Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/5–851

Memorandum by John P. Davies, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

secret

[Washington,] May 8, 1951.

Davis (EE)¹ has just told me that he has been informed in a telephone conversation with Cory (USUN) that Malik’s and Tsarapkin’s May 3 invitation to Cory and Corrigan to ride with them from Lake Success into New York City arose out of rather natural circumstances.² The two Americans were without transportation and the invitation followed.

Cory informed Davis that he (Cory) had suggested that Malik dine with him sometime and that Malik had indicated willingness to do so.

The question is whether we should follow up on Malik’s evident willingness to talk about American-Soviet relations.

I think we should. I am still of the belief that we can learn far more than we can give away (if there is anything left to give away in information). There seems to me to be only two objections which can be advanced. One is that the Russians publicize these conversations as they did the Smith-Molotov talks³ and thereby embarrass us. The other is that bilateral conversations between us and Soviet representatives would make our allies nervous and apprehensive lest we make a deal behind their backs.

I would question whether either of these objections is valid. I think that the risks of a disclosure of the conversations for propaganda purposes can be avoided if our representative is someone whom the Kremlin feels (a) will not seek a personal, political advantage through publicizing his role, and (b) although not a high American official, is in a position to speak with authority and in confidence for the Government. That person is Kennan. Kennan should be asked to do the job, be briefed and meet with Malik at a three-some dinner with Cory. If the exploration proceeds satisfactorily and we wish to transfer the talks to an official plane, we can always do so.

As for the nervousness of our allies, I suspect that nowadays it is less a fear that we will go soft and sell them out to the Kremlin than that we will be so tough that we will bring down a war around their heads. Therefore, it seems to me that there can be less objections now to bilateral feeling out than was the case several years ago. Whether we should inform the British and the French or others of such talks, I would leave to our specialists in European Affairs. Personally, I think we can save our friends much idle speculation if we go ahead without telling them, at least at the outset.

. . . . . .

Not to follow up on the opening provided by Malik is to continue our relations with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of blind man’s bluff without even attempting to discover whether the blindfold can be lifted a bit.

John Davies, Jr.

1. Richard H. Davis, Officer in Charge of Soviet Union Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs.
2. See the memorandum of conversation, dated May 3, p. 401.
3. Reference is to discussions concerning the Berlin Crisis during the summer of 1948; for related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, pp. 995 ff.