Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795B.5/8–1651

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, August 16, 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary: In my letter of 22 June,¹ I advised you at that time that the Secretary of the Army would undertake discussions with you on the general subject of additional ground force contingents from other United Nations Members for service in Korea. Subsequently, the armistice talks were initiated, and the Secretary of the Army recommended, in light of this development, that the revised views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be communicated to the Department of State by letter, rather than by him personally, as was originally contemplated.

Past correspondence between the Department of State and the Department of Defense indicates that the two Departments are in full accord as to the necessity of obtaining additional forces for Korea, either in the form of substantial contributions from nations which have not contributed any forces, or in the form of appreciable increases in the size of contingents that have been contributed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that recommendations as to the feasibility of requesting certain nations for contributions, and to the extent to which pressure should be maintained on nations which have expressed a reluctance to make initial contributions or to increase their forces, should be based on the following:

a. The military desirability of having contingents not smaller than regimental combat teams or brigades. In a recent radio, attached hereto, General Van Fleet and General Ridgway set forth their comments and recommendations on the size, composition and training of United Nations contingents in Korea.² The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in general, accept those views of the field commanders.

b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments and schedules, and the military capabilities of NATO nations.

c. The military capabilities, and present or probable future security requirements, of other U.N. nations.

d. The fact that, except for a few nations, a proportionally large increase in the size of a national contingent in Korea will result in only a proportionally small decrease in the size of forces stationed within the boundaries of the nation.

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff must reserve the right to consider the desirability of accepting each offer, in light of equipment and training requirements, after it is made.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to each of the nations mentioned in your letters of 26 April, 2 May and 25 May 1951 are attached hereto.³

Faithfully yours,

Robert A. Lovett

[Annex]

Views of Joint Chiefs of Staff Regarding Additional Ground Force Contingents From Other United Nations Members for Service in Korea

a. Great Britain and NATO countries on the European Continent. As pointed out by the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the position that “Great Britain and North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries on the European continent should not be pressed to furnish additional forces,” and the Department of Defense took the position that “it would be desirable, if it could be done without interference with the NATO schedules, for Great Britain to bring her forces [in Korea] up to division strength.” It is considered that the latter position is still sound. In addition, if the British should present NATO commitments as a bar to augmenting their forces in Korea, it can be suggested that the British may find it possible to increase their over-all forces or speed up their NATO schedules. With respect to NATO nations on the continent, in view of General Van Fleet’s and General Ridgway’s recommendation and considering that a large proportional increase in forces in Korea would result in only a small proportional decrease in forces in Europe, it would seem reasonable to further revise the initial position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so as to provide for an increase specifically in the Netherlands and Belgian battalions now in Korea and to remove any injunction against pressing other NATO countries on the mainland for contributions, such to be accomplished in a manner similar to that set forth above for the United Kingdom. However, in the case of France, it is considered that any decrease in European forces should be only for the purpose of increasing French forces in Indochina.

b. Australia and New Zealand. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to Australia and New Zealand were forwarded to the Department of State by letter from this Department, dated 10 July 1951.⁴

c. Canada. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it would be inadvisable to request the Canadians to divert to Korea troops which are earmarked for Europe. However, they consider that further approaches should be made to the Canadian Government with a view to encouraging the Government to increase its over-all forces or to speed up its program.

d. Turkey. While the Turks already have a brigade in Korea, it is believed that a further approach might produce results in view of the U.S. position with regard to Turkey’s entry into NATO. Furthermore, it is possible that the Turks would send additional forces to Korea if suitable financial arrangements are made.

e. Greece. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that the Greeks have been approached to increase their contribution to a brigade. They concur in this action.

f. Iran. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the Secretary of State that Iran is in a precarious position on the Soviet perimeter. However, it is considered that the precariousness of the position would be increased very little by the reduction of Iranian forces to the extent of a regimental combat team and that, ultimately, the rotation of combat experienced Iranians should strengthen the Iranian defense capabilities appreciably. It is realized that a unilateral approach by the U.S. at this time may not be desirable.

