795.00/7–2551: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations
75. Re Korea. Urtel 145 July 25. In light of your thoughtful analysis and strong UK and Fr preference we agree that combination of SC and GA action following Korean armistice would be desirable. However, as emphasized in Deptel 30 July 14 it is highly important obtain widest possible prior commitment from UK and other leading Dels, for whole-hearted support for GA action along desired lines as soon as SC resolution is passed.
1. SC Action.
Under our present thinking SC resolution would a) refer in preamble to SC resolutions on Korea of June 25, 27 and July 7, 1950, and to report on armistice to be submitted by UC under resolution of July 7, b) note with approval terms of armistice, and c) request SYG to transmit present resolution to GA in connection with GA task of considering permanent settlement of Korean problem.
We agree that since preamble suggested in a) above places proposed resolution in context of the UN action in Korea there will be a risk of Soviet veto. USSR might ask for separate vote under SC Rule 32; it might vote against preamble but might vote for the resolution as a whole since veto would be difficult to reconcile with Sov pose as “champion of peace”. If Soviets should seek to veto preamble only we may take position separate vote on preamble is preliminary and veto to be effective must be asserted against entire resolution. Another [Page 784] alternative would be for US and other co-sponsors of resolution to exercise right under Rule 32 to oppose separate vote. This alternative may be less desirable propaganda-wise. In event, of veto of entire resolution we would move immediately into GA.
There is also question of sponsorship for a SC resolution. We are inclined to believe that widest possible sponsorship may be desirable.
2. GA Action.
Our ideas re contents of GA resolution are given in para 1, sub-para a, b, and c of Deptel 30 July 14. These are consistent with objectives for GA action set forth in Section II urtel. We agree that resolution might also provide for some UN machinery calculated to achieve political settlement consistent with UN objective in Korea but we are unable at this time to indicate what form such machinery should take. One of possibilities we are considering is the appointment of UN representative to assist in negotiations for political settlement.
While we agree that UNCURK should not be continued for any considerable period of time following conclusion of armistice, it appears desirable to postpone its liquidation and its replacement by new long term machinery until there is some indication as to prospects and course of discussions on political settlement.
We do not believe it advisable to have GA note UC–UNKRA agreement. This is an operating agreement not requiring such notice. If GA notes it, presumably any future change in agreement would also have to be brought before GA. Moreover, it is not clear what useful purpose would be served by opening GA discussions of UNKRA until new action in this field is called for.
On basis of above we agree you may in your discretion initiate discussions with other dels as suggested in Section III urtel. You should make it clear that discussions are wholly tentative and exploratory since armistice negotiations to date have barely reached substantive questions, and course of discussion affords no basis for optimism that agreement can be reached on difficult basic questions involved. In these circumstances we believe question of possible Five Power consultations (Section I D of urtel) should be held in abeyance and not raised with other Dels.