S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 728
Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Here follows a list of persons present (23). Messrs. Matthews, Hickerson, and Rusk were the principal participants for the Department of State during the discussion on Korea. Messrs. Lay and Gleason were present for the National Security Council staff. General [Page 860] Bradley attended the meeting along with Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations, General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, and General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.
[The first portion of the memorandum, not here printed, covers discussion on topics unrelated to Korea.]
General Bradley introduced the question of courses subsequent to an armistice or a breakdown of negotiations in Korea. He said that the prospect was that we were more likely to have to deal soon with the second rather than the first. He said the military view as to courses of action differed from the State view in that the military saw two possible situations, an armistice or a breakdown, whereas State saw three—an armistice, a breakdown followed by vigorous renewal of hostilities, and a breakdown followed by a quiet military situation.
Mr. Rusk said political aspects did differ somewhat from military ones. He commented that the two crucial questions in the sequel to a breakdown of armistice talks were: (a) Are we prepared to try to find out whether the other side is disposed to a military situation constituting a sort of de facto cease fire? (b) Are we prepared to accept risks involved in acting ourselves to step up the tempo of military action? He said this second involved the question whether we could produce greater pressure in an effective way toward a solution or would we merely irritate the adversary into reacting.
General Bradley said the military had not taken into consideration the idea of a de facto armistice produced by a quiet military situation, and he doubted whether this was realistically in prospect. He said: (a) There could be no fadeaway of forces without an armistice as it would “put Ridgway into too much of a hole”. To fadeaway on the basis of a de facto situation would permit the enemy a situation where he could “knock the hell out of you”.
Mr. Matthews said that a reduction of our forces would be undertaken only as the enemy indicated a reduction on his side.
General Bradley said the crux was that the enemy would not have to come back so far as our forces would and that the element of danger to our remaining reduced forces was not eliminated by the consideration that the enemy had also withdrawn part of his forces.
General Hull said he could not visualize the de facto cessation of hostilities inasmuch as the enemy had been building up and making himself able to jump at a moment’s notice and it would be impossible for our forces to sit idly by and give him an invitation to do so.
General Bradley said that a sort of de facto reduction of hostilities on the ground now existed in Korea and that recent attacks had been on a regimental basis or less. He said he could not visualize our calling [Page 861] off our air and navy in a de facto situation following a cessation of talks.
Mr. Hickerson said the State Department view contemplated continuation of air and navy actions as before.
General Bradley said it was unrealistic to suppose that one could fade out with respect to one arm and maintain full activity with the other two.
General Hull said he could visualize that sort of situation.
Mr. Rusk said that a de facto cease-fire would not solve the prisoner-of-war problem.
General Hull said it would not be a solution to anything whatever. He said Ridgway had to have freedom of action to keep pressure on the enemy so as to prevent the enemy from achieving a build-up beyond Ridgway’s capacity to contain. He commented that the deterrent on the enemy must always be that he would be cut to pieces badly by a counterthrust and a rollback, and this circumstance prevented a static situation and a fadeout except with an armistice.
Mr. Matthews and Mr. Hickerson commented that this capacity to counterthrust and roll back raised the question of the Neck or the Yalu as the ultimate limit.
General Hull said that the Neck was preferable as overextension would weaken our forces logistically.
Mr. Matthews raised in addition the prospect of Russian reaction in event of too close an approach to the Yalu.
General Bradley addressed himself to the State Department’s view of what additional action should be taken by the UN side in the new phase of increased hostilities following a cessation of armistice talks. He enumerated these as: Removal of restrictions on certain North Korean targets, permission for hot pursuit of enemy aircraft beyond the borders of Korea, including attacks on airbases and anti-aircraft installations. He commented that it would be necessary to do more; it would not suffice to slap the enemy on the arm instead of on the wrist; it would be necessary to knock him out. He said one of the things required was blockade.
Mr. Hickerson said this was in the State Department’s list of actions.
General Bradley said that his impression was that it was not.
Mr. Rusk explained that the State Department’s approach to the question was to get the other Governments to forbid their ships to go to China and then give the UN navy forces authority to police shipping to that end rather than to attempt to rely on physical presence of naval forces alone as the basis for blockade.2
[Page 862]General Bradley said that the requirement was to take action necessary to solve the situation and bring it to a definitive end. He said in event of no armistice, we could not sit there to see what the enemy was going to do, as that might involve sitting there five years. He said that would not be supported by the public and it would be necessary to take positive steps, not just wait and see.
