Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 117: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

Tokyo, 27 July 1951—8:47 p. m.

C–67826. This msg in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice Conference at Kaesong, 27 July 1951.

Part 1. Summary:

Today’s meeting opened with Nam Il discussing UNC Delegation’s proposals of 26 July regarding procedures, which Nam Il accepted in principle. Nam Il reserved comment on proposed preamble. It was agreed that articles of any armistice document would be titled with full text of agenda item wording. Admiral Joy read statement giving UNC Delegation’s initial position on demilitarized zone. Enemy called recess until 1000K 28 July.

Part 2. Progress:

Nothing significant other than agreement on mechanical procedures.

Part 3. Attitudes:

Enemy delegates showed irritation over Joy statement but absolutely no surprise. On glancing at map outlining UNC proposed zone Nam Il remarked: “Yes, the battle line.”

Part 4. Sequence of events:

Conference reconvened 271000K: Nam Il opened. He accepted in principle the proposed organization and structure of armistice agreement as proposed by Admiral Joy yesterday. He then expressed willingness to try the proposed mechanical procedure for drafting the articles of the agreement reserving the right to propose any improved procedure which might be discovered during the progress of the work. In furtherance of this procedure he named 3 officers, including Col Chang as his representatives. He suggested United Nations Command delegation representatives might wish to remain in Kaesong nights for this work and offered welcome and working space. Commenting on the United Nations Command proposed preamble, he stated that the armed forces he represented were incorrectly named and the names were inappropriate. Correct names were “Peoples Army of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea” and “The Chinese Peoples Volunteers”.

Admiral Joy accepted minor revisions proposed by Nam Il with respect to these technical matters and appointed Staff Officers to collaborate with Commie Staff Officers in translating agreement of the delegates into mutually acceptable draft articles.

Admiral Joy then offered a brief rebuttal of Nam Il’s statement of the 27th on the selection of the 38th parallel as a military demarcation line and followed with the opening statement of the United Nations Command delegation on the demilitarized zone. Both statements follow in full.

First, brief rebuttal:

“In your opening statement yesterday on agenda item number 2 you proposed that the 38th parallel be accepted as a military demarcation line and that both sides withdraw an equal distance from this line. Among the reasons advanced by you was that this selection would be consistent with historical fact. That is, hostilities started at the 38th, therefore, ipso facto, they should end on the 38th.

“It is true as you say, that the war began on the 38th parallel. This fact, by itself, constitutes no basis whatever for the contention that this line should be selected as the military demarcation line under current conditions. Following the start of hostilities and before the United Nations were able to implement fully their resolution to assist the Republic of Korea, their military forces withdrew to the Naktong River, where the military situation stabilized. Had an armistice been concluded a year ago today, it is difficult to believe that you would have agreed to a military demarcation line along the 38th parallel.

“Subsequent to the 15th of September 1950 your forces withdrew to the region of the Yalu River. Had an armistice been concluded at that time, you could not reasonably have expected us to agree to accept the 38th parallel as a cease fire line.

“From the standpoint of history then and of military realism, it is obvious that not since the outbreak of the war, on 25 June 1950, has there been any valid basis for considering the 38th parallel as a military demarcation line.

“A military demarcation line, or line to limit the advance of opposing forces during an armistice, bears no relation to past history. Such a line, moreover, does not involve the question of good faith; neither is it concerned with long-term territorial readjustments of a political nature. Finally, no demarcation line is essential for the establishment of a demilitarized zone. Your position in this regard is therefore untenable.

“In summary, none of the several arguments you advanced in support of your proposal that the 38th parallel be accepted as a military demarcation line has any validity whatever. On the contrary they imply a lack of understanding of the true nature of such a line.”

Second, opening statement on demilitarized zone:

“You have agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established across Korea. Within this zone all armed forces are to be excluded. We contend that the delineation of this zone must be based on practical military considerations as they exist at present and that it be entirely uninfluenced by consideration of any ultimate settlement at governmental level of political and territorial problems. On the other hand, every element pertaining to the military effectiveness of both opposing forces, must be thoroughly and impartially considered.