g. Ethiopia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that no further request should be made for Ethiopian troops until the military effectiveness of the unit now in Korea has been tested in combat.

h. Israel and the Arab States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that an approach to certain of these nations would serve as a desirable indication of U.S. confidence in their military capabilities and in the United Nations as an instrument for preserving peace in the the Middle East. It is considered, for instance, that Egypt and Israel could each furnish one brigade, although it is realized that strong objections might be made in regard to the latter because of the existing tense situation.

i. Pakistan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Pakistan be approached, first, because Pakistan troops would probably provide a substantial contribution to the military effectiveness of the U.N. Command and, second, because such an approach would indicate U.S. confidence in a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue.

j. India. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not doubt the accuracy of the view that “India’s policy is such that an approach … would not be welcomed,” they consider that India, as evidenced by the presence of the medical unit in Korea, has not remained aloof from the conflict and that an approach should be made in view of the military effectiveness of many Indian units. It may be expedient to point out the military balance of power as between the Indians and Pakistani.

k. Philippines. The requirements for maintaining internal security in the Philippines preclude an attempt to obtain increases in the Philippine forces now pledged to Korea.

l. Thailand. Because of the low military value of Thai forces in cold weather, the limited military resources of Thailand and the situation in Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that no approach be made for an increase in Thai forces.

m. Latin American Nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Latin America is probably the most promising source of substantial contributions. They recommend that efforts be continued to obtain forces from the nations reported on by the Secretary of State, including Mexico, and that Argentina be requested to make substantial contribution. It is considered that offers by Argentina and Brazil should be on the order of a division each.

n. Sweden. In addition to the nations previously referred to herein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Sweden may be receptive to a suggestion that the country offer a combat unit for service in Korea.

1. See the letter from Secretary of Defense Marshall, p. 544.

2. The message referred to was telegram CX–63852, dated June 1, which read as follows:

   • “1. Quoted in Para 2 is a recent comment by CG Eighth Army concerning UN (other than US) ground forces.
   • “2. ‘The following comments and recommendations are submitted with respect to United Nations forces that may be sent to this command in the future. Although some bn size units have performed magnificently in this campaign they do present some problems in command, fire support and logistic support. It is therefore recommended that member nations of the UN be encouraged to send not less than a regimental combat team or brig in which fire support, logistic support and administration are integrated and that those units of bn size now in Korea be increased to brig size without delay. It is further recommended that units sent to this command be trained prior to arrival. It is recognized that some physical hardening and weapons familiarization must be conducted here; however, the limited training facilities of this command make it highly desirable that basic and unit training be conducted elsewhere.’
   • “3. CINCFE concurs with Eighth Army views as stated in Para 2 and requests DA initiate action to accomplish recommendation contained therein. Limitation on training facilities in Korea (as stated in Para 2) has even greater application to FEC areas outside of Korea and it is strongly recommended that basic and unit training of all UN forces be accomplished before troops are shipped to this area.”

3. The letter of April 26 is printed on p. 380; the letters of May 2 and 25, not printed, dealt with Australia and New Zealand; see footnote 4 below.

   There were no additional exchanges during the balance of 1951 between the Secretaries of State and Defense on the subject of overall U.N. troop contributions, nor were any substantial troop contributions made by U.N. countries, other than Australia, through the remainder of the year. For a table showing U.N. troop strength as of June 1951 and 1952 and July 1953 along with a country by country breakdown of the totals, see Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 513.

4. The letter of July 10 is not printed, but the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning Australia were incorporated in the message from President Truman to Prime Minister Menzies in telegram 42, August 9, to Canberra, p. 796. Regarding New Zealand, the Joint Chiefs had suggested that no further increase in forces be requested, particularly in view of the fact that, on a relative population basis, New Zealand’s contingent was second in size only to that of the United States. (795B.5/7–1051)