Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 37: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

C–50115. Early in the armistice negotiations it became apparent that the Communists could not or would not control the Kaesong neutral zone in a manner guaranteeing security for both sides. Beginning with the military police violation on 4 August they began to utilize the insecurity of the area for propaganda purposes by means of incidents either manufactured by them or perpetrated by nonmilitary groups of unknown attachment which they were unable to control.

In spite of United Nations Command efforts to establish understanding and agreements providing for greater security of the area the Communists have rebuffed all efforts in this direction. In view of the desire to continue negotiations, even in the face of recognized danger, the United Nations Command delegation was forced to enter the conference area over routes having no security guarantees and which were always subject to hostile ground or air attack. It is possible that members of the delegation will be ambushed by persons whose identity or status can not be determined. The probability of such action increases with every incident charged against the United Nations Command by the Communists. Should they be charged with responsibility for injury to United Nations Command delegation [Page 876] personnel under the conditions stated, the Communists logically could and would deny such responsibility.

Subsequent to the military police incident of 4 August I felt it desirable to insist on a new location for the negotiations, providing for an area within which security for both sides could be guaranteed. At that time I proposed that my broadcast reply to the Communists message of 6 August contain the following conditions under which the United Nations Command would resume negotiations (see my C 68437, 6[7] August 51):1

“You have not taken satisfactory measures to prevent recurring incidents in the neutral area. Resumption of negotiations under these conditions which you have allowed to exist is unacceptable.

“I therefore propose that a joint inspection team, consisting of 3 individuals designated by you and 3 designated by me, be organized to perform joint inspections of the Kaesong neutral zone in order to guarantee against recurrence of these violations.

“In the event you do not agree to the formation of such a joint inspection team, and to accord it free movement within the Kaesong neutral zone, I shall insist upon a new site for the resumption of negotiations where the United Nations Command can and will guarantee against the violation of neutral areas established by agreement.” For reasons which you brought out at the time (your DA [ JCS ] 98216)2 you did not consider it desirable to insist on these conditions and the quotation above was covered in my broadcast by the following.

“It must be clearly understood that my acceptance of a resumption of the armistice talks is conditional on complete compliance with your guarantee of neutralization of the Kaesong area. Any further failure in this regard will be interpreted as a deliberate move on your part to terminate the armistice negotiations.”

At a later date an attempt was made through the liaison officers of each side to arrive at agreements which might provide greater security in the zone and in the approaches thereto. These discussions were interrupted by the series of alleged incidents charged to the United Nations Command, beginning 22 August, which suspended all negotiations.

The United Nations Command has made every effort within its power to avoid incidents. The physical location of the Kaesong site, however, renders these efforts abortive long as the enemy refuses to cooperate. He gives every evidence that he does not intend to cooperate. In the meantime, the immunity of the Kaesong zone is imposing definite restrictions on United Nations Command military operations [Page 877] while military advantages are accruing to the enemy. The build-up of charges and counter-charge regarding the Kaesong area has reached the point of apparent impasse. Neither side can abandon, without loss of prestige, their diametrically opposed positions.

There are no indications that the Communists intend an early cessation of their complaints against alleged violations of the Kaesong neutral zone, or that they intend to provide steps for the reopening of negotiations. Continued Communist allegation of ground violations in the Kaesong area provides the United Nations Command an excellent basis for charging the Communists with manifest inability to provide security for the area. It provides a logical basis for proposing a new site, if and when negotiations are resumed. Should an agreement be obtained for a new conference site it would provide opportunity for the introduction of positive methods toward negating charges of violations, would improve our military capabilities and would alleviate the danger to the United Nations Command delegation, a matter of urgent concern to me. In fact I know of no way in which the personal safety of our delegation can be reasonably assured in event negotiations are resumed in the Kaesong area.

I therefore request the following actions as a matter of urgency:

a. That I be authorized, at such time and in such manner as I consider appropriate, to insist upon a new and satisfactory conference site within which security for both sides can be guaranteed beyond any reasonable doubt, and,

b. That I be authorized as an included action in the foregoing to categorically refuse any further negotiations within the Kaesong area.

  1. Ante, p. 785.
  2. Dated August 6, p. 789.