Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 101: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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C 67520. Re my C 67474 and your JCS 969381 in reply thereto, appreciate potentialities of my proposed action. It was for that primary reason that I reported in advance this element of planned operations in Korea.
It is my belief that substantial buildup of hostile offensive potential has cont since prior to the enemys first positive step taken in connection with current negotiations and at an accelerated rate throughout that period. It is my estimate that these negotiations, however long cont, may fail of agreement on at least one basic condition without which we cannot agree to cease hostilities, and that is the issue of unrestricted inspection in Korea. Finally, it is my estimate that the hostile offensive potential will be used to its max, possibly incl air, at such time as it becomes evident to the Kremlin that its proposals will be rejected, and local conditions become suitable.
The en offensive potential, if and when exercised, means add heavy loss of American lives, and if en air is employed, probably heavier than any so far suffered in any single offensive.
Withholding of this atck, an element in other planned operations, may therefore, result in serious and avoidable losses. Successful delivery of the atck will probably inflict serious logistics losses, materially reduce his offensive capabilities at this time, and subject the whole Communist combine to increased stresses and strains.
I feel obliged to present these add thought prior to your decision thereon, because this issue involves a fundamental in the responsibilities with which you have charged me, namely the scty of UN Forces and the conservation of their lives. I do so with full recognition that [Page 722] my views are based primarily on conditions within a single theatre, and that the problem has world-wide aspects.