Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/6–3051: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command ( Ridgway )

top secret
priority

Washington , June 30, 1951—12:25 a. m.

JCS 95354. Noforn. Personal for General Ridgway eyes only from JCS.

1. This message cancels our previous directives regarding armistice terms and contains instructions regarding such terms for your guidance in any conversations which might develop between you and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea. It is believed that the chance for a successful conclusion of such negotiation may depend upon secrecy in at least the opening stages; it is not, therefore, intended to make these instructions public.

2. General policy.

a. Our principal military interest in this armistice lies in a cessation of hostilities in Korea, an assurance against the resumption of fighting and the protection of the security of United Nations forces, as set forth in NSC 48/5,¹ copy of which you have received. General policy and background guidance is found in the same paper.

b. We lack assurance either that the Soviet Union and Communist China are serious about concluding reasonable and acceptable armistice arrangements or that they are prepared to agree to an acceptable permanent settlement of the Korean problem. In considering an armistice, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to reach arrangements which would be acceptable to us over an extended period of time, even though no progress is made in reaching agreement on political and territorial questions.

c. Discussions between you and the commander of opposing forces should be severely restricted to military questions; you should specifically not enter into discussion of a final settlement in Korea or consideration of issues unrelated to Korea, such as Formosa and the Chinese seat in the United Nations; such questions must be dealt with at governmental level.

3. You are authorized to adopt, for negotiating purposes, initial positions more favorable to us than the minimum conditions set forth in these instructions. However, great care should be used, in putting forward a negotiating position, not to allow talks to break down except in case of failure to accept our minimum terms; not to appear, to over-reach to an extent to cause world opinion to question our good faith; and not so to engage US prestige in a negotiating position as to make retreat to our minimum terms impossible. Our minimum position is essential to us but we must recognize that it will not be easy for opponents to accept; the difficulty of your negotiation is fully appreciated here.

4. Pursuant to the above, the armistice agreements:

a. Shall be confined to Korea and strictly military matters therein, and shall not involve any political or territorial matters.

b. Shall continue in effect until superseded by other arrangements.

c. Shall require the commanders concerned to order a cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea; shall require the establishment of a demilitarized area across Korea; and shall require all ground forces in Korea to remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear except that all forces which may be in advance of the demilitarized area shall be moved to positions in the rear thereof;

d. Shall provide for supervision over the execution of and adherence to the terms of the armistice arrangements by a Military Armistice Commission of mixed membership of an equal basis designated by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations command and by the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces. The Commission and teams of observers appointed by the Commission shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea and shall be given all possible assistance and cooperation in carrying out their functions.

e. Shall require the commanders concerned to cease the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing air, ground or naval units or personnel during the armistice. This shall not be interpreted as precluding the exchange of units or individual personnel on a man-for-man basis;

f. Shall require the commanders concerned to refrain from increasing the level of war equipment and material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. Such equipment and material will not include those supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Commission nor the vehicles, ships or aircraft used to transport such supplies.

5. The following specific details are essential to the above armistice arrangements:

a. The Military Armistice Commission must be empowered to inspect to insure that the terms, conditions, and arrangements as agreed to are carried out by all armed forces, including guerillas. It shall be provided with competent assistants designated equally by the Commander in Chief. United Nations Command, and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea, in numbers sufficient to enable it to carry out its duties and functions;

b. The armistice arrangements should not become effective until the Commission has been organized and is ready to exercise its functions;

c. The demilitarized area shall be a zone on the order of 20 miles in width, to be determined by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea, based generally upon the positions of the opposing forces at the time the armistice arrangements are agreed upon. For purposes of negotiation your initial demand might be that the Communist forces must withdraw 20 miles or more along the entire front. If it becomes necessary for purposes of bargaining for you to agree to some withdrawal of United Nations forces, you may do so to the extent that your present strong military position and your ability to carry out your military mission are not placed in jeopardy. You may agree to continued Communist control of the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas for purposes of the armistice only. If the Communist Commander refers to statements attributed to United States Government officials that the United States is prepared to accept a settlement on or around the 38th parallel, you should take the position that such statements are not applicable to an armistice in the field but are properly the subject for governmental negotiation as to a political settlement. Further, you should state that in any event the military arrangements you propose involve certain areas under Communist military control south of the 38th parallel and certain areas under UN control north thereof. The net result, while military in character, does not prejudice political and territorial questions which would be for further consideration by appropriate authorities.

d. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing ground forces in Korea. These forces shall respect the demilitarized zone and the areas under the control of the opposing force.

e. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing naval forces. Naval elements shall respect the waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone and to the land areas under the control of the opposing force, to the limit of three miles off-shore.

f. The armistice arrangements shall apply to all opposing air forces. These forces shall respect the air space over the demilitarized zone and the areas under the control of the opposing force.

g. Vehicles, naval units and aircraft required for special missions authorized by the Commission shall be excepted from subparagraphs d, e, and f, above.

h. Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis as expeditiously as possible. Until the exchange of prisoners is completed, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can.

i. Organized bodies of armed forces including guerillas initially in advance of the demilitarized zone shall be moved back or passed through to the area of their own main forces.²

1. Dated May 17; see the memorandum containing the sections on Korea, p. 439.

2. The following addition to the directive was forwarded to General Ridgway by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram JCS 95843, dated July 9:

   “Add new para 6 to JSC 95354, 30 Jun 51:

   “‘Para 6. The foll provision is considered desirable, though not essential, for inclusion in the Armistice Arrangement:

   “‘Graves Registration personnel of the mil services shall be permitted free and unlimited access to all of Korea for the purposes of search, recovery, and evacuation of deceased and missing mil personnel. Provision for such matters as identification of Graves Registration personnel and escorts therefor shall be arranged as mutually agreed between CINCUNC and the Commander, Communist Forces in Korea.’”(Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 44)