Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 58: Telegram

The Senior United Nations Command Delegate in Korea (Joy) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

secret
flash

Korea, 23 August 1951—6:55 a. m.

HNC–258. At 2330K Communist Liasion Officer contacted United Nations Command base camp by radio telephone. In an agitated voice he stated the Armistice conference site was bombed and strafed at 2320K. He requested Senior United Nations Command Liaison Officer to come immediately to make an investigation. Difficulties of hour and half journey through front lines at night were cited. Liaison Officer was insistent in his request. Since United Nations Command delegation had previously chided Communists for delay in protesting alleged incident, I ordered United Nations Command Liaison Officers Colonels Kinney and Murray to investigate. They travelled by jeep to Kaesong arriving there about 0145K. Delay in arrival was due to necessity our liaison party crossing Imjin river by boat.

On arrival at the conference house in Kaesong, Colonel Chang and Lt Col Tsai surrounded by Communist press corps awaited the United Nations Command Liaison Officers. Col Chang stated a United Nations Command aircraft had attacked the Kaesong neutral zone at 2320K. The attack included strikes within the immediate conference area. Lt Col Tsai produced 2 marble size bits of metal which he alleged had hit the jeep of the Senior Communist delegate. On inquiry by Col Kinney, Col Chang could not say whether one or more aircraft involved. He stated he did not know how many bombs were dropped or how many passes the aircraft made. Col Chang stated all present heard the aircraft. All present included Communist Liaison Officers and staff assistants, Communist news reporters and photographers, but none of the Communist delegates were present. Kinney and Murray were escorted to within 100 yards of United Nations Command delegation house, and there were shown a rumpled piece of rolled metal about 18 to 30 inches covered with oil and lying in the road. Chang asserted this was napalm bomb. There was no bomb crater near, and no scorched earth. The piece of metal appeared to be part of a tank of some sort. About 25 yards away was a minor depression in the earth perhaps 6 inches deep and approximately 24 inches in diameter. Murray judges possible result partially buried explosive of force equivalent to grenade. Kinney judges clearly not a bomb crater. Near residence of Communist Delegates, 3 other pieces of metal were pointed out. Two of these appeared to be pieces of United Nations Command aircraft. Flush riveting noted.¹ Each piece about one foot square. Third piece was fin of rocket. No craters, no furrows apparent. Pieces of metal either lying on surface of ground or penetrate a few inches. On return to Conference House Col Kinney asserted evidence plainly not result of United Nations Command bombing. Pointed out no damage to any structure, person or even crop. Chang immediately announced, from written notes, that there would be no further meetings. Kinney inquired if Chang meant subdelegation meetings as well as liaison meetings. Chang replied, all meetings “were off from this time”.² United Nations Command Liaison Officers departed to camp. Halfway to Pan Mun Jom they were overtaken by Chang and Tsai, asked to return to Kaesong to view more evidence. Kinney and Murray protested darkness, rain precluded satisfactory investigation, but returned to Kaesong. Two more pieces of flush riveted metal were pointed out in area near Communist delegation residence. There was a hole nearby about 1 foot deep, 2 feet in diameter. Colonel Murray judged this hole could possibly be the result of grenade size explosion pre-set in ground. Judged by Kinney clearly not bomb crater. Final piece of metal also flush riveted, and was laying in only small amount of liquid possibly poor grade of napalm. Three or four scorched areas about 15 square inches each nearby.

Kinney requested [return?] in morning in better light. Chang refused, saying investigation was complete. Kinney requested all evidence be left in place for examination in daylight since darkness prevented proper observation. Chang stated evidence had to be taken in for analysis.

In course of discussion at last site, Kinney asked if anyone present had actually seen an aircraft. A CCF soldier was put forward who declared he saw aircraft at 2320K. Kinney asked if aircraft showed lights. Soldier answered yes, lights were on—headlights. European Communist newspaperman intervened, charging Kinney with tricking soldier by trap question. Kinney required Chang to clear area of news reporters immediately. Chang complied after argument.

As United Nations Command liaison officers prepared to depart again Chang demanded Kinney accept responsibility for attack. Kinney declared evidence ridiculous, but would transmit to Joy. Liaison officers advance 2 possible explanations of incident. First, the so called evidence manufactured on ground out of whole cloth with Communist aircraft flying over to touch off show. Second, holes might actually be result of dropping by Communist aircraft of small cans napalm and small explosive charges such as grenades with doctoring up by addition of aircraft metal.

Preliminary telephonic report by Joint Operations Center Fifth Air Force indicates no United Nations Command aircraft in Kaesong area during night. No United Nations Command aircraft off course, lost, or in difficulty during night. Bogie on Fifth Air Force radar at 2130K west of Kaesong. This being checked further.

Obviously, suspension of these meetings required high level decision. This could scarcely have been secured in interval from 2320K to 0145K. This considered confirmatory evidence of fraudulent nature of incident.

Total lack of damage and wide distribution of evidence suggests metal pieces might have been dropped by Communist aircraft, possible including very small explosives such as grenades to mark drops. Conclusion of Kinney and Murray is that incident was unquestionably staged by Communists.

1. A statement issued later on August 23 by General Ridgway made the following observation on this point:

   “A flush-riveted piece of metal, which was identified by the Communist liaison officer as a part of the napalm bomb utilized in the attack, is not of the construction used by the United Nations Command, as flush riveting is not employed in the manufacture of napalm tanks. They are of rough construction, more economically produced as they are used only once.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 3, 1951, p. 390)

2. A statement issued on August 23 by President Truman noted that it was unclear whether the Communist side intended to stop the talks for a day, several days, or permanently; until this could be clarified, no appraisal of the Communist action could be made, save to note that it was not designed to move the negotiations forward toward an armistice (ibid., p. 391).