Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/S Files: NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Gleason) to the National Security Council

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Washington, May 15, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia

References:	A. NSC 48/4
	B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May l,1 8 and 14,2 1951

The enclosed revisions of paragraphs 6–e and 6–f and of the introductory sentence of paragraph 8, prepared by the Senior NSC Staff in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (reference memo of May 14), are submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council in connection with Council action on NSC 48/4 on the subject at its meeting on May 16, 1951.

S. Everett Gleason

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared by the Senior Staff of the National Security Council

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Proposed Revision of Paragraphs 6–e and 6–f and of the Introductory Sentence of Paragraph 8 of NSC 48/4

6–e. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

6–f. Consistent with e above and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.³

8. While continuing to recognize the National Government as the legal government of China, the United States, with respect to Communist China, should now; … .⁴

1. See footnote 1 to the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 387.
2. See footnote 1, p. 431.
3. At its 91st meeting on May 16, the National Security Council accepted the above language for Paragraphs 6–e and f, as prepared by the NSC Senior Staff, and recommended approval by the President (NSC Action No. 471). Mr. Truman approved NSC 48/4, as amended, on the following day, May 17, and the final document was circulated as NSC 48/5; for the text, see vol. vi, Part 1, p. 33. For extracts from NSC 48/5, May 17, dealing with Korea, see p. 439.
4. The introductory sentence of Paragraph 8 of NSC 48/4 did not contain the prefatory clause on recognition of the Nationalist Government of China, which was approved and included in NSC 48/5.