Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 107: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
flash
CX–67670. Subject: Armistice Negotiations.
Part 1:
Meeting on 25 July opened at 1100K. Senior delegate United Nations Command delegation made following statement:
“We have carefully reviewed the positions expressed by both delegations in connection with the question of whether to add to the agenda an item dealing with withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. We have examined and reexamined the arguments you put forward, so that we could be sure we fully understood them. In this review the United Nations Command delegation has been guided by three premises on which your delegation has indicated agreement with ours: (1) we are mutually concerned with a military armistice conference at this time, not with a final peace settlement (2) we must confine ourselves to those subjects with which military commanders are properly engaged (3) we are presently discussing an agenda, a general framework [Page 725] within which specific discussions can evolve, not a listing of preconceived conclusions.
“With this agreed guidance before us, it became apparent that not one of the arguments you have used to support your contention has been shown to be valid. You did state that a major consideration of this conference was to provide against resumption of hostilities after a cease fire had once been ordered. We agreed with that. You further stated, however, that the withdrawal of foreign troops was the basic and principal guarantee against resumption of hostilities in Korea. We cannot agree with you on that. Were this true, certainly the United Nations Command delegation would favor the earliest withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea as quickly as possible. Consequently, we examined with great care your assertion that withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea would insure against resumption of hostilities.
“In our review of the question, one fact immediately stood out like a beacon: There were no foreign forces in Korea in June of 1950, when the hostilities began. Thus, history demonstrates clearly that hostilities did occur in Korea in the absence of foreign forces. How, then could absence of foreign forces be a guarantee against hostilities resuming in Korea? You assert that the absence of foreign forces will insure against repetition of violent events which in fact occurred in the absence of foreign forces. This is total conclusion to cause and effect. This is upside-down reasoning.
“Furthermore, we recall that for a period of time after the end of World War II, foreign troops were in Korea. No war occurred as a result of the presence of those troops; rather, their presence was an aspect of the ending of a war. However, only a short time after the foreign troops were withdrawn from Korea, the threat of hostilities in Korea appeared, and was followed all too soon by actual fighting.
“You have stated that the presence of foreign forces prevents the Korean people from settling their problems themselves. By what means was the settlement of these problems progressing in June of 1950, before the appearance of foreign forces in Korea? By guns, tanks, aircraft—by war, as all the world knows. By immediately withdrawing foreign forces from Korea, we would restore the condition as to presence of troops in Korea that was the case in June of 1950. Would we have a guarantee against resumption of hostilities? The absence of foreign troops served as no guarantee on June 25, 1950.
“The facts show that the withdrawal of foreign troops is no guarantee against resumption of hostilities in Korea. On the contrary, over-rapid withdrawal of foreign troops could well be the direct cause of resumption of hostilities. Certainly, the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, on the orders of the governments which [Page 726] sent them to Korea, is to be expected. Their withdrawal must be kept in accurate phase, however, with the development of assurance that hostilities will not begin again. The sooner the governments whose troops are in Korea are convinced that a genuine military armistice has been honestly implemented, the sooner the groundwork can be laid for settling the other problems of Korea including the question of foreign forces. Thus, it is perfectly clear to the United Nations Command delegation that your proposal to add to the agenda an item dealing with withdrawal of foreign forces is a proposal based on a totally false promise. It is a proposal conceived in error and containing the seed of fresh danger and suffering for Korea.
“We have pointed out to you that the question of withdrawing foreign forces from Korea is a question for determination by the governments which sent them to Korea. It is beyond the scope of a military armistice, beyond the purview of this conference. We have reminded you that a decision regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is not necessary to accomplish a military armistice. A military armistice is merely a suspension of hostilities, usually a prelude to broader settlements which could properly include politico-military topics, and resolve them. We have emphasized that this conference must be confined to military matters essential only to the negotiation of a military armistice. Withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is not one of these. We have shown clearly how fallacious is your basic reason for urging that withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea be made an agenda item. We have demonstrated that far from being a guarantee against resumption of hostilities, the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea would endanger the military armistice. We have expressed our belief that as the military armistice proves itself reliable, the governments concerned will take up the matter of withdrawing their forces from Korea, along with other problems relating to Korea.
