795.00/9–751

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs ( Merchant ) to the Ambassador at Large ( Jessup )

top secret

Subject: JCS and Defense Comments on FE Position Papers for WFM.

The Department has received from General Marshall JCS and Department of Defense comments on two FE Position Papers relating to Korea.1 The following is for use in discussions with representatives of the Department of Defense or JCS.

1) WFM T–10/1, UN Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice.2

The substance of this paper has been under discussion between the State and Defense Departments, as a result of which the attached revised draft “Courses of Action in Korea in the Event No Armistice is Achieved” has been prepared.3

The Department is transmitting to General Marshall this revised draft which is believed to meet the objections of the JCS with the exception of the recommendation with respect to “hot pursuit”, which has been referred to the National Security Council for consideration.

2) WFM T–10 “UN Action in Korea in Case of an Armistice.4

Regarding paragraph 2 of the section entitled “Position to be Presented”, the Department suggests that, in order to remove any uncertainty, this paragraph be amended to read as follows:

“A settlement on Korea cannot be related to other Far Eastern problems and must be dealt with entirely on its own merits. Political discussions of other Far Eastern problems cannot take place prior to a Korean political settlement.”5

The Department does not concur in the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a political conference concerning Korea shall be limited to “representatives of belligerent nations in addition to the delegation appointed by the United Nations.” A political settlement of the Korean problem is distinct from a military armistice in Korea. Participation in such a political settlement, therefore, has no necessary relationship to a status as a belligerent in the conflict. The Department agrees that theoretically a discussion of a political solution of the Korean problem might be restricted to representatives of the Republic of Korea and of the North Korean people with the participation of the United Nations, which has played a substantial role in this problem in the past. As a realistic matter, however, particularly since the armistice would leave Chinese and possibly USSR forces in [Page 887] Korea in large numbers, no settlement of the Korean problem is possible without the agreement or acquiescence of the Chinese Communists and of the USSR. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union could claim a right to participate on a basis of geographic contiguity to Korea and the long history of relations with that country.

While the Department’s position paper in paragraph 5 b uses the wording “the participants might be”, our present thinking is that the countries named should be given an opportunity to participate. It is far from clear that they will wish to take part formally. The Communists may prefer to maintain the fiction that their troops were only “volunteers” and that the Chinese government has no specific relationship to the Korean problem. The Soviet Union also may prefer to speak through its satellites and have the advantage of participating in fact without being formally bound by the results of the conference.

While, from a theoretical point of view, the Soviet Union would have dual representation in such a conference, due to its membership in the United Nations, actually the opposition and obstruction of the Soviet Union to all action taken by the United Nations with respect to Korea since the question of Korea came before the UN, makes it impossible for any United Nations Delegation to represent the “interests” of the USSR.

With regard to paragraph 5 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department’s draft position paper assumes that a satisfactory armistice would be in effect before any mutual reduction of forces were undertaken. Such an armistice would undoubtedly provide for a boundary militarily acceptable to the United States.

The Department has no objection to the other changes suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by Secretary Marshall.

  1. See the two letters from General Marshall dated September 4, pp. 877 and 879.
  2. Dated August 18, p. 835.
  3. For the text of the final version of this paper, WFM T–10/1a, dated September 8, which was identical to the revised draft under reference, see p. 889.
  4. Dated August 18, p. 831.
  5. For the text of the final version of this paper, WFM T–10a, see infra.