“Therefore, an imaginary geographical line such as a parallel of latitude has no validity whatsover in developing a military armistice. In approaching the problem of a demilitarized zone, the United Nations Command delegation desires to call attention to certain military realities.

“Under the terms of any armistice agreement which we may arrive at there will be in fact, 3 zones of military significance.

“First, the Air Zone. The United Nations Command maintains air superiority over all of Korea.

“Second, the Sea Zone. The United Nations Command controls the entire sea area around Korea.

“Third, the Ground Zone. The United Nations Command controls everything south of a line running roughly from Chodo-Ri on the east coast of Korea in a westerly direction through the high ground south of Pyongyang; thence south-westerly through Pan Mun Jom to Haechang-Ni and along the northern banks of the Han River to its mouth.

“The effect of Air and Naval power, as well as ground force effectiveness, all 3 considered together, influence materially the location of the ground demilitarized zone. In other words, the ground demilitarized zone must be kept in proper focus in its relation to the other military zones carved out by Air and Naval power, the impact of which you are fully cognizant.

“Due consideration must be given, therefore, to the effects the Air and Naval forces have on ground operations. The United Nations Command Air Force and Naval Air have restricted the freedom of movement of your forces and have inflicted heavy casualties on your ground troops. The attacks of the United Nations Command Air Forces in your rear areas have compelled you to employ large numbers of troops and guns in rear area AA defenses, troops and guns otherwise available for employment on the ground battle lines. Your capabilities for concentrating troops and supplies in the battle area have been materially reduced. Your capabilities for providing air surveillance and close air support to your ground troops are practically nil.

“Again, with respect to Naval power you fully appreciate the realities. At the present time you are landlocked. The United Nations Command has free access to the seas contiguous to the entire area of Korea while your use of sea lines of communications is restricted. Your roads and rail lines along both coasts are subject to effective Naval gunfire. The United Nations Command retains the capability of conducting amphibious operations, requiring you to deploy sizeable forces along the coasts against the threat of these landings. Your ports, military installations, lines of communications, and supply depots near the coasts are subject to Naval bombardment at will. In contrast South Korea is free from a Naval blockade and from attacks by Naval forces.

“The military realities of the situation are clearly shown geographically on this map. Your attention is directed toward the large areas which the United Nations Command control by its Air power and Naval power. It includes all of North Korea, from the present line of contact to the Yalu and the Tumen Rivers. You have nothing comparable in South Korea.

“In considering the ground situation alone our respective capabilities may lend themselves to a more nearly equal comparison. However, here again we must be realistic and consider thoroughly and impartially every element pertaining to the military effectiveness of the opposing forces in their present positions.

“It must be clear by this time that the line you have frequently proposed to use in determining the demilitarized zone is entirely unrelated to the overall military situation as it exists in Korea at this time. It is not even related to the present line of ground contacts. It fails completely in reflecting the effectiveness of Air and Naval forces. It is far less related to the overall military situation in Korea than would be the case of a line of demarcation running generally through Pyongyang and Wonsan. In other words, the advantages given by you in a withdrawal of your ground forces to the north of a line running generally through Pyongyang and Wonsan would in no way equal the advantages you would gain by the United Nations Command withdrawing its Air and Naval power from North Korea.

“The ground forces, yours and ours, are in general contact at this time along a specific line, known to you and to us so well that it is not necessary to go into detail as to its location. Considering only ground forces a cease fire arrangement with all forces remaining in place would appear reasonable. This, however, would stop only a part of the hostile action. Our Navy would still be free to blockade and bombard along both coasts of North Korea. Our Air Forces would still be free to reconnoiter and inflict military damage over all of North Korea. If, then, we are to agree on an armistice whereby our Ground, Air and Naval Forces cease operations against your forces we contend that the location of the demilitarized zone, in all fairness, must be appropriately influenced by all of these factors.

