Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

top secret
priority

Washington, May 1, 1951—6:57 p. m.

JCS 90000. From JCS.

1. Foll instructions, which are a compilation and condensation, with minor modifications, of existing directives, constitute your authority for conduct of mil operations in Korea and do not pertain to instructions regarding China, Formosa, and Japan. All previous directives or portions of directives in conflict herewith are rescinded.¹

2. UN Security Council in its resolution of 7 Jul 50 recommended that all mbrs providing mil forces and other assistance, pursuant to Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June 50, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.

3. In accordance therewith you have been designated as the cdr of those mil forces assisting ROK. Your title in this capacity will be CINCUNC.

Mission

4. In accordance with appropriate UN resolutions, over-all mission of UN is to assist ROK in repelling the aggression and to restore peace and security in Korea.

5. As CINCUNC your mil objective is to destroy the armed forces of North Korea and Communist China operating within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto. In pursuit of this objective two considerations are overriding:

A. Security of forces under your command; and

B. Your basic mission, as CINCFE of the defense of Japan.

Operations

6. In pursuit of your mil objective in Korea, you are authorized to conduct air and naval operations within geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto as deemed by you to be necessary or advantageous to successful attainment of your objective. This specifically does not include authority to conduct air or naval action against Manchuria, against USSR territory, or against North Korean electrical power complex including the Yalu River power installations, and as a matter of policy no operations will be conducted within 15 miles of USSR territory.

7. With regard to ground operations, your planned operation set forth in your C 59397 Apr 51 is approved.² You will not undertake any general advance beyond limiting line specified therein without prior approval of JCS. You are, however, authorized to conduct such limited tactical operations as may be necessary or desirable to insure safety of your command, to maintain contact, and to keep enemy off balance. This includes authority to conduct guerrilla operations and limited amphibious and airborne operations in enemy rear areas.

Forces

8. As CINCUNC the fol forces are available to you:

A. All United States forces currently deployed in FECOM except 40th and 45th Inf Divs. These divs will not be employed outside Japanese Islands without authority from JCS, and the integrity of personnel and units in these divs will be preserved. For planning purposes you may assume that in event implementation of Jt Outline Emerg War Plan is directed while UN forces are in conflict with Communist forces in Far East, all SAC units operating in Far East Theater will be redeployed as required to support strategic air offensive. This does not include the 19th Bomb Wing.

B. Such ROK forces as are made available by ROK. You will not provide logistic support to any major ROK units other than those already being provided for, except on prior approval of JCS. At your discretion, attachment of ROK personnel to United States units is authorized.

C. Forces of UN mbrs accepted by Unified Command for service in the UN Campaign. Negotiations for provision of additional forces from UN mbrs will be handled at governmental level.

Operational Restrictions

9. Under no circumstances will your forces cross Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea.

10. In the conduct of naval operations care should be taken to keep well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR.

11. Aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory, including coastal waters, is authorized, up to Yalu River on west coast but short of Korean-Soviet international boundary on east coast. Aerial reconnaissance over coastal area of China to determine imminence of attack on Formosa is limited to areas south of 32nd parallel and north of Hong Kong.

12. There is no restriction on your employment of United States naval and air forces as between support of Korea and def of Formosa. Only United States forces will participate in operations relating to Formosa except with prior approval of JCS.

13. You are prohibited from attacking Rashin with air and naval forces.

14. In event of Chinese Communist air or sea attacks against United States forces outside Korea, principle of immediate retaliation on Chinese mainland is approved. However, subject to right of immediate self-defense, you will inform JCS of facts concerning the Chinese Communist attack and receive approval for retaliatory action prior to attacking targets on Chinese mainland.

Soviet Intervention

15. In event of open or covert employment of major Soviet units in Korea (including “Volunteers”) you will, subj to security of your forces, assume the defensive, make no move to aggravate situation, and report to JCS. This is not to be interpreted as a restriction on conduct of air and naval operations in Korea.

16. If Soviet Union announces in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea and gives warning either explicitly or implicitly that their forces should not be attacked, you will refer the matter immediately to JCS.

