Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 57: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
HNC–060. This message in 6 parts.
Part 1. Considerable agreement was reached in administrative matters such as freedom of movement and communications between headquarters and respective delegations. Most of day spent in explanation of terms and meaning of phrases. Some misunderstandings arose due to poor translations into English by their interpreter. They appeared quite concerned when he misunderstood their intentions, especially when our understanding of a statement was of more serious nature than they intended it should be. With the explanations and propaganda behind us, it seems we should make more progress at next meeting.
Part 2. Main items discussed by United Nations Command Delegation:
- a.
- Admission of newsmen to conference area.
- b.
- Disinterest in imaginary line across Korea which we stated had no military significance.
- c.
- Statement of impossibility of including question of withdrawal from Korea of non Korean troops as an agenda item.
- d.
- Explanation of terms and meanings of items on United Nations Command proposed agenda.
Part 3. Main items discussed by Communist Delegation:
- a.
- Reasons why admission of International Committee of the Red Cross inspectors to prisoner of war camps should not be included on agenda.
- b.
- Priority of items on agenda, and an adamant stand for their agenda and apparent unwillingness to change items 2 and 3 on their agenda.
Part 4. Sequence of events:
1. Conference convened 1000K. Communist began by reiterating that they do not plan any restrictions on UNC Delegation. They said again their concern is mainly for our safety. After we pressed the issue of free transit from Imjin River to conference area and within designated place in the area, Communists agreed to let properly marked vehicles move if we notify them when they depart from Imjin River or other designated areas. Arrangements made for wire communications from Munsan to Kaesong with link-up with Communist at Pan-munjon their outpost check point. Radio voice circuit between Munsan and Kaesong being arranged for communications between delegations.
[Page 661]2. Discussion on admittance of UNC press, photographers, etcetera. Communists feel that it is not important now and besides there is no agreement on agenda yet. (See Part 6).
3. UNC Delegation stated its views that the IRC should be permitted to visit POW camps for which reason a report on location of camps is necessary. Also explained meaning of (1) limitations of discussions to military matters in Korea, (2) demarcation line and demilitarized zone, (3) Armistice Commission and Observer Teams. We repeated reasons why “withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea” could not be discussed by Military Commanders. Further stated we could not discuss imaginary line that had no military significance.
4. NK Delegation answered with many questions. They said there is no relationship between the Red Cross visiting PW camps and the cease fire. They did not understand what was meant by “guarantee against resumption of hostilities”, “inspection teams”, and “Armistice Commission”. They could not see how armistice could be guaranteed without withdrawal of foreign troops. Meeting adjourned at 1227K.
5. Conference resumed at 1400K. UNC Delegation further explained our position on the Red Cross visiting PW camps. Stated we could not understand how NK delegate could take opposite view that his Government took 13 July 1950.1 We further explained what was meant by Armistice Commission, Observer Teams, and demilitarized zone.
6. One hour of discussion between Delegations concerning the order of priority of items to be discussed. Communists insist that “cease fire”, “demarcation of 38 parallel” and “withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea” are the basic points which must be placed first on the agenda. They felt that their agenda was proper and adequate.
7. UNC Delegation asked if Communist were willing to broaden their agenda item concerning the establishment of the demilitarized zone on the 38 parallel since this is only one line and there are many possible lines and zones which ought be discussed. They quickly asked what line did UNC Delegate suggest. They appear anxious to start discussions even prior to adoption of agenda. They also stated they did not consider 38 parallel an imaginary line. This line existed before and war broke out on that line. Therefore cease fire must be concluded on this line and must be on agenda. UNC Delegation then stated its understanding that the Communists had made it very clear that they refused to generalize their item reference demilitarized zone involving 38 parallel. We closed meeting 1554K on press problem as stated in para [Part] 6.
Part 5. Attitude of the NK and CCF Delegates. (The following represents the consensus of the Delegates).
[Page 662]The opposing delegation continued to conduct themselves in a precise military manner and were serious and earnest on all items discussed.
Nam Il remained the dominant figure, appeared confident and sure of himself and expressed himself forcefully. In most cases, he kept notes himself and at his proper turn talked directly from his notes without prior consultation with other delegates. In a few instances, he conversed with the second NK Delegate on matters and through a Chinese interpreter to General Teng Hua. On matters relating to security of the UNC Delegation and duties of liaison officers in the area, handling security of personnel, he asked and received advice of the second ranking Chinese General who apparently is in command of the CCF Forces in the immediate area.
In one instance, just prior to Nam Il’s last statement on the 38 parallel, Nam Il wrote a note to CCF Generals through interpreters who nodded agreement and returned note to Nam Il who then made his statement reference meaning of 38 parallel to his forces. There appeared to be no schism between the NK and CCF members although the latter appeared as the junior and silent partner in todays negotiations.
NK Delegates appeared extremely sensitive to any proposition concerning inspections or reports by IRC Teams. Nam Il appeared desirous of making progress in the discussions evidencing slight irritability over what he considered minor matters. Noticeable anxiety in NK group occurred when Admiral Joy’s final statement regarding press representatives was misunderstood to mean an immediate and irrevocable termination of all future discussions.
Statements reflecting a political slant appeared to have been prepared in writing before hand, or during the interpretations, by an officer behind Nam Il who passed written notes to him. Contents generally concerned reference to 38 parallel or withdrawal of forces.
The NK Delegates appeared extremely anxious to be sure that their interpretations of translations were correct.
Part 6. Reference HNC 055.2 Senior Communist Delegate stated in afternoon session that his answer to the question of admittance of newsmen to conference area did not constitute a refusal, but that the matter must be held in abeyance in the interest of proceeding with the main problem.
Admiral Joy complied with my instructions quoted in part 2 cited message just prior to adjournment, and asked for response by 120730K July. Nam Il reacted with noticeable agitation. He inquired if this meant that the United Nations Command Delegation wanted to discontinue [Page 663] the meetings. He was advised that we wished to continue the meetings but would recess until sessions can be resumed with newsmen present in conference area. Their concern was apparent from inquiry as to how they could convey their reply to the United Nations Command Delegation by the deadline.
In event of favorable Communist reaction, next meeting will be held 121000K July.