Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/5–351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Corrigan and Thomas J. Cory of the United States Mission at the United Nations

secret
US/GEN/419

New York, May 3, 1951.

Subject: Some Soviet Views on the World Situation.

Participants:	Mr. Jacob Malik, Permanent Soviet Representative to the United Nations.
	Mr. Semen K. Tsarapkin, Alternate Soviet Representative to the United Nations.
	Dr. Frank P. Corrigan, U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
	Mr. Thomas J. Cory, U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

Tone of Conversation: A ride into Manhattan with Soviet Delegate Jacob Malik and his Deputy, Semen Tsarapkin, following yesterday’s Security Council meeting afforded an opportunity for a four-way conversation on many subjects. The discussion was free and informal and, on occasions, very animated. Mostly, it was between Malik and Cory and between Tsarapkin and Corrigan, but at times it became general. Both Russians expressed themselves in a casual and unofficial way and showed little of the caution and reserve which ordinarily mark their public appearances. They did not seem to be trying to “make propaganda”, but seemed rather to be enjoying a frank exchange of views with two antagonists.

American Luxury: As we were getting into the car, Malik said that his Chrysler is a fine American automobile, that it has especially large tires, and that it rides very comfortably. He compared the luxury of the automobile to the luxury of all American life, and said that he fails to understand why the United States with all its wealth, devotes so much effort to imperialist aims in Europe. He wondered why the United States should spend its resources so far afield. We answered that the United States is trying to help reconstruct Europe. Malik said he believes the real aim of the United States is to make satellites of the Western European countries and that this is a form of aggression which naturally alarms Russia.

American Bases: Malik remarked that Russia is well aware of American aggressive intentions against the USSR and that Russians follow carefully the construction of American bases in Greenland, North Africa, England, Japan, and other countries encircling the Soviet Union. He observed that there are no Soviet bases in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Canada, or other countries around the United States and wondered how Russians could avoid their conclusions about American imperialism when they looked at a map showing the location of American bases.

Foreign Invasion of Russia: Malik then went into considerable detail about the long history of foreign aggression against Russia. He began with Tamerlane and passed to Genghis Khan, Sweden, Lithuania, Poland, the Teutonic Knights, Napoleon, the Kaiser, the Allied intervention, and Hitler. He noted that these invasions had all failed and that any American invasion likewise would fail. Cory said that Malik demonstrated an unreasonable fear; that the United States has no intention to invade Russia as had Napoleon, Hitler, and others; that the United States seeks a peaceful solution to outstanding problems and avoidance of war. Malik objected to the use of the word “fear”. He said Russia fears no one, that Russia has been invaded so many times that she has ceased to fear, but that she is united in her determination to resist aggression. Cory suggested that perhaps a better word would be “suspicion” and that geography and history give the Russian people good cause to be suspicious. Malik assented to the substitute word, saying that suspicion is an important characteristic of Russian psychology. We all agreed that Russian history and tradition are factors which should not be lost sight of during the present crisis.

Peaceful Coexistence: Malik asked whether the United States believes in peaceful coexistence. We replied that of course it does but that the history of the last five years has taught the American people that peaceful coexistence is something which must be purchased by preparedness, that good will on one side is not sufficient. To this Malik observed that the American press carries many reports of public speeches and statements by American officials proving that American officials are opposed to peaceful coexistence. He referred to speeches of Senators which advocate dropping atom bombs on Moscow and to what he called inflammatory war propaganda in Washington, in the American press, and in speeches made throughout the United States. Malik said that no such public statements are made in Moscow. Cory suggested behind the walls of the Government and Party offices in Moscow, perhaps inflammatory statements also are made, but that they never come to the attention of the world because of the secrecy which cloaks the activities of the Soviet State. Malik denied that this is so, saying that no Russian official ever makes such statements either privately or publicly and that in any event the Supreme Soviet of the USSR recently passed a law providing severe punishment for war mongers. He dismissed Pospelov’s last speech as containing not propaganda but only the unvarnished truth.¹