17. In event of an attempt to employ small Soviet units covertly in Korea you should continue your current action.

18. It is agreed in principle that, in event of Soviet attack against the FECOM, UN forces will be withdrawn from Korea and you should plan accordingly. Situation may require some immediate movements of your forces by air. Subj to this, however, and to immediate security of your forces both in Korea and in Japan you will initiate major withdrawal from Korea only upon instruction furnished you after receipt of info from you as to conditions obtaining. Pending further instructions, you should not plan for use of any UN forces other than those of United States, in defense of FECOM outside of Korea.

Psychological Warfare

19. You should make an intensive effort using all info media available to you to initiate and maintain a psychological offensive designed to support your mil mission.

Civil Affairs

20. In South Korea the provisions of WAR 85117, 6 Jul 50,³ as currently implemented in field remain applicable.

21. In North Korea provisions of JCS 95328, 29 Oct 50, as interpreted in WAR 95715, 2 Nov 50,⁴ remain applicable. The changing situation requires re-examination of this directive by Depts of State and Defense and the UN, and certain revisions may hereafter be necessary.

Logistic Support

22. You are authorized to send to Korea any munitions and supplies from sources at your disposal which you deem necessary. You will report your estimates of amounts and types of aid required from sources outside your control.

23. With respect to logistic support of foreign forces under your command, WAR 90576, 3 Sep 50⁵ will serve as your guidance.

Captured Matériel

24. You will be guided with respect to the acquisition, use, and ultimate disposal of enemy matériel captured in Korea by instructions by JCS contained in JCS 99193, 19 Dec 50, as amplified by JCS 2171/2, dated 6 April 51,⁵ fwdd to you by CSA on 24 Apr 51.

Prisoners of War

25. Handling of POWs will be in accordance with pertinent United States Army Regulations and International Conventions.

26. Consistent with provisions of Geneva Convention⁶ and other applicable regulations, you should initiate and maintain a comprehensive program for interrogation, indoctrination, and reorientation of POWs with a view toward their eventual utilization as avowed anti-Communists.

Censorship

27. While it is recognized that you do not have the facilities to impose complete censorship within your command, you are in a position to impose delays and news blackouts from time to time. Therefore, you are directed to impose a news blackout and impound pertinent communications immediately under your control in appropriate Korean areas whenever in your judgment necessity requires such action.

Armistice

28. In event Communist mil leaders request an Armistice in the field, you will immediately report that fact to JCS for instructions.

29. For your background info, views of JCS with respect to an Armistice are contained in a memo for Sec Def dated 27 Mar 51 (encl to JCS 1776/201) fwdd to you by CSA 4 Apr 51.⁷

Channels of Communication

30. Directive from Unified Command (United States Govt) will be transmitted to you through JCS. CSA will act as executive agent for JCS in these matters.

31. Requirement for rendering reports to the UN on operations of UN forces in Korea is contained in JCS 87422, 28 Jul 50.⁵

32. With regard to public policy statements your attention is invited to JCS 98134, 6 Dec 50.⁸

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 25 had approved the draft directive and had forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense recommending that he submit it to the President. Secretary of Defense Marshall, under a covering letter dated April 30, forwarded the directive to the President, who approved it. (JCS Files)
2. This message, dated April 5, 1951, had been sent by General MacArthur prior to his recall; for a summary of its contents, see Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 363. In general, it called for advance by U.N. forces, which had already entered North Korea, to the Kansas and Wyoming lines.
3. Not printed.
4. Neither printed; for a summary of their contents, see Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 221. For the text of the civil affairs directive for North Korea, see telegram 256, October 28, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, p. 1007.
5. Not printed.
5. Not printed.
6. The Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, dated August 12, 1949, entered into force for the United States on February 2, 1956; text in TIAS No. 3364; 6 UST (pt.3) 3316.
7. For the text of the March 27 memorandum, see the enclosure to the letter from Lovett to Acheson, March 31, p. 285.
5. Not printed.
8. Text in Hearings, p. 3536.