persons wishing to cause trouble. It would be the adoption of a policy of desperation by these people. They had no labor movements comparable to those in the US and UK to support their point of view and the potential for trouble always existed. He remarked, “If I were Stalin, I would have a go at it.” The UK didn’t want to become involved in a war with China. He agreed that if UN forces were heavily bombed, we would have to strike back, but the UK didn’t want to do things needlessly. As diplomats, it was our business to avoid World War III. Communist China need not necessarily be a slavish Communist satellite. Mr. Bevin had believed that Chinese history, character and sheer numbers gave some basis for the assumption that they would draw a line between themselves and the Soviets. He had also believed that the USSR purposely made it difficult for China to be admitted to the UN in order to force China to turn to the Soviets for understanding and assistance. The UK didn’t want to do anything to drive China to further cement its defensive union with the USSR. Another point was that if the UN became more heavily engaged in the Far East, the Soviets would likely start trouble elsewhere. These, he felt, were the basic UK points of view.

7. Mr. Morrison was not clear on whether the JCS was an entirely American military group; when this point was made clear to him, he said that his comments might be subject to those which General MacLean might wish to make. As for Korea, he said the British were satisfied to depend on Ridgway’s discretion regarding tactical moves. He felt that it was necessary for a field commander to have such discretion, and he well understood the point regarding troop morale because London had experienced a similar problem when undergoing the terrific German bombings and a job to do was vital in maintaining morale.

8. With regard to training Japanese forces, Mr. Morrison said that he had not heard of this before and the question was being raised sooner than he expected it might be. He wanted to get advice from his colleagues before he commented. There was some apprehension among certain people in the UK regarding German rearmament which he personally did not share because he felt to leave Germany out of the picture would result in the North Atlantic Treaty nations being lined up on one side against the Soviet Union and its Satellites on the other. However, he felt the idea of arming Japanese would raise some excitement in Britain. As far as training South Korean troops went he felt this was perfectly all right. He remarked that the question of bombing the Yalu Dam was “apparently under control”, but that General McLean might wish to comment further. As far as a blockade by the UN was concerned, he was not sure it would be effective. He also felt it might cause China, to rely even more heavily on the USSR. The Ridgway report, he agreed, must make clear that it is not the UN’s fault that cease fire negotiations have been terminated. The UN should reaffirm its decision to resist aggression.

9. General McLean said that the British Chiefs’ view was that they accepted the idea of UN tactical advances as far as the waist of Korea. They really didn’t know enough about the situation and were satisfied to leave it up to Ridgway. They did feel, however, that the UN forces were in a good position at the present time and that if they went to the waist, it would add to their line of communication and internal security problems, at the same time shortening the Chinese lines which were vulnerable to air attack. Their consensus was that it was best for the UN to stay where it was. Mr. Acheson said that these same factors had been considered by the JCS and the general idea of maintaining our present position was considered sound. General McLean interjected that the British forces held the view that pursuit beyond the waist was considered a problem requiring governmental decision.

10. Ambassador Franks asked if he might pose a question regarding Mr. Acheson’s earlier statement that if fighting were resumed the general danger had markedly increased. He wondered what the background for this assumption was. If fighting was resumed, the Chinese would require additional men and equipment both on the ground and in the air. He supposed that it might be that the Chinese felt they could not withdraw. At the same time the USSR did not want to push the fighting further or give up larger amounts of material to the Chinese, but their commitment to the latter made them take a larger risk, and it is not clear where the fighting will stop.

11. Mr. Acheson said that is the underlying thought. In speculating on the situation it was possible to reach the conclusion that the Malik suggestion was based on an analysis by the Russians which foresaw that the fighting would proceed on a larger scale which might easily spread and endanger the Soviet position. The Chinese may desire to press on in an attempt to gain a victory. This posed for the Russians the problem of providing equipment and building a strong China or of attempting to conclude hostilities and waiting until the general situation was more favorable to the Soviets. For some reason this idea was not working out. The Kaesong protests were continuing and apparently were designed to continue until someone loses patience and feels there is no use in attempting to come to terms with the Communists. Ridgway was being very careful in this connection. However, we had reports which indicated that considerably more equipment was arriving for the Chinese Communists, including the armored divisions and large numbers of aircraft. A new attack on the UN forces might be very serious. If large-scale fighting does resume, the world situation is markedly worse. In this connection he doubted that there was much value in worrying about Chinese reactions to such things as additional restrictions placed on them by the UN. He felt that these could not irritate them a great deal as compared with the larger situation.

12. Mr. Acheson said that to go back to the Japanese troop point, he desired to make it plain that there was no intent to use Japanese forces in Korea. What we were proposing was to expand the Japanese police reserve. They could easily be made a military body by increasing their training and armament. The purpose was to increase the defenses of Japan. Our Defense Department had been disturbed last autumn when Japan was denuded by transferring all available United States troops and supplies to Korea. A situation had existed where it would have been easy to take Japan and if that ever happened the position of our forces in Korea would be untenable. It was difficult for the US to meet the security requirements of Japan and also to send troops to Europe under NATO commitments.

13. Mr. Morrison said this explanation improved the situation greatly from his point of view. He understood the problem in Japan. He thought it was agreed between us that we must do everything we could not to “go over the line.” It was not inconceivable that the Soviets might be forced in their own thinking to “preventive war.” On the question of additional troops for Korea he felt that he must state now that this would not be easy for the UK. They were having trouble in Malaya and elsewhere and unless there was partial mobilization or the possibility of obtaining troops from Australia was looked into he could not foresee any availability. He wanted to consider this question with his colleagues in London.

14. On the question of a blockade, Mr. Morrison wondered if this implied that UN naval units might actually stop Russian ships attempting to proceed to China.

15. Mr. Acheson said that we did not at present believe it was reasonable to have a naval inspection of vessels in the area but rather our thought was that UN member countries should agree to order ships under their registry not to go to China. Mr. Morrison said he appreciated having our many points with regard to the Far Eastern situation and would report fully to his colleagues in London.

[Here follows a discussion on East–West Trade.]

1. This was the second of two meetings between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Morrison. No discussion of Korea was held during their first meeting, nor was there any such discussion during Mr. Acheson’s one bilateral meeting with French Foreign Minister Schuman on September 12. A record of the brief discussion on Korea at the seventh and final tripartite meeting on September 14 may be found on p. 916. For complete documentation on these meetings, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff.
2. Chief Staff Officer to the British Minister of Defense.
3. Assistant Under Secretary, British Foreign Office.
4. Hugh Gaitskell, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.
5. Economic Minister, British Embassy, Washington.
6. Reference is to document WFM T–10/1a, September 8, p. 889.

7. The following addendum sheet, dated September 17, was attached to the minutes:

   “With regard to the reference to air attacks on Rashin mentioned in paragraph 3, page 2, the Department has been informed that the outstanding JCS directive did not require advance approval by Washington on an individual case basis. The JCS has established a set of conditions relating to visibility and so-forth which if met, authorize General Ridgway to conduct raids on Rashin when he considered such action militarily advisable.

   “The British were informed by the Department of the appropriate modification of this point in the bipartite talks.”

8. See the note from the British Embassy, May 11, embodying the text of Mr. Morrison’s message to Mr. Acheson, May 10, p. 427.