“In connection with our agreed agenda items 2, 3, and 4, both of our delegations have announced the purpose of presenting unilateral views on details not expressly mentioned in the wording of the agenda item this understanding has become a basic part of our agreement on wording of agenda items. You, for example, have made clear your intent to present views with reference to a specific parallel in connection with the agreed items. We have likewise expressed an intent to present views on matters not specifically covered in the wording of the agenda items, such as the International Red Cross visits to prisoner of war camps. It is clearly the right of either delegation to voice its views on any subject it sincerely believes to be pertinent to [Page 727] the question under consideration. In fact, it was to make provision for exercising this right, that the United Nations Command delegation has advocated generalized wording of agenda items. Certainly our agreed item dealing with arrangements for an armistice provides ample opportunity for you to express any views you may entertain on such questions as withdrawal of forces from Korea. Of course, neither delegation is obliged to accept such unilaterally submitted views as correct or even pertinent.
“The foregoing does not minimize in any way the importance of the ultimate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea in relation to an overall settlement of the Korean question. Its importance is recognized in the public declarations of the U.N. as well as of the individual governments having troops in the U.N.C. However, this question is only one of those which must be considered on the governmental level in effecting a permanent settlement and which cannot be discussed separately or in advance of agreement on, and implementation of, armistice terms.
“In view of this established understanding, the United Nations Command delegation does not perceive the need for additional agenda items. As we have said, the agreed agenda item dealing with arrangements for a military armistice provides you with ample opportunity to put forward your views on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. In the interests of making progress toward stopping bloodshed in Korea, we therefore, urge that you accept the agreed items as the agenda, so that our work can go forward.”
Part 2.
Communist delegation requested a recess until 1400K. When meeting reconvened Communist delegation made following proposal:
“We therefore propose to add a 5th item to the four items on the agenda already agreed upon—‘recommendation to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides’ so that after discussing and obtaining concrete agreements on the four items, we may discuss under this item the question of recommending to the governments of the countries on both sides that within a definite time limit after the armistice agreement becomes effective, a conference of their representatives of a higher level be convened to negotiate on the question of withdrawal by stages of all foreign armed forces from Korea. We consider that such an item on the agenda and the content of the recommendations we are prepared to put forward when this item is under discussion will not only be conducive to an early realization of our desire for an armistice agreement but also enhance the hope [Page 728] of assuring peace in Korea. We believe that the delegation of the United Nations force will surely agree to our proposal.”
1426K
United Nations:
In order that we can make no mistakes about your proposal we should like to have in writing exactly what you said.
1427K
North Korea:
That we can do.
1427K
United Nations:
Can we have it now?
Recessed at 1427K hours.
Reconvened at 1500K hours.
1500K
United Nations:
Do we understand your actual proposed item to be, and I quote: “Recommendation to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides”, and I unquote. Correct?
North Korea:
Yes, that is the recommendation to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.
United Nations:
We understand.
North Korea:
And I explained the content of it.
United Nations:
You mean the rest, in other words, is just explanation?
North Korea:
Yes.
United Nations:
Is it intended that your new item 5 be discussed by our two delegations after an armistice agreement based on the four mutual agreed upon items is signed and in effect?
North Korea:
Then I will explain it again. That means after having discussed the four items and reached an agreement on them, we will recommend to the governments concerned on both sides, and then we may discuss under this item the question of recommending to the governments of the countries concerned that within a definite time-limit after the armistice agreement becomes effective, a conference of their representatives of a higher level be convened to negotiate on the question of withdrawal by stages of all foreign armed forces from Korea.
[Page 729]United Nations:
In other words, you mean this is another agenda item which must be discussed before the agreement is signed?
North Korea:
To have the agreement on the armistice smoothly. See? So we present the first four items first and when we have discussed the armistice items. That is only a technical question. Before the signing or after. We want to have a 15-minute recess to consider that.
United Nations:
What I want to get clear is this—whether you mean if both delegations do not agree on the recommendation, you will not sign the agreement?
North Korea:
Your statement is duly noted.
Part 3:
I have instructed Admiral Joy as follows:
“Your recommendation ‘acceptance of the Communist proposed item 5 is recommended’ is approved. I am at once reporting my action to JCS, which, of course, may otherwise instruct me. If so, you will be promptly informed.”
Part 4:
In the event you have other instructions they should reach me by 2608002 Tokyo time.