I am attaching a copy of a message which Prime Minister Attlee has sent
to you via the British Embassy. This is the message which I discussed
with you over the telephone this evening. I am also attaching a copy of
my message to Mr. Bevin1 which
is referred to in the message Mr. Attlee has sent you.
We will endeavor to have a reply prepared for your consideration tomorrow
morning and will coordinate our efforts with the Department of National
Defense.
[Annex]
The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman
Dear Mr. President: I am greatly disturbed
by present developments in the Far East, and feel that I should open
my mind to you in order that there may be no possibility of
misunderstanding between our two Governments.
My colleagues and I have been basing their policy on the assumptions
that we should fight it out in Korea and try to localise the
conflict. This was my understanding of the common position which we
reached together in Washington in December. It is on these
assumptions, and on the assumption that if we could hold a line and
build up a position of strength in Korea the Chinese might then be
in a mood to respond to a suggestion for a negotiated settlement,
that His Majesty’s Government have been pressing that the
possibility for a negotiation with China should be kept open. This
accounts for our attitude on future action in the United Nations. It
now appears from the information we are receiving that the intention
of the United Nations Command is to evacuate rather than fight it
out. I feel compelled to ask you to give me an authoritative
indication of the intentions of the United States Government in this
respect. I am left with the impression, particularly from Secretary
Acheson’s message to [Page 38] Mr.
Bevin of the 5th January, that the United States Government may wish
to substitute for a policy of localising the conflict in Korea, a
policy aimed at developing limited action against China.
It may be that it is militarily impossible to hold on in Korea. This
possibility was recognised between us in Washington last month.
Moreover, we are not blind to that possibility that China may intend
to spread hostilities in the Far East. But looking at the world
situation as a whole, and bearing in mind that the Soviet Union is
the principal enemy, we think it unwise to provoke China
unnecessarily to further aggression. The wiser course, it seems to
us, is to harbour our forces and build them up in order to meet
Communist attacks where ever they may come. It is true that Mr.
Acheson, in his message of January 5th, states that the United
States intend to do everything they can to prevent hostilities
spreading from Korea to wider areas in the Far East. But the kind of
action against China for which the United States Government appear
to be pressing at the United Nations will, in our view, almost
certainly provoke China to extend hostilities. There can be little
doubt that, for example, a campaign of subversion or guerrilla
warfare against China involving the use of Chiang Kai-Shek’s men
would certainly have that effect. I do not know whether such a
project is intended by the United States Government, and I should
like to know whether they would intend to recommend such action by
the United Nations after China had been declared an aggressor.
It was for all these reasons, which I have felt bound to explain to
you frankly, that we have been opposing the introduction at this
stage of a resolution in the United Nations condemning China as an
aggressor and calling on the Collective Measures Committee to
consider what measures should be taken.
In any case we consider it desirable, in order to consolidate opinion
in the United Nations which is at present disarrayed, and ensure the
greatest measure of support on the part of the free world, that an
immediate step should be taken at the United Nations which, while
recognising the facts of the situation in Korea, would show that all
concerned were prepared to go to the utmost limit in giving the
Chinese a chance to reach a peaceful settlement. Such an immediate
step might take the form of a resolution based perhaps on the latest
set of principles drawn up by the Cease-Fire Committee. This might
include a clause condemning Chinese intervention in Korea and might
lay more stress on the 5th point of the principles. There was a good
deal of support among our Commonwealth friends here for the notion
that the Big Powers have a special responsibility in this
crisis.
[Page 39]
It would be of the greatest assistance to me if you could possibly
let me have a reply in time for tomorrow’s meeting.
With all good wishes
C. R. Attlee
8th January, 1951.
