Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 70: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
HNC–098. This message in 5 parts. Subj: Armistice conference at Kaesong on 15 July 51.
Part 1. Summary: Conference opened at 1409K, 15 July by United Nations Command Delegation stating the administrative requirements necessary if the conferences were to continue. Communist Delegation agreed to all proposals. (Details in Part 3). Next 45 minutes spent by North Korean delegate criticizing United Nations Command agenda and justifying his own. Stress was laid on the 38 parallel being the basic principle upon which the Korean armistice must be solved. There was no concession by them on the agenda. United States Command Delegation agreed to remove the “International Red Cross visiting PW camps” item from the agenda and discuss it under the general topic of prisoners of war. We also agreed to remove the item which stated that only military matters in Korea would be discussed, since [Page 685] Communists had given us their assurance that this was their intention. We further explained that we could not accept any particular military demarcation line as an item for discussion as a basis for establishing an agenda. Conference adjourned at 1601K with an agreement to meet at 1000K, 16 July.
Part 2. Generally, the opposing delegates seemed willing and anxious to get down to business as if they wanted to show results or determine the United Nations position as quickly as possible. They were serious and attentive throughout.
When Admiral Joy told of being stopped by guard on road and told he must wait until main convoy caught up, Nam Il and Lee Song Cho evidence surprise but the two Chinese appeared very much annoyed and showed it in their quick glance at Nam Il.
When Nam Il read a prepared paper concerning the agenda, he hesitated and stammered several times. He appeared a little more nervous today than in previous meetings. The Chinese seemed particularly impressed by Admiral Joy’s argument regarding the military difference between a line of parallel and defensible line.
Nam Il and two associates listened until Admiral Joy said he had been directed by the Commander in Chief to request that they convey to their superior a request that the location of prisoner of war camps be given to the International Red Cross and that representatives be allowed to visit them, then all three grabbed pencils and began taking notes with a deep frown on their faces which relaxed considerably when Admiral Joy later explained the prisoner of war matter would be given less important place on agenda. Nam Il was particularly interested in discussion of 38th parallel and asked that certain part be read again in English.
Part 3. Progress made.
1. Agreement reached that: a. A neutral zone 5 miles in radius centered on traffic circle in Kaesong be established. Pan Mun Jom on eastern edge to be included therein, b. Each side refrain from hostile acts in neutral zone. c. All military forces to be removed from neutral zone except those necessary for military police duty and armed only as necessary for this function, d. Area of conference be established of ½ mile radius centered on conference house. e. All armed personnel to be removed from conference area. f. Main road from Pan Mun Jom to conference area to be free of armed guards and that United Nations Command delegation has unrestricted use of this road during daylight hours without notification.
2. Very little progress made in arriving at agreed agenda but consider atmosphere more favorable for tomorrow’s meeting.
Part 4. Sequence of events: United Nations Command delegation [Page 686] secured agreement on administrative requirements. Communist delegation took 15 minutes recess after our proposals were made. After the recess they agreed to a neutral zone and suggested Liaison Officers handle the other technical matters which was done after the conference adjourned. North Korean delegation then stated they had studied our agenda and the remarks which they previously had made regarding it and that they still consider that their analysis of it is correct. They insist that their agenda is appropriate and ours inappropriate. Their criticism was that United Nations Command agenda (a) Does not put most important items first (b) Does not separate the important items from the unimportant (c) Includes matters which are not of sufficient importance to be separate items. They repeated that they could see no relationship between “The location of prisoner of war camps and authority for International Red Cross to visit them” and the cease fire problem. On the next item they argued that we both agreed to discuss military matters in Korea only and saw no need for an item of this nature on the agenda. They considered our agenda item concerning the cease fire and the conditions on which it is to be based is too abstract. They repeated the reasons previously given why the main points are (1) The 38th parallel is the basic principle upon which the armistice must be based, (2) Cease fire and establishment of demilitarized zone and, (3) Withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. They argued that whether we were empowered to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea or not, it was essential to discuss this matter if the armistice were to be discussed. They could not see why we expected to consider only some part of the armistice discussions and not one of the major items. United Nations Command delegation then read statement on Red Cross observation of prisoner of war camps, arguing that it was for humanitarian reasons that we included it high on the agenda. After asking them to request their commanders to report the location of prisoner of war camps to the International Red Cross and to permit representatives to visit these camps without further delay, we agreed to withdraw this item from the agenda which referred to limiting discussions to military matters in Korea only. We then gave our arguments against placing any particular line as the military demarcation line as an item on the agenda. We concluded the meeting with statement that we won’t discuss any particular line in the formulation of an agenda and that we will continue our remarks tomorrow.
Part 5.
Conclusions: We conclude that (a) Communist delegates have been instructed to get down to business and stop quibbling on administrative matters. This is evidenced by their complete withdrawal of armed guards along the road and in the conference area. Only guards seen with arms were two acting as military policemen at road junctions to [Page 687] direct traffic. (b) Communist delegation may be under the impression that these armistice talks are for the final settlement of peace in Korea as evidenced by their insistence upon the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea as part of the armistice discussion. (c) Pressure by the Chinese may have been put on North Korean delegates to get along with the talks. (d) Communist delegation either believes or strongly hopes that United Nations Command delegation is or will be directed to settle for 38th parallel. Communists intend to press this point to fullest. (e) Communist delegation intends to force issue of withdrawal of foreign troops on to the agenda, and will continue to insist strongly that withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea must be considered during the armistice discussions.