320.2–AC/5–1451: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations
secret
Washington, May 14,
1951—7 p. m.
925. Re urtel 1524, 11 May and re Hickerson-Gross telcon re Rau suggestion, Dept’s preliminary reaction is as follows:
- 1.
- We feel strongly that strategic embargo presently being considered by AMC shld be put on books of GA without regard to any other questions like those raised by Rau proposal. In other words, it shld be dealt with separately and distinctly and be completed before other questions re Korean case are raised.
- 2.
- We remain willing as always to agree to arrangements which wld stop fighting, and aggression and ensure against its resumption.
- 3.
- Rau proposal seems to be effort to use a GA Res initially as a vehicle for bringing about cease-fire. We assume proposal wld not impair [Page 435] in any sense UN political objectives with regard to unification of Korea.
- 4.
- In our view a GA Res is not suitable vehicle to achieve cease-fire. Such Res permits less flexibility than efforts through instrumentality like GOC, and wld limit freedom of negotiation. Further, a GA Res supported by US might even make more difficult getting Chi agreement to cease-fire.
- 5.
- We feel that GA Res wld be vain and futile exercise unless there is prior indication of willingness on part Chi Commies to agree to acceptable cease-fire. Best prospects for cease-fire wld be through continued informal approaches by GOC and others. If Chi Commies indicate interest, then cease-fire cld be negotiated, and subsequently a GA Res to confirm agreed arrangements might be desirable.
Acheson