Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 39

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

secret

[Washington,] August 15, 1951.

Subject: Korea and the San Francisco Conference

Participants:	Australian Ambassador, Mr. Spender
	Mr. David McNichol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
	New Zealand Ambassador, Sir Carl Berendson
	Mr. Frank Corner, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
	Canadian Minister, Mr. W. D. Matthews
	Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
	Mr. Basil Jarvie, Counselor, South African Embassy
	FE—Mr. Rusk
	NA—Mr. Johnson
	BNA—Mr. Shullaw

At the request of the Australian Ambassador, Mr. Spender, I met with him and with other Commonwealth representatives today to discuss the situation in Korea and the forthcoming San Francisco Conference. Mr. Spender took the initiative in arranging this meeting (memorandum of my conversation with Mr. Spender August 9, 1951, subject Korea).¹ I read to the group the directive of August 11 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway on the conduct of the Kaesong negotiations.² In the discussion which followed no one present registered any dissent from our present course of action in the negotiations nor from the view that we should continue along these lines, at least for the next week.

The Australian Ambassador expressed the opinion it was not generally understood that there was a distinction between a military ceasefire line along present battle lines and the 38th parallel as a political dividing line. He suggested that it might be helpful if the Secretary or some one else were to make this distinction clear in a public statement. In commenting on the Ambassador’s suggestion, I said that no one had ever recognized the 38th parallel as a political dividing line, it was merely the line used in determining who would receive the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea at the end of the war. Furthermore, the Communist negotiators have no standing on the question of the 38th parallel, the Chinese have no legitimate interest in it and the North Koreans are recognized only as the military commanders of a force engaged in hostilities. Sir Carl Berendson observed that if there were military arguments against the 38th parallel as a demarcation line for the cease-fire, then these arguments likewise applied against the 38th parallel as a political line. Ambassador Spender did not pursue his suggestion further.

In discussing relative advantages and disadvantages of a prolongation of the talks at Kaesong, I told the group that the Far East command believed the Communists now had the capacity, as a result of their buildup, to launch an attack at any time and maintain it for fifteen days. I said that we did not believe the talks had given the Communists an advantage in this build-up. Air action had been reduced during the past few weeks because of the weather, and furthermore, the UN forces are now deployed along the best available defense line and would prefer to receive an attack, if one is launched, in those positions. Mr. Spender remarked that a military appreciation of the situation resulting from prolongation of the talks would be helpful.

I asked whether any of the representatives present had a theory to offer about the connection between the development of the Korean talks and Russian attendance at the San Francisco Conference. Sir Carl Berendson thought there was no connection. Mr. Tomlinson expressed the opinion that a cease-fire agreement would precede by several days the opening of the San Francisco Conference,³ thus giving the Russians a propaganda point in their attempts to disrupt the Conference. Their line might be that a first step in a general Far Eastern settlement had been taken with agreement on a cease-fire in Korea, and further progress should not be jeopardized by signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty without further discussion of its terms.

In the discussion of probable Russian disruptive tactics at San Francisco, the point was made by several of those present, including Mr. Spender and Sir Carl Berendson, that the Russians could be expected to use every parliamentary trick at their command to prolong the Conference. Sir Carl Berendson remarked on the need for a strong chairman to counter Russian attempts to involve the Conference in parliamentary wrangling. Mr. Spender thought that quite a number of friendly nations might be confused by the Russian tactics and suggested the desirability of going to work on these nations immediately to develop a solid front in the Conference. It was suggested that a schedule for the Conference might be circulated allotting time for speeches and fixing a time for the signing. I mentioned the fact that with some countries only their ability to make a statement explaining their position permitted them to sign the Treaty. This was a factor to be kept in mind in any efforts to limit debate.

1. Not printed.
2. See JCS–98713, August 11, p. 811.
3. The conference for the conclusion and signature of the peace treaty with Japan was held in San Francisco from September 4 to 8, 1951; for related documentation, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.