“These, in our opinion, and I am sure in yours, are matters worthy of the most serious consideration. These factors all influence the location of the ground demilitarized zone. All of these factors must be considered in any discussion concerning the military advantages which each side may have to concede in order to arrive at an equitable and effective armistice.

“In general, then, you must be aware that a cease fire on the ground, in the air and along the coasts on the part of the United Nations Command Forces is a concession far greater than a cease fire by all the North Korean and Chinese forces in Korea under present conditions. It is at a minimum, equivalent to a major withdrawal to the North of North Korean and Chinese ground forces.

“The depth of the demilitarized zone should be sufficient to prevent the occurrence of minor but disturbing incidents between individuals of both sides during the period of the armistice. This is a simple precautionary measure that each commander has the right to expect. To accomplish this without unduly complicating the administrative arrangements within the zone, we propose that, in general, the demilitarized zone be approximately 20 miles in depth.

“As we indicated many times during the preliminary conferences, there are several methods by which the zone can be delineated. Inasmuch as this zone represents a temporary military expedient to insure against misunderstandings which might delay progress toward final settlement of the Korean problem, we consider that it should be delineated by easily recognized ground or terrain features.

“In consideration of the foregoing remarks, we now propose the following:

• “1. Cessation of all ground action, and the establishment of a demilitarized zone from which all military forces will be withdrawn. The ground demilitarized zone proposed is outlined on the map which I presently will hand you.
• “2. Cessation of our air effort in the area extending southward from the Yalu and Tumen Rivers to the southern boundary of the demilitarized ground zone to be agreed upon.
• “3. Cessation of our Naval bombardment and blockade along the coasts of Korea from the mouth of the Yalu on the west coast and the mouth of the Tumen River on the east coast, southward to the southern boundary of the demilitarized ground zone to be agreed upon.

“This map¹ at a scale of 1:250,000 outlines in general the zone but does not define it in the detail that will be required later for administrative purposes.”

Description of boundaries and demarcation line fol: Zone shown on 1:250,000 map. All lines from west to east.

Northern boundary: From point 3 miles off-shore at mean tide at YB 4095 north to coast at YC 4211 northeast to Yulla-Ri, at YC 5225, northeast to BT 6741, northeast to Hanan-Ni at CT 0149, northeast to road junction at Songhung-Ni at CT 1465 northeast to Songmun at CT 5080 east to DT 0076 northeast to DT 0779, northeast to Sogibau at DT 1487 to coast at Saho-Ri at DT 2594 and extending 3 miles off-shore.

Southern boundary: From point 3 miles off-shore at mean tide at YB 6085, north to coast at YB 6090, north to mouth of Hwayang-Chon River at YC 6102 northeast to Paekchom at BT 6407 northeast to Bench Mark 355 at CT 1818 northeast to CT 2124, northeast to CT 2430 northeast to Songhyon at CT 3238, northeast to CT 5048 east to Hill 1062 at CT 6546, east to CT 8047, southeast to Tonson-Gol at DT 0142, east to Mundung-Ni at DT 1142, northeast to Ousil at DT 2451, northeast to DT 3562 to coast at DT 4669, extending to 3 miles off-shore.

Demarcation line: From a point 3 miles off-shore at mean tide at YB 5094 north to coast at YB 5199, northeast to YC 5307, northeast to YC 5713, northeast to Sinmhong-Ni at BT 6223 to BT 7727, to CT 0733, to Chumak-Tong at CT 0935, northeast to CT 2352, northeast to CT 5062, northeast to CT 6064, east to CT 8362, southeast to Bench Mark 1068 at DT 0159, northeast to DT 1061, northeast to DT 2068, northeast to coast at DT 4085, extending 3 miles off-shore.

At 271115K Nam Il proposed a recess until 281000K.

Part 5. Conclusion: Enemy delegation fully expected UNC location of demilitarized zone at least as far north as presented.

1. Not printed.