Mr. Rusk commented that the State Department paper,3 prepared a month ago,4 was based on the premise that if there was a cessation of talks and yet the enemy did not come in with a massive attack, using large scale air forces, it would be hard for us to carry the attack by air into Manchuria, if for no reason than that such action would involve the risk of incurring retaliation against Japan.
General Hull said that if negotiations broke down and hostilities continue, every effort would have to be made to force the enemy to call off the fighting—that is every effort within our means. He commented that our means were limited but we must use them to their limits. He said that public insistence on taking the steps necessary to enable bringing the boys home would be very great.
General Bradley referred to the great amount of support General MacArthur had elicited by his prescription for ending the war and getting the boys home. The point, he said, was not as to the fallacy of MacArthur’s approach but as to its public effectiveness.
Mr. Rusk raised the question whether we were in position to hit the enemy sufficiently hard to gain that result.
General Bradley then compared the State Department paper and the JCS paper5 item by item. He noted that they differed on one item—whether to remove restrictions on bombing of Rashin—now an obsolete issue since the restriction had been removed. He summarized the crucial differences as turning on these ideas: Don’t wait for the other side to take the initiative. Don’t take risks. He said an additional difference concerned the question whether to do certain things without further consultation or to consult first with the allies concerned.
Mr. Rusk said it would be necessary to consult on blockade and that it would certainly be well, in our own interests, to consult on hot pursuit and related action against anti-aircraft installations beyond Korean borders.
General Bradley expressed a doubt about this, commenting that air action involved only our forces, not the forces of our allies.
[Page 863]Mr. Hickerson commented that the participating allies had already been told that in event of massive air attacks on our forces we might have to respond beyond present limits without there being time for consultation in the event.
General Hull asked what if we should consult and find a big objection?
Mr. Matthews said the allies’ governments would be in a better position if told even though they did not concur in the action.
General Bradley said that if the action were taken without their concurrence after consultation some might pull their troops back.
Mr. Rusk said that our actions might involve precipitating general war, and we would be in much better shape with our allies if we had taken them into confidence, and our allies’ governments would likewise be in a better position with their peoples.
Mr. Matthews said this was particularly true as to the British.
Mr. Rusk said it would be more serious if splits developed between peoples and governments on our side even if they developed as among governments.
Mr. Hickerson said agreement on the issue would be easy in event of massive air attacks; the difficulties were foreseeable only if the initiative was taken by us.
Admiral Fechteler asked whether it would be true that we could not talk these things in candour with our allies, especially the British.
Mr. Hickerson said not talk, but agreement, was the crux.
Mr. Rusk said that perhaps the difference in view between State and the military should be taken up to the President.
General Bradley said the differences were on these points: The possibility of a de facto cease-fire; consultation with allies, the idea of sitting and waiting.
Mr. Hickerson said the de facto cease-fire and fade-out was a remote possibility.
Mr. Rusk said there was also the question of whether we could afford the risks now of widening the conflict. He asked as to the air defenses of Japan.
General Twining said they were weak.
General Eddleman6 said there were 13 AA battalions there.
Mr. Lay said the most pressing question was that of our action in response to a greatly stepped up attack while the San Francisco conference was in progress, and all that should be decided before the President got out of town.
General Bradley went over the immediate requirements in this [Page 864] situation one by one, and the consensus was that instructions already covered this situation.
Mr. Lay said the question then was getting ready to act promptly on matters beyond the immediate actions in response to an enemy offensive.
Mr. Rusk pointed out the tensions incident to having the President, the Secretary, and so on out of town next week. He asked whether the Joint Chiefs would be in Washington.
General Bradley assured him they would be.
- The source text, drafted by Charles Burton Marshall of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, represents a State Department draft not cleared with any of the participants.↩
- For the text of a Department of State paper (Document WFM T–10/2a), dated August 27, dealing with the question of economic controls on China and North Korea, see p. 2009; the response from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated August 31, is printed on p. 2011.↩
- Reference is to Document WFM T–10/1, August 18, p. 835.↩
- See the memorandum by Messrs. Hickerson and Merchant, August 3, p. 771, which formed a basis for the preparation of Document WFM T–10/1.↩
- The paper from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated August 29, responding to Document WFM T–10/1 is printed as an attachment to the letter of September 4 from Secretary Marshall to Secretary Acheson, p. 880.↩
- Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army.↩