U.S. and Soviet Strength: Malik inquired what the United States hopes to achieve by its aggressive warmongering policy against the USSR. He touched on the long history of disagreement between the United States and the USSR in the United Nations, blaming the U.S. for failure to reach agreements on atomic energy or in the Military Staff Committee. He was told that American policy seeks to prepare not for aggressive war, but to develop protective strength against existing Soviet power and that disagreements such as Malik had mentioned arose not because of American aggressive policies, but because the Soviet Union was out of step with the rest of the world. Cory said that the United States is engaged in building up strength to ensure against Russian employment of the military force the Soviet Union now has under arms and mentioned current press estimates that the USSR has 275 divisions under arms. To this, Malik replied heatedly that the United States always speaks of the number of Soviet divisions, which number, he said, is nothing like 275, but that the United States never refers to its own powerful navy or its strategic air force or its stock of atom bombs. He said that the United States had never made public the number of atom bombs in its stockpile and claimed that a given number of atom bombs can certainly offset a given number of divisions, and that therefore the United States may actually be stronger than the USSR regardless of the number of divisions each country has in the field. (There was no braggadocio in Malik’s analysis of the strength of the two countries.)

How to Reconcile Disagreements: Cory said the conversation shows that the disparity between his thinking and that of Malik is just as great as that between the United States and the USSR and wondered how two such differing points of view could ever be reconciled. Malik replied that the only hope is abandonment of United States aggressive policies. Cory insisted that the United States deeply desires peaceful settlement of outstanding issues, but Malik continued to insist that all facts argue to the contrary.

Settlement of Korean War; The conversation shifted to Korea and here, we suggested, is a limited dispute which could be settled by good will on both sides in a manner which could pave the way for settlement of other great disputes between our two countries. Malik answered that all the evidence shows the United States wants no settlement of the Korean War. Cory objected strongly to this, saying that the United States’ policy in the United Nations clearly testifies to the American desire for a peaceful settlement on honorable terms and mentioned U.S. support of the Cease Fire Committee and of the Good Offices Committee. Malik said that these are merely words, that the facts of the case show that the United States definitely does not want a peaceful settlement. Malik was then asked how a peaceful settlement could ever be brought about. He initially replied that he thought it might be done through the two Foreign Ministers. Cory asked what Malik meant, whether he was referring to the Soviet and U.S. Foreign Ministers. Malik said no, that he was thinking of the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers. Cory asked whether Mr. Malik was proposing that the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, if it is ever held, should add settlement of the Korean War to its agenda. Malik said he was making no proposal, that he was merely thinking that the Korean dispute, as well as many other outstanding matters, could and should be settled by discussion between the United States and the Soviet Governments. He said the Soviet position on such bilateral discussions is well known. (Malik deftly avoided being pinned down more specifically on how to settle the Korean War, and he did not volunteer, and a shift in the conversation denied us a chance to discuss the position of the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in such settlement.)

Facts are Facts: Cory said that Malik, and also Mr. Vishinsky last fall, often referred to the facts of the case, saying let the facts speak for themselves. Cory suggested that a useful approach in the Korean situation might be for the two governments to isolate facts from propaganda and said that he himself had been in Korea at the time of the North Korean attack and that as far as he is concerned, it is a fact that the North Koreans commenced the aggression. Malik replied that even observers on the scene sometimes fail to interpret correctly what has happened and suggested that Cory might have been mistaken. Cory heatedly denied this, saying that any man in Seoul at that time, particularly one in the Political Section of the American Embassy, could have no doubt as to the facts in this particular case. Malik continued to deny that such facts are necessarily evident to an observer on the scene. Cory mentioned that as a matter of fact that very afternoon Senator Austin had held a press conference in which he presented two captured North Korean documents which clearly confirmed that the war had been started by the North Koreans.² Malik said he had not seen the documents, but that it is well known that such documents can easily be forged. We answered that of course they could, but that these documents certainly had not been forged because they agreed too completely with what already is known of the North Korean aggression. Cory then referred to the North Korean White Book,³ saying that Soviet spokesmen in the UN are on very weak ground in quoting from it because there is in that book no document attributed to U.S. sources which proves that the U.S. or the Republic of Korea began the aggression. He said that the only such “proof” in the White Book consisted of statements and broadcasts of South Koreans who had defected and who necessarily would give slanted and mendacious testimony.

Settlement of Korean War: We insisted again that the United States wants a peaceful settlement of the Korean War on honorable terms, to which Malik replied that any settlement on honorable terms must necessarily be on terms which are honorable to all interested parties (Malik obviously was referring to North Korea and Communist China). Cory admitted that this seemed reasonable but that the U.S. was striving for a settlement of the Korea situation per se and saw no reason to bring Formosa or recognition of the Chinese Communists or Chinese Communist membership in the UN into what the United States considers a localized question. Malik merely repeated that any Korean settlement must contain honorable terms for all interested parties.

Formosa: Malik shifted the conversation to Formosa, inquiring how the United States occupation of Formosa could do other than cause the Chinese Communists to hate the United States. He seemed to believe this is the principal reason for the Chinese Communist intervention. He was unperturbed by Cory’s mention of the fact that last fall Mr. Dulles had expressly told the UN that there were only 42 American soldiers in Formosa. Malik continued to insist that the United States occupies Formosa, adducing as additional proof the recent establishment of an American Military Advisory Group for Formosa. At this point, Tsarapkin came into the conversation to observe that there were various forms of occupation and the United States could occupy Formosa without many Americans being present. (From the tenor of the conversation, it seems possible that Tsarapkin was assuming that the United States occupies Formosa with few Americans being present in much the same way that the USSR managed to control North Korea with relatively few Russians in the country.)

Capitalist War Profits: Cory said that he found this a depressing conversation and one which was doing nothing to narrow the differences between us. Malik reverted to his previous claim that the reason for this is that the United States does not want peace and added the new theme that Wall Street capitalists are making such profits from the Korean war that they never will end the fighting if they can help it. He adduced some statistics on earnings of U.S. corporations and said that he recently read in the newspapers that Charles E. Wilson, Defense Mobilization Director, had received a large bonus from his company⁴ due, he assumed, to the great earnings of this company from the Korean war. We objected to this, saying that Mr. Wilson and many Americans like him may have sons or relatives in Korea and that no right-thinking American places profits above the welfare of his own kin and country. Malik seemed totally unimpressed by this argument and continued that capitalist forces in the world are the ones responsible for aggression whereas no Soviet citizen could conceivably profit from war.

Yugoslavia: Cory then inquired how, if capitalist forces cause war, had the dispute between the USSR and Yugoslavia arisen, that being a dispute between two socialist states. Malik replied by saying that American capitalists had incited Yugoslavia to her action. Cory ridiculed this, saying Malik must be aware of the status enjoyed by Americans in Yugoslavia prior to the defection. Malik answered that even though American capitalists themselves may not have been present they at least sent agents to Yugoslavia to do the job.

U.S. Foreign Service Officers: At one point during the discussion of United States’ warmongers, Malik inquired what has become of George Kennan who, he said, he understands to be the number one American expert on Russia. Cory replied that Kennan is not now in the Government and is at present engaged in advanced study at Princeton University. Malik said that Kennan has had a great and unfortunate influence on United States’ policy toward Russia and that he has no doubts that Kennan’s voice is still heard in American policy circles. Malik inquired about Charles E. Bohlen, saying that he assumed Bohlen is now the number one American expert on Russia. Cory replied that Bohlen is still in Paris, but that presumably he will return shortly to Washington to assume his duties as Counselor of the State Department. Malik did not warm noticeably to Cory’s contentions that Kennan is a great admirer of many qualities of the Russian people, that he has devoted his life to the study of Russia and that he is particularly interested in the life and works of Chekhov of whom Kennan reportedly hopes some day to write a biography. Tsarapkin inquired about Elbridge Durbrow and seemed interested to learn that Durbrow is now Chief of Foreign Service Personnel. Tsarapkin also inquired about Charles W. Thayer, mentioning that he saw him last in Korea in 1946 or 1947. We said that after leaving Korea Thayer had headed the Voice of America for several years. Tsarapkin commented that in Russia the Voice of America is known as something like the “Lying Voice”. Tsarapkin asked where Thayer is now. When told that Thayer is now in Germany,⁵ Tsarapkin said that he assumed Thayer must be engaged in warmongering and anti-Soviet propaganda directed at Eastern Europe and Russia. At this point, Malik remarked rather jokingly in English to Tsarapkin that it is interesting that an American officer has gone from Korea to Germany and that he thought it might be worth while to study the transfer of other American officials from Korea to Germany. To this Cory observed that there had been several such transfers of American officers but that he was not worried about any aggressive intentions being behind the transfers, although he would worry very much if such Soviet officials as Tsarapkin, who had Korean experience, were transferred to Germany. Malik sought to dismiss the worry by saying that Soviet officials had no aggressive purposes in North Korea and would have none in Germany if they were transferred to that country.

GA Resolution of February 1: At one stage in the conversation about Korea, Malik mentioned that immediately after the passage of the GA resolution of February 1 which found the Chinese Communists to be aggressors he had heard Ambassador Austin exclaim “Thank God the UN has passed this resolution.” Malik said that this resolution clearly shows the aggressive forces behind United States’ policy and the fact that the U.S. desires the war to continue.

United Nations: The discussion then revolved around the U.N. and Malik made the statement, “The UN is dead”. Cory asked him to say that again and Malik did, saying, “The UN is dead”. Cory asked him precisely what Malik had been doing that afternoon at Lake Success and Malik replied that he was out there but that his work is not important. Malik then ticked off the United States “mechanical voting bloc”, listing the 20 American Republics and 10 or 12 Western European nations. He said that all these nations are American satellites. We asked whether he included France and England in this category and Malik replied that of course he did. Cory asked Malik whether if “the UN is dead” he expects soon to be the Soviet Delegate to the World Peace Council. Malik dodged this and said only that the UN has so changed since 1945 that it no longer is the organization it started out to be. Cory asked how Malik could honestly think that the U.S. has a mechanical voting block in the UN when Malik must see from the newspapers the difficulty the U.S. has been having in obtaining support for a UN program of economic sanctions against Communist China. Malik replied that he may have read something of this in the newspapers but that not being on any of the appropriate committees he is not well acquainted with difficulties which the U.S. may be experiencing in this respect.

General MacArthur: In talking about the dismissal of General MacArthur, we observed that this dismissal clearly demonstrated the United States’ desire to localize the war in Korea and that, according to the press, the school of thought championed by General MacArthur involves an enlargement of hostilities to which the Administration is opposed. Malik seemed unimpressed by this argument and responded only that the entire history of recent months shows clearly that the U.S. intends to continue the war in Korea and probably, in time, to extend it.

Chinese Communists in Korea: Another subject discussed at some length and with some heat was the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. Corrigan asked what did the Chinese Communists expect to gain for China by forcing the hand of the United Nations perhaps to the point of provoking all-out war against them and observed that the course they are pursuing will interfere with their plans for social and economic development and will lead to their utter destruction. The two Russians contended that wars do not always turn out as planned by the aggressors.

Chinese “Volunteers”: It may be worth noting that during the discussion of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, Malik did not once refer to “volunteers”, or attempt to use any terminology to disguise the fact that regular forces of the Chinese Communist regime are fighting in Korea.

Cost of War Preparations: Tsarapkin lamented that because of aggressive U.S. policies, the Soviet Government is compelled to spend so much money on defense to the detriment of great plans for grand canals, transportation, reforestation and so forth.

U.S. Democracy: Tsarapkin expressed a low opinion of US Democracy. He said that the people have no voice. His statement that an American had told him that if he had 100 million dollars to spend, he could elect a “Chinaman” President of the United States, gave Corrigan an opportunity to point out the folly of paying attention to such stupidity and to counsel a new approach to his study of the United States, pointing out the obvious fact that no one can predict who will be the next President nor even what men will be the nominees of the two great parties. Corrigan also pointed to the fact that our informed public opinion is independent of the newspapers which had often been 90% mistaken in their appraisal of it. He said our confidence is founded on the basic tenet of democracy that an informed electorate can determine what is good for them better than anyone can decide it for them and quoted Lincoln, “Give the people the light and they will find their way”. This analysis seemed to make little impression on Tsarapkin. Perhaps, he said that may have been true in the time of Lincoln, but not today. He seemed interested in Corrigan’s presentation but remained convinced in his own mind that somehow or other he must be right.

Nationalism: Corrigan and Tsarapkin engaged in a philosophical discussion on the importance of national sovereignty and its accompanying national feeling as a political force and reached agreement that even in Russia, as well as in Yugoslavia, it has major influence. Tsarapkin said that perhaps it has to be admitted that this is a century or age in which nationalism is still a predominant force and in which international arrangements must be obtained through an accord of sovereign nations ceding a share of their sovereignty to an organization like the United Nations, at least with regard to armaments and war.

American Effeteness: Tsarapkin manifested to Corrigan an amazing lack of appreciation for the American scene and a depreciation of American virility. He gave the impression of believing that all Americans are coddled and spoiled and lack the ability to withstand the hardships which are the accepted lot of the noble Russian people.

Comment: Malik was a charming and cordial host during the 45 minute ride to Manhattan, Tsarapkin somewhat less so. Most of the conversation was in English with Cory occasionally helping Malik in Russian and Corrigan assisting Tsarapkin in French. There was no serious language difficulty.

Corrigan was impressed by the manner in which the two Russians referred to their “colleagues”, using the word as well as other diplomatic expressions in a way indicating a deep-rooted desire to be accepted by others as colleagues in the diplomatic sense.

Leaving aside the major question of the imperviousness of the two Russians to foreign ideas, their statements raise wonder as to (1) how well informed they really are on the secret workings of the Soviet State and its relations with Communist China and (2) the extent to which they project into the non-Soviet world the psychology of themselves and their own country.

1. Presumably, the reference is to a speech given by P.N. Pospelov, former editor of Pravda, head of the Soviet Communist Party’s Department of Agitation and Propaganda, on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of Lenin’s death, January 21, 1951. The speech was bitterly critical of United States imperialism, particularly with regard to American intervention in the Russian Revolution. For the text, see The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, February 17, 1951, p. 3.
2. On May 2, 1951, Ambassador Austin transmitted to the U.N. Secretary-General a special report from the U.N. Command in Korea forwarding two documents captured from North Korean forces. The documents, dated June 18 and 22, 1950, were presented as evidence that the North Korean forces had planned aggression against the Republic of Korea prior to the outbreak of hostilities on June 25, 1950. The text of these documents is contained in U.N. document S/2112 and in the Department of State Bulletin, May 21, 1951, p. 828. For the North Korean response, May 18, see U.N. document S/2167/Rev. 1. A retort from the United States, May 31, is in U.N. document S/2179.
3. Documents and Materials Exposing the Instigators of the Civil War in Korea: Documents From the Archives of the Rhee Syngman Government. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pyongyang, 1950)
4. Mr. Wilson had been President of the General Electric Company.
5. Mr. Thayer was Chief of the Liaison and Reporting Division, Office of Political Affairs